Glendinning's The Idea of Continental Philosophy is, to be blunt, the best work of "continental" metaphilosophy (particularly that concerning the purported analytic-continental divide) I have read in a long time, in terms of year of publication probably the best since Deleuze and Guattari's What Is Philosophy?. Glendinning is probably most famous for his so-called "skepticism" or "deflationism" concerning the analytic-continental divide, a view of his work that I had inherited from other major works in the same area (such as Chase and Reynolds' Analytic Versus Continental: Arguments on the Methods and Value of Philosophy).
However, such a view is an oversimplication, as Glendinning's treatment is extremely nuanced and perceptive. He does not crudely dismiss the divide as some kind of fantasy, but instead argues that there is no such thing as "Continental philosophy" in terms of a shared tradition in philosophy. In a particularly insightful move, Glendinning points out that all the attempts to provide some account of "Continental philosophy" as even a loosely-related philosophical tradition make some of the canonical "Continental" authors far more similar to certain canonical "analytic" philosophers than to other purported "Continentals!" (the example of Oxford Ordinary Language Philosophy and Phenomenology is illustrative). Rather "Continental philosophy" is a concept "internal" to "analytic" philosophy, a free-floating phantom of what philosophy should not be. In this way, "analytic" philosophy conceptualizes itself heavily in terms of what it isn't, a tendency that Glendinning traces to the desire to be free of the risk of being that which all philosophy risks being - "sophistry and illusion." By setting up the "Other" of "Continental philosophy" as "that which we don't do around here," analytic philosophy is able to maintain an image of itself as philosophically healthy. To the extent that philosophers in Anglophone academia self-identify as "Continental" philosophers, this is in response to the practical constraints (consciously or not) created by this othering.
Glendinning also engages with several other metaphilosophical accounts of the divide presented by other current "Continentalists," with his most constant point of reference being Simon Critchley's Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction, which despite its title is really more an extended metaphilosophical reflection presented in a highly readable fashion than a real "introduction," but also with thinkers like Robert Pippin (who famously provided a Hegelian account of the divide in Modernism as a Philosophical Problem: On the Dissatisfactions of European High Culture). Whilst finding much of value in these various competing accounts, Glendinning ultimately accuses them of "chickening out," of not biting the proverbial bullet of there being no "Continental philosophy" and providing some very flimsy argument for some kind of methodological or thematic unity that is not in keeping with the rest of their analysis.
I cannot recommend this (short) book highly enough, and it should be a mandatory reference point for anyone interested in metaphilosophy, whether self-proclaimed "analytic" or "Continental." It was so good that I read it in one sitting, and then read it again over the next few days to check the references and such!
EXTRA: On a semi-related note, for those interested, the best metaphilosophical account of analytic philosophy "internal" to the tradition is in my opinion to be found in What is Analytic Philosophy? by Hans-Johann Glock, whose books on Wittgenstein I also have the utmost respect for and are always some of my first references when engaging with Ludwig.