I found this book to be concise and convincing. It would be hard to find a fault with it. It is too easy to associate Keynes with only tax and spend policies, but this book effectively highlights the other areas of economics Keynes stressed, many of which have proved very relevant to recent events.
The first of these areas Keynes emphasised was the "neutral money axiom"/ liquidity preference. The argument is that free market economists fail to understand how people can choose to hold liquid money as a reaction to uncertainty, instead of investing which would be the rational free market assumption.
Secondly I found the discussion of the whole area of "market makers" very interesting and new to me. In my own personal free market type ignorance, I have never before appreciated exactly how financial markets benefit from liquidity and how this liquidity is not inherent, but has to be generated by organisations pro-actively willing to buy when the herd is selling, and sell when the herd is buying. The desirability of market makers and the liquidity they bring highlight another angle from which to observe the weakness and folly of many of the new hybrid financial products which played their toxic role in the recent troubles. Many of these new securitised investment products were sold as being very stable and very liquid. When the troubles came to these markets, many investors quickly learnt otherwise.
Thirdly the "ergodic axiom" (calculating future probabilities based on past data). More broadly this is the fallacy of confusing probabilistic risk which can be pooled, managed and tamed, with uncertainty which should be treated with more caution. From this book it is easy to assume Keynes would have also seen the inherent dangers of complex finacial products and practises, and the idiocy of institutions believing they had quantified the risks they were exposed to, when it was really unquantifiable uncertainty, which we are now all paying for. Keynes would also have recognised the delusional self congratulation of organisations employing ex-rocket scientists to design and manage their exposure to financial risk, when they really did not have a clue as to what was around the corner.
Also I thought I had little more to hear regarding critiques of free trade policies, but Davidson managed to include a few more gems. For example he explains in accessible language that the full benefits of comparative advantage assumes full employment in both countries in order for their to be reciprocating exports and imports, and also the theory assumes that the extra goods generated automatically are demanded and do not cause excess capacity.
But on a cautious note, much is made in this book and by other left orientated economists about the WWII spending of the US finally ending the last great depression. But consider America's position after WWII, finding itself one of the few undamaged industrialised countries remaining. Most of its old competition in Europe had reduced its capacity for manufacturing consumer goods, and Japan was in poor shape also. Of course America was going to enjoy a prosperous decade, its industrial capacity was experiencing high demand and scarce supply. Presently with an industrialising China and India, can America really have the same confidence that it can pay off a large Keynesian government debt over the next few decades? I would rather be 1950's America with any amount of debt, than today's America suffering from out-sourcing and off-shoring.
Also the proposition Davidson makes regarding not importing from countries with lower child labour / environmental / health and safety standards sounds simple enough, but it would open the way for endless complexity and subjective gaming by domestic interests. I advocate protectionism more strongly than anyone, but would be wary of a subjective basis for it such as described in this book.
A big strength of this book is that it identifies the correct target head on regarding America's problems: being the trade deficit with China and co, and the loss of jobs resulting. Davidson proposes a clearing house kind of international exchange system which would put the onus on creditor (export surplus) countries to reciprocate their stored up demand (export earnings), instead of saving it as presently is happening too much. A central part of Keynesian analysis was the way savings reduce aggregate demand, and on an international scale, this is now the issue. This question of China not importing as much as it exports is THE biggest question in world economics presently, and Davidson must be commended for proposing a plan which squarely tackles this issue. I am not able to fully comprehend or judge how good a plan it is, but I greatly respect the fact that he has one. Excellent read.