The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French defeat in Vietnam (Cassell Military Paperbacks) [Paperback]

The author takes the time to explain the military and political settings of the war in Indo China, offers detailed accounts of the opposing forces and commanders and provides a well researched narrative of the events leading up to this battle. The story of the battle itself for Dien Bien Phu is a classic military narrative that really pulls the reader into the story and gives us a rare insight into the hardships of the French soldier and his enemy.

One quote in the book that was used for a chapter heading by Colonel de Castries says a lot about this battle and the terrible fighting involved; "It's a bit like Verdun, but Verdun without the depth of defence, and, above all, without the Sacred Way". This is an excellent account of a shocking battle and I am sure that anyone who enjoys reading or studying military history will find this book an excellent addition to his or her library.

In over 657 pages of text (HB version), along with 22 maps of varying size and detail the author offers the reader a well researched and well presented account of this famous battle. At no time did I find the story boring or bogged down in detail. The narrative is fast paced, exciting and filled with human tragedy and numerous stories of soldier?s courage in the face of horrendous conditions.

In closing this is what Max Hastings had to say about this book: "This is an outstanding work of military history. It tells the story of the ghastly French experience in Indo-China in a way that has never been done before in English. The account of Dien Bien Phu is a masterpiece of meticulous historical narrative."

The noise, sights and smells of the battle jump from the pages. Beautifully paced, Martin Windrow is fair and even-handed to all participants. He clearly states where there are conflicting accounts and carefully explains the sources and logic of his own views.

While the losses on the French side (of which many were non French legionnaires and locally recruited Vietnamese and hill-tribe troops) were appalling to the modern reader, the losses of the Vietnamese communist troops were very much worse. Windrow makes clear that crude WW1 type "human wave" tactics used by the Vietnamese units under General Giap almost won, or, at least, extended the battle for the French. (To be fair to Giap, who was receiving Chinese advice, the Chinese had also used the same bloody tactics in Korea - but Giap did not have the huge numbers of replacement soldiers that the Chinese could rely upon). Even with Chinese support, General Giap was expending soldiers, equipment and ammunition at a rate the Vietnamese recruitment, training and logistics could barely match. General Giap may have won the battle, but it was at a huge and painful cost to the fledgling Vietnamese army.

Giap meanwhile learned many lessons and went on to hone his military skills against the might of the USA. The Americans also studied Dien Ben Phu, but erroneously concluded that it was only a matter of logistics and matériel that had lost the battle for the French. This fails to identify the importance of both the willingness of the army to fight, and the willingness of the battling nation to accept the financial costs and human losses. In the end the Vietnamese had a greater supply of these vital attributes than the French, and eventually the Americans.

Martin Windrow shows the core of this Vietnamese strength, and identifies piece by piece the comparative weaknesses and mistakes of the French which eventually caused them to surrender.

The implications of the book suggests that if France had planned for and managed better air supply, bombing and ground support operations from the start (possibly with better planned support from the USA), the outcome in this single battle might possibly have being different, but Windrow also shows that whether this would have made any difference to Vietnam in the long term is very doubtful. He shows that the Vietnamese were always prepared for a very long war, and by 1954 the French public were already sick of the military losses and the expense of fighting the war.

The French Army were also convinced that simple lack of political will lost them both the battle and the war. As later in Algeria, the cry went up: "We were betrayed".

An excellent piece of historical research and analysis. Well worth buying.