West and Smith have delivered perhaps the definitive embedded report account of Gulf War II. Like Mark Bowden's seminal "Black Hawk Down," "The March Up" will go down as a classic account of modern warfare.
Unlike other "embed" reporters, West and Smith are not journalists but retired U.S. Marine officers with service in Vietnam. West served in the Defense Department under the Ford and Reagan Administrations. West is highly decorated retired general and commanded Marine forces in Grenada in 1983. West and Smith were able to attach themselves to a Marine public affairs effort with the 1st Marine Division--a unit both men were veterans of. West does the writing in this book, relating the experiences that both he and Smith witnessed.
Because of their semi-official brief and Marine service, West and Smith were able to move amongst many units in the division--unlike other embeds who stayed with one or two battalions the entire war. West and Smith thus smoothly experience the war from the level of the Private First Class to the two-star general running the division. Unlike some of the embeds, West and Smith sometimes were actually in the midst of real combat on the front lines, and were themselves under fire on several occasions.
As the cliche goes, there are no ex-Marines, and it's clear early in the account that West and Smith a vested stake with the Marines not like that of ordinary journalists. West's son was serving with the 1st Force Recon Company and Smith acts at times like the general he was. Marines ask both men for their insights and even when not solicited, the Marine commanders often listen to both men.
The 1st Marine Division, comprised of three regimental combat teams (RCTs), jumped off from Kuwait in late March 2003 and ended up carrying out the longest land advance in Marine Corps history for over 200 years. Iraqi Freedom was an unusual war for the Marine Corps in that much of the advance was done by vehicles, with infantrymen only disgorging to take or clear a particular complex of buildings or confront Fedayeen or Iraqi Army forces that try to attack their progress along the roads and trackways. Because of the political imperative for speed, the Marines had little choice but drive in such exposed columns but overwhelming firepower--both air and land--and near incompetent and suicide resistance by the Iraqis meant the Marines could operate in this manner.
Acquiring a captured yellow Nissan Pathfinder, West and Smith follow along with the massed Marine columns of Abrams tanks, amphibious tractors (Amtracs), and Humvee vehicles. With excellent rapport amongst the division's officers, West and Smith are usually able to find out where the most interesting action is and get there to be on scene either during or just after.
Still, the campaign was not bloodless for the Marines and West relates the deaths of Marines he witnessed or was later told about. Sometimes, these deaths hit home as Marines that he knew previously are killed. Though the number of 1st Marine Division dead was comparatively small, West's account reminds us all that war is not a painless endeavor and even one death can have a cascading effect on many others.
The book shifts focus smoothly and seemlessly. One moment West writes about a Marine fire team given the task of seizing an important oil pumping station before Iraqi forces can create an economic disaster. Later, the book focuses on the ridiculous Western media defeatism that followed setbacks in Nasiriyah (when Jessica Lynch's convoy was ambushed) and Najaf by making the excellent point that the Marines needed no pause, and unlike their Army brethren, were used to operating with bare-bone logistics. West even weaves in the history of the Marine Corps' doctrine from Vietnam to the present. But never is any discussion so lengthy that the reader feels bogged down. "The March Up" should keep the interest of both casual readers and hardened military historians.
Though the authors obviously support the war, they do not shy away from criticism of certain aspects of the campaign. Sometimes they even make plain their criticism to other Marines they are journeying with. West does not likes the policy of shooting at civilian vehicles that do not respect Marine challenges—but he admits that he didn’t have a better policy for preventing suicide bombers. In one controversial part of the book, West writes of his complete disgust when a foreign officer (the country is not mentioned) on exchange to the Marine Corps opens fire with a LAV-25's 25mm cannon, cutting down two Iraqis who did not seem to be combatants.
The book successfully gives an insight into the personalities of the Marines at all levels. West writes of Marine generals and colonels who constantly keep themselves engrossed in all details of the campaign. Then there are the infantrymen who constantly feel chagrined that the Marine Abrams tanks are "getting all the kills" of Iraqis who challenge the vehicle columns. This pent up desire to slay the enemy finally releases itself in an awesome display of infantry movement and firepower at Baghdad University. New York Times and Guardian readers will surely be horrified at the Marines’ attitudes but the account rings true. Professional American Marines, while not warmongers, feel like athletes who train constantly but never get into the big game. For many of the Marine infantry, the march to Baghdad was their big game and they wanted to get into it to prove what they could do.
As time goes on, later embedded reporter accounts will benefit from the passage of time and the declassification of records. But it's hard to see anyone surpassing this book. For anyone wanting to gain an insight into modern warfare and into one of the world's most elite fighting forces, buy this book immediately and select the quickest shipping option possible. This book is absolutely mandatory reading.