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In this far-ranging history, Avi Shlaim analyses that question in remarkable detail, tracing the shifting policies of Israel toward the Palestinians and the Arab world at large. Herzl, he writes, followed a policy that consciously sought to enlist the great powers--principally Britain and later the United States--while dismissing indigenous claims to sovereignty; after all, Herzl argued, "the Arab problem paled in significance compared with the Jewish problem because the Arabs had vast spaces outside Palestine, whereas for the Jews, who were being persecuted in Europe, Palestine constituted the only possible haven". This policy later changed to a stance of confrontation against the admittedly hostile surrounding Arab powers, especially Syria, Jordan and Egypt; this militant stance was a source of controversy in the international community, and it also divided Israelis into hawk and dove factions. The intransigence of those hawks, Shlaim shows, served to alienate Israel and made it possible for the Palestine Liberation Organisation and other Arab nationalist groups to enlist the support of the great powers that Herzl had long before courted. Both sides, in turn, had eventually to face the "historic compromise" that led to the present peace in the Middle East--a peace that, the author suggests, may not endure. --Gregory McNamee
In this far-ranging history, Avi Shlaim analyses that question in remarkable detail, tracing the shifting policies of Israel toward the Palestinians and the Arab world at large. Herzl, he writes, followed a policy that consciously sought to enlist the great powers--principally Britain and later the United States--while dismissing indigenous claims to sovereignty; after all, Herzl argued, "the Arab problem paled in significance compared with the Jewish problem because the Arabs had vast spaces outside Palestine, whereas for the Jews, who were being persecuted in Europe, Palestine constituted the only possible haven." This policy later changed to a stance of confrontation against the admittedly hostile surrounding Arab powers, especially Syria, Jordan and Egypt; this militant stance was a source of controversy in the international community, and it also divided Israelis into hawk and dove factions. The intransigence of those hawks, Shlaim shows, served to alienate Israel and made it possible for the Palestine Liberation Organisation and other Arab nationalist groups to enlist the support of the great powers that Herzl had long before courted. Both sides, in turn, had eventually to face the "historic compromise" that led to the present peace in the Middle East--a peace that, the author suggests, may not endure. --Gregory McNamee --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
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He gives a sound, comprehensive analysis of the creation of the state of Israel within a historic and political context. But he goes further than that. He presents his views and criticises where necessary both the Israelite politicians and the state.
The use of language is understandable and simple. This enables the reader to focus on the content rather than the unneccessary long/complicated language used by many historians.
I recommend this book strongly to anyone who wants to find out more about Israel and the Arab World. Edward W. Said was absolutely right in saying that this book is a:
"A milestone in modern scholorship of the Middle East"
He couldnt have got it more right than this!!!
However, where I would dissent from other reviewers is that I found the book's momentum became bogged down in the second half in a thicket of irrelevant detail. Every single diplomatic initiative and exchange, great and small, is described exhaustively. The most insignificant aspects of meetings are noted e.g. chapter 11 even describes the dining arrangements at a meeting attended by King Hussein of Jordan and Shimon Peres, and who did the washing up!. The upshot of all this pointless and tiresome clutter is that Schlaim's promised central narrative - the destructive consequences of the 'iron wall' doctrine of revisionist Zionism - gets lost along the way. This fine work of scholarship clearly would have benefited from improved editing. With footnotes it runs to over 640 pages.
Another major problem with the book is that its narrow diplomatic focus makes the Palestinians as 'a people', largely invisible players. Readers wanting a more rounded socio-economic approach, or one which deals with political events 'on the ground' would be advised to look to Edward Said, Ilan Pappe, Noam Chomsky or Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal's work.
a fair minded informative book thats cuts through the fog of the propaganda of all sides to the conflict
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