Who said that woman doesn't exist? Before becoming one of Lacan's favorite aphorisms--along with "there is no sexual relationship"--, this denial of woman's existence was pronounced by a minor Austrian philosopher in the beginning of the twentieth century. Born in Vienna in 1880, Otto Weininger died young: he committed suicide at the age of 23, not before publishing his maiden work, Sex and Character, in 1903. This essay, and the dramatic death of its author, had an impact on Viennese circles around that date: Ludwig Wittgenstein held the book in high esteem, and it may have inspired other Viennese luminaries.
But the truth of the matter is that Sex and Character was a misogynistic and antisemitic tract. For Weininger, woman was entirely dominated by sexuality: "Woman is only and thoroughly sexual, since her sexuality extends to her entire body and is in certain places, to put it in physical terms, only more dense than in others." Woman lives only for sex: "The idea of pairing is the only conception that has positive worth for women." The female life is consumed with the sexual function: both with the act, as a prostitute, and the product, as a mother. By contrast, the duty of the male, or the masculine aspect of personality, is to strive to become a genius, and to forego sexuality for an abstract love of the absolute, God, which he finds within himself.
Why does Zizek reproduce this sexist babble? What need is there to unearth this case of fin-de-siècle anti-feminism? The reason is that, for Zizek, there is no better way to conceal a crime than to confess it right away. Zizek specializes in borderline statements and outright provocations. His readiness to discuss anti-Jews propaganda, or violence against women, should not be read as an endorsement of hate speech. But neither does he denounce it, or rejects it right away. Rather, by the elusive character of his politics, by the undecidability as to where he actually stands, he compels us to take position, and to decide upon our own values. Understanding Zizek is to reject him, and the reader should follow his admonition to throw the baby with the bathwater.
For Zizek, this is all for a good cause: his aim is to "rescue for progressive thought authors who are usually dismissed as hopeless reactionaries"--Weininger of course, but Hegel and even Lacan could be added to the list. He does so by practicing a kind of intellectual jujitsu: when you want to put down an adversary, you stick close to him and use his own force to send him to the ground. Zizek never contradicts an author: he brings him to his point of absurdity, where Kant meets with Sade in his call for a genuinely ethical act, and where Hegel's dialectic runs in a purely negative mode, without any hope of sublation.
Alas, the progressive thought Zizek is out to rescue is a pitiful mixture of Marx and Freud, of Althusser and Lacan, that might have been in fashion in the seventies, but that has lost whatever contact with reality it ever had. Where Zizek reconnects with reality, and pitches the interest of his reader, is with his references to popular culture and Hollywood movies. They are relatively few in this book, which is quite highbrow and loaded with heavy philosophical discussions. But Zizek reveals his proprietary trademark when he confesses, in the self-interview that closes the book: "I am convinced of my proper grasp of some Lacanian concept only when I can translate it successfully into the inherent imbecility of popular culture."
Zizek also gets it right when he underscores the changes in the figure of authority in contemporary society. The modern father, or the political leader, is no longer the towering figure ordering us to do right and to follow the Law: it is the Master of Enjoyment who invites us to trespass law and bend rules, thereby obstructing our very access to transgression and pleasure. The Ego Ideal turns into the superego and reveals the obscene 'nightly' law that necessarily redoubles and accompanies, as its shadow, the 'public' Law. This unwritten code is meant to be kept hidden: in public, everybody pretends to know nothing about it, or even actively denies its existence. Its function is to sustain the Law and to hold the community together: solidarity-in-guilt is induced by participation in a common transgression. Identification with community is ultimately based upon some shared lie or disavowal of a founding crime. In Andersen's tale, of course everybody knew that the emperor was naked, yet it was precisely the denial of this fact that held the subjects together.
What is new in contemporary society is that this shared lie is now made public: state authorities recognize using torture and other illegal means to reach their aims; greed is turned into a virtue by unfettered money-makers; and people no longer hide when they violate common decency or morality. The secret law becomes the official rule, and the legitimate law is denied as ineffective or out-fashioned. In today's epoch, a state power, or a political leader, can proudly admit to its dark side, advertising the fact that it is discreetly doing dirty things it is better for us not to know about. The emperor can rule as long as his subjects feign to acknowledge that he has clothes on: but when he goes around naked and boasts about it, the kingdom is in peril.