This volume is a great, concise analysis of the New Deal's political economy. Badger opens with a short account of the economic causes of the Great Depression, detailing problems with maintaining consumer demand sufficently to match the overwhelming productive capacities of the American economy. As this gap expanded and factories were forced to go idle, American businessmen followed a range of investment opportunities and incentives overseas (with the hope of helping European economies so they could pay off their World War I debts to Uncle Sam) at the expense of reinvesting in American businesses. Deflationary national and international monetary policies, combined with a worsening international economic situation (which hurt further the production potential of American business) sealed the fate of the American economy in the early 1930s.
Badger looks at the New Deal's response to this dark situation in several areas: industrial policy, labor relations, agrucultural politics, welfare policy and coalitional politics. In each of these areas, Badger emphasizes the constraints that Franklin Roosevelt faced in attempting systematic reform. At first, Roosevelt had to stress recovery over reform: in the dark, dark, days of the winter of 1932-33, people needed a sense that help was on the way immediately not a few months down the line. Later, when the economy at least stablized, he had to assess realistically his desire for economic restructuring and social justice (to the extent he possessed such intentions) against growing congressional conservatism, the power of localism in the administration of New Deal reforms (which usually worked to the benefit of local elites), and the belief of most working and middle class Americans in the American creed of individualism and laissez faire capitalism.
In sketching this, Badger seems to be most interested in countering critiques from the left concerning President Roosevelt and the New Deal. From the left, historians have argued that government and coporate leadership concocted the New Deal to save capitalism and inhibit the native radicalism of the American citizen confronted with the overwhelming catastrophe of the Great Depression. This cabal highjacked revolution and preserved capitalism.
Professor Badger agrees that Roosevelt saved capitalism, but he did so against the tooth and nail efforts of almost all capitalists in America, who did not appreciate FDR's efforts on their behalf. There was no cabal, just a lot of animosity between Roosevelt and industrialists. With a handful of enlightened exceptions (many of whom reaped big time benefits in World War II mobilization) capitalists were too shortsighted to engage in a plot to stave off revolution.
Badger's main critque of Roosevelt is that he should have embraced governmental spending -- Keynsianism -- on a systematic basis much earlier in the 1930s (he grudgingly accepted the eocnomic principles of Keynes only in 1938). This would have raised wages and thus increased demand. Had that happened earlier in the 1930s, Badger argues, Roosevelt could then have focused, if he wished, on the systematic reform of the American economy, and genuine social justice.
Regardless of how you feel about the correctness of Badger's analysis of Roosevelt's motivations and achievements, this is one of the best single volume treatments of the New Deal. It is an excellent case study of the political/historical constraints of politicians and policy makers in America, in the face of certain institutional and political cultural constraints.