The Hitler-Hess Deception [Paperback]

He had left Germany in May, 1941, under mysterious circumstances, and was held essentially incommunicado ever after. At that time, the Nazis had instituted a number of antisemitic laws, they had instigated or at least tolerated a pogrom, and were following an expansionist and aggressive policy, but with some hindsight, one wonders why this man had to be shut up for the rest of his life, whereas other figures among Hitler's close associates who had played a more active role for a much longer time, were released from jail after a number of years that appear reasonable under normal legal aspects.

The author has gathered together the shreds of evidence that remained after the British in 1945 had collected and destroyed whatever pertinent files they were able to put their hands on and „neutralized" undesirable witnesses. He shows that the „Hess incident" - Hess' solo flight to Scotland in May, 1941, a month before Germany attacked the Soviet Union - was not at all the feat of a madman decided on at the spur of the moment that it was later made to appear by both the British and the German side. Even (nay, particularly!) Hitler's deputy could not just get into his personal Messerschmitt 110 and take off for the 1000 mile flight to Prestwick without major technical and logistic preparations in Germany, along the way, and at the other end.

The book explains that the flight as such was the result of a sting operation devised by Britain's Strategic Operations staff, aimed at making Hitler believe that the British government could be toppled, peace could be made in the West, and the Germans would be able to affront the Soviets without having to worry about their western flank.

According to Allen, in the year prior to Hess' flight, there had been numerous contacts, mainly in (neutral) Spain and Switzerland, between British representatives and German politicians and intellectuals. The talks in Scotland were to be, as it were, the touchstone of the matter. As time was getting short for the Germans, Hess convinced Hitler that the German delegate should not be a mere emissary acting under orders but a political figure able to take decisions on the spot - Rudolf Hess.

In the end, it makes little difference whether the British were thrown into complete disarray, as Allen asserts, when unexpectedly Hess turned up, or whether a lower-grade delegate would have been able to fly safely back to Germany and report. The British sting operation was effective enough in getting Hitler to continue with his preparations for the war against the Soviet Union and thus remove pressure from Britain. To what extent the British actively encouraged the Germans in their plans, or whether or not they went so far as to promise support cannot be ascertained at the present time - whatever British files still exist seem to be under lock and key for another dozen years or so. Russian sources, on the other hand, may be provide some answers at an earlier date.

What is frightening about the events Allen describes is the apparent lack of scruple with which the British government went about setting the two dictatorships up against each other. The outcome of this duel was not at all certain, for if weather conditions in late 1941 had been just a little more favorable for the German side, the Soviet empire might well have toppled and Britain would then have had to face a Germany extending from the Channel coast to the Urals. This unpleasant but entirely possible risk for Britain is begging the question to what extent Churchill, in order to forestall such a potentially horrifying scenario, did not somehow play a double game by keeping the Soviets informed, and assured of future Allied aid.

Some American, quite a few Russian, and a couple of German historians have recently argued that Stalin, in 1941, was himself preparing to attack Germany. Considering the recent revelations by Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin on the activities of the „Cambridge Five", it is entirely conceivable that, officially or unofficially, British sources kept Stalin informed of the negotiations. For a man like Stalin whose distrust was legendary, the obvious reaction would have been to prepare against a German attack, possibly by a pre-emptive strike. It is significant that at the time of the sting operation, Anthony Blunt, a member of the Cambridge Five, occupied a key position within MI5; after the war, he was to be involved in the cover-up operations in Germany.

Regardless of who, Stalin or Hitler, would eventually win that confrontation, the only thing that was certain, even in 1941, is that such a war would spell the end of freedom for most of the still independent states in Central and Eastern Europe. The only foreseeable difference would have been that, under Soviet rule, the Slavic states might fare slightly better, whereas countries like Hungary or Romania would have found Hitler somewhat more accomodating. In any case, the fate of the lands in question should have been clear to the Western world when the Germans discovered, in 1943, the graves of thousands of Polish officers murdered by the Soviets at Katyn two years earlier. However, by then it was too late, the Western powers preferred not to take too close a look at the implications, and chose to abandon those countries to the Soviets for the next half century.