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"Extraordinarily clear and well organised. Reading this book takes you right into the centre of the intense contemporary debate on moral theory. Smith knows exactly what he is doing, and slowly puts together a redoubtable argument for the broadly realist position he favours." Jonathan Dancy, University of Reading
"An intelligent, clear, and engaging book" Times Literary Supplement
"An outstanding and ambitious work, it serves at once as a lucid introduction to metaethics and a wide–ranging inquiry into some of its hardest problems." Brad Hooker, University of Reading
"A marvelous volume: it is not only an important contribution to philosophical ethics, but also an exciting introduction to the subject. The book is an excellent model of how to do philosophy, a model I hope students (and their teachers) will adopt for themselves." Gilbert Harman, Princeton University <!––end––>
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It is a common fact of everyday life that we appraise each others' behaviour and attitudes from the moral point of view. Read the first page
Concordance
Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index | Back Cover
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Plattitude 1: moral judgements have a truth value (objectivity of moral judgements). Plattitude 2: moral judgements consitute reasons for action (practicality of moral judgements). Plattitude 3: desires are constitutive of reasons for action (folk psychology).
1 and 2 entail that beliefs - states that have a truth value - constitute reasons for action, contrary to 3. 2 and 3 imply that moral judgements are (or express) desires - states that do not have a truth value - contrary to 1. 1 and 3 result in the conclusion that desires have truth values, contrary to 2 - as reasons for action are constituted by non-cognitive states, i.e. states without a truth value.
As will be clear to those familiar with contemporary meta-ethics, proposing a solution to this problem requires an analysis of rival solutions as given by for example expressivism, cognitivism, and error theory. Smith gives such an analysis and forcefully argues that these solutions are flawed. His own solution starts by pointing out that - although plattitude 3 is indeed a plattitude and should be retained - it is not the whole story about human motivation. If you want to find out more about these issues, this is the book to read.
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