The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality [Paperback]

Besides clearly explaining Popper's well-known positions on the distinction between scientific and non-scientific propositions, testing possibilities for falsifications of theories or piecemeal adaptations of social systems, this book constitutes the burial of the Frankfurter Schule (Adorno, Habermas, Horkheimer).
By the way, non-scientific propositions are not meaningless (e.g., music, literature, myths).
Science probably began with myths, superstitions and prejudices.

K.R. Popper rejects the myth of the framework, `the doctrine of the impossibility of mutual understanding between different cultures, generations or historical periods, even within science, even within physics.'
Critical reasoning and open discussions (`without killing any authors or burning books') should always be allowed and be the bacon of all our theories about and solutions of practical and theoretical problems. `Man has achieved the possibility of being critical of his own tentative trials, of his own theories.'

Frankfurter Schule
Popper torpedoes the Critical Theory of the Frankfurter Schule as follows: `Horkheimer rejects, without argument and in defiance of historical facts, the possibility of reforming our so-called `social system'. This amounts to saying: let the present generations suffer and perish - for all we can do is to expose the ugliness of the world we live in, and to heap insults on our oppressors, the bourgeoisie.'
He also lambastes the supreme influence of Hegelianism on German philosophy (`a tradition destructive of intelligence and critical thought'). He sides here with Marx who remarked that `in its mystifying form dialectics became the ruling German fashion.'

This book is a must read for all those interested in philosophy and, of course, for all 'critical' Popper fans.

Karl Popper (1902--1994) established a formidable reputation as a philosopher of science. His most famous principle is that a scientific theory must be capable of falsification on the basis of empirical observation. One cannot ever prove a theory is true (induction is defeasible), but a single aberrant observation can prove a theory false, Popper claimed. The world is full of people who deny Popper's insight for one reason or another. For instance, a logician might say, if theory p is falsified by observation o, then theory (not p) is verified by the single observation o. A defender of Popper might say that if p is a theory, then (not p) is not a theory at all, because theories must be expressed by universal quantification, or covering laws, or what have you. Similarly, a historian of science might claim that a single observation never led scientists to chuck a prized theory unless there was available and alternative theory that explained everything the old theory did, plus the new observation.

All this is very interesting to the philosopher, but for with limited tolerance for hair-splitting, Popper holds quite a different significance. Popper was the avowed and indefatigable enemy of Freudian psychology, Hegelian/Marxian philosophy and political theory, and other highly emotive and value-laden ideologies that appealed to True Believers but had no serious roots in the scientific method. If he were alive today, he would be launching his attacks on post-modernism, creationism, and other such drivel that has taken away the rationality of so many smart people in recent years. So, I Love Popper! I'm sure you will love Popper, too, unless you are among decorticate folk who believe that some ideas are just too precious to be subjected to empirical testing.

"I may be wrong and you may be right," says Popper, "and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth." (p. xii) Actually, if you really understand this assertion and can defend it, you don't really need this book. This says it all.

Popper's falsification approach is actually very well defended in the first essay in this little book of essays. Popper argues that science has a Darwinian dynamic. A scientific theory can reproduce itself from mind to mind and generation to generation, but anomalies in the theory reduce its "fitness" and random mutations in the theory (theoretical paradigm shifts and emendations) sometimes produce a less anomalous offspring which then replaces the earlier theory, and hence is akin to biological adaptation. It follows that scientific progress requires both close attention to the facts and the willingness of scientists to entertain "heretical" views.

"One of the components of modern irrationalism is relativism (the doctrine that truth is relative to our intellectual background, which is supposed to determine somehow the framework within which we are able to think)" says Popper in the second essay (p. 33). Relativism will always be attractive to many people because it affirms a radical tolerance of the views of others. However, in science relativism is a poison, because it leads people to leave off struggling over truth, and hence it renders scientific progress impossible. Popper fully understands that different intellectual frameworks make discursive interaction difficult, just as he understands that there are few bald "facts" that exist independent from a theoretical framework to interpret these facts. However, he notes by observing the history of science that inter-framework discourse and struggle has been constant and fruitful. "I am very ready to admit that a discussion among participants who do not share a common framework may be difficult [but]... a discussion between vastly different frameworks can be extremely fruitful." (p. 35)

Among the topics covered in these essays is Popper's perspective on the famous "positivism debate" between such rationalists as Karl Popper and the Frankfurt School of critical philosophy, which included Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Jürgen Habermas in the 1960's. Popper actually takes a "sociology of knowledge" approach to the critical theorists, observing that the Germans public is impressed by big words and complex-sounding arguments, even if they are trivial in content or make no sense at all. Popper treats Adorno as a peddler of platitudes and Horkheimer as a minor cultural critic. Moreover, he argues that the critical school's treatment of culture is arrogant and elitist, prejudice rather than insight. He says the same of Habermas, although I think Habermas has developed quite important ideas in recent decades. I think Popper's assessment of "critical theory" is right on the mark, and it is developed in this book in a highly cogent and entertaining manner. By the way, the idea that Popper is a positivist is quite ludicrous---consider, for instance, his strong critique of Francis Bacon's scientific methodology, which is also sketched in one of the book's essays.

Excellent, stimulating essays with some surprising and appealing ideas. Also some repetition and some dull essays. A very good book indeed. Popper was a maverick; his ideas will enrich your thinking even if you don't agree with them altogether.