Dick, Lord Taverne, Liberal-Democrat peer but former barrister and Labour minister, makes a case that the scientific method be accorded qualitatively greater respect than various "pseudo-sciences". He documents how people in the UK in particular, and in the West in general, have come to regard science with suspicion and distrust whereas until just fifty years ago it was seen positively (but perhaps rather too uncritically) as a source of further developments that would make the world a better place.
He deals initially with three specific examples: alternative medicines (mostly snake oil, at best placebos), organic farming (not as good for the world as you might think) and GM crops (a development that could already have made a massive positive impact in the third world in particular, with no negative side effects that any respectable scientists have been able to demonstrate).
He then moves on to look at some themes of anti-science. Eco-fundamentalism is a catch-all for those who oppose scientific developments but do not use the scientific method. He characterises them as having closed minds: Lord Melchett, Director of Greenpeace, he quotes as an example, having said that he would oppose GM crops "permanently, definitely and completely" irrespective of any new evidence about them. He points out the similarity of this approach and fundamental religious beliefs. He exposes the "Precautionary Principle" espoused by many eco-fundamentalists (and several others) as a precept that might be used to justify our stopping scientific progress altogether.
Like Taverne, I am not a scientist, but also like him I understand and admire the scientific principle. A scientist posits a theory (often based on experimental work); his peers seek to disprove that theory. No scientific theory can be proven, "proof" in this context really amounting only to not having been dis-proven for quite a time. "Peer review" is of course a feature of non-scientific academia as well, but in science theories can be very conclusively disproven in a way that is often not possible in social sciences and the humanities. It is in theory, at least, more rigorous. Taverne points out that the "facts" used by eco-fundamentalists have often been used without any peer review, and continue to be bandied about even after then have been conclusively disproved by the scientific community. He cites the case of Dr Arpad Pusztai whose allegation that GM potatoes were demonstrably unhealthy led to talk of "Frankenfoods" and was significant in bringing about an effective end to GM development in Europe. Having been used indiscriminately by journalists in pursuit of a good story, the same journalists were (un)surprisingly silent when the good doctor was rejected by the scientific community. Would that journalists would make the effort to understand the difference between peer reviewed and other papers, and would reflect that in their writing. The problem, of course, is this would in many cases make for less arresting headlines!
Taverne's style is one of gentle polemic - gentler certainly than Dawkins, similar perhaps to Lomborg, both of whom he clearly admires. My own approach was, I admit, already very much in tune with Taverne's in the first place, but he has succeeded in shaking me out of complacency in having accepted some of these untruths. Whereas, for example, I would have taken the view that while GM foods might have certain advantages, it was indeed fair to ban them according to a precautionary principle. I realise now that the consequence of that ban is that many people in the third world, who might already be benefiting from GM crops, are still living more impoverished, less healthy lives than they would if certain GM crops had been developed, and we in Europe had not closed our minds to buying them.
If I have a criticism, it is this. He overdoes the extent to which scientists are always genuinely neutral in the pursuit of greater understanding. All too often, sadly, scientists become victims of their own preconceptions and prejudices, and their science a crusade to prove their old argument right in the face of mounting evidence that they are wrong. Equally, all too human social networks and obligations undermine peer review and honest criticism. Group think sets in: see Booker & North (2007) "Scared to Death". While Taverne reminds us that the scientific method is a powerful tool in the quest for knowledge, he does rather give the impression that scientists are, per se, above ordinary human failings, and sadly that is not also the case.