This book might be thought of as a sort of companion piece or sequel to Wilfred Cantwell Smith's classic work "The Meaning and End of Religion". In this book professor Cavanaugh takes us on a philosophical and historical journey to show how our notion of what is and is not "religion" was constructed, providing examples such as the creation of "Hiduism". Cavenaugh argues in roughly the following manner:
There is no single objective "essence" to religion, and nor is there a consistent, universal practice to which this term might apply:
"...religion is not a transcultural reality. Masuzawa puts this conclusion bluntly: "This concept of religion as general, transcultural phenomenon, yet also as a distinct sphere in its own right... is patently groundless; it came from nowhere, and there is no credible way of demonstrating its factual and empirical substantiality." Those who go looking to spy religion in all places and times - as if it were a reality that is simply there before anyone develops a concept of it - are guaranteed to produce confusion or worse. Religion is originally a Western concept, and it only becomes a worldwide concept through - and in reaction to - Western influence." (P98-99)
The author concludes that so-called religions like Buddhism and Christianity have precious little in common, and what they do have in common can also be found in secular practices that are not defined as "religions" such as Marxism. Not only is there no reason to draw this distinction from a substantivist perspective, there's also no way to avoid these sorts of problems from a functionalist view. It's argued that, no matter which way you square it, the concept and definition of "religion" is arbitrary and contradictory, and certainly doesn't efer to any universal, transcultural practice. Cavanaugh provides us with this helpful and amusing elucidation of the problem of defining what is and is not religion:
"As William Arnal says, there might be a logical way of dividing the world's phenomena into things that are blue and things that are not blue, but it would not justify coming up with general theories of the nature of blueness or having Departments of Blue Studies in universities." (P105)
Having made the case that "Religion" is a Western construct, which has its origins in our Judeo-Christian culture, and which was then arbitrarily applied to other cultures in a way that distorted and misrepresented the authentic practices and beliefs of those very different cultures, the author then turns his attention to discovering how this was done, and for what reasons it was done in the way it was:
"Instead of searching [...] for the timeless essence of religion, therefore, let us ask why certain things are called religion under certain conditions. What configurations of power are authorized by changes in the way the concept of religion - and its counterpart, the secular - are used? What changes in practices correspond to changes in these concepts? Why deny that the natives have religion at first, then assign some of their practices to the category religion? Which practices become religion, and why? Why deny that Marxism is a religion? Why accept that Marxism is a religion but emphatically deny that U.S. nationalism is?" (P119)
The author argues that the discourse of religion was and is intimately linked to the legitimization of Western cultural and political dominance:
"...the discourse of religion has been used to provide a tool of comparison by which non-Western practices could be shown to be deficient when compared with Christianity and Western culture more generally. Perhaps most important, the discourse of religion was also a tool of secularization, the cordoning off of significant elements of non-Western cultures into a personal, apolitical realm of belief." (P100-101)
Cavanaugh goes on to write:
"The idea that there is a transcultural phenomenon called religion that has a dangerous tendency toward violence - and must therefore be domesticated - is not only a misdescription of reality. The idea itself should be interrogated for the kinds of power that it authorizes. The attempt to domesticate certain practices as religion, both at home and abroad, is not innocent of political use." (P101)
In short, Cavanaugh is arguing this: our arbitrary and misleading definition of religion as a universal, spiritual phenomenon, that can be easily misused to become a dangerous force, and which stands in opposition to reasonable and moderating secularism, serves as a means to justify the violence of the secular state and to marginalize or colonize other cultural traditions and practices. This is the eponymous myth of religious violence.
Let's be clear about what this book is and isn't though: this book is about the history and origin of an ideology, and provides a deconstruction of it. In that sense it stands in the tradition of Foucault's archaeology of knowledge, and like Foucault emphasises the role of power in the construction of understanding (though this author differs from Foucault in not jettisoning the idea of objective truth altogether). It is a radical, deconstructive thesis, rather than a conventional apologetic. One of the other reviewers on Amazon describes the book more or less accurately, but nonetheless accidentally gives the impression that this book is more like a standard apologetic or polemic against secularists. This book does, of course, include those polemical elements (especially towards the end), but it's also much more profound, challenging and controversial than that. I would recommend this book to anybody who's interested in examining our understanding of terms like "religion", and the way that these concepts have been applied so as to shape our understanding of the world.
Regardless of your own position on these issues, this book is a must-read.