The High-Beta Rich: How the Manic Wealthy Will Take Us to the Next Boom, Bubble, and Bust: How the Maniac Wealthy Will Take Us to the Next Boom, Bubble, and Bust [Hardcover]

This is an excellent book about a little known subject: Plutonomy. The Plutonomy theory was advanced in 2005 by three Citigroup stock analysts, including Ajay Kapur mentioned in the book. Their research report was called "Plutonomy: Buying Luxury, Explaining Global Imbalances." This theory was so controversial that Citigroup removed it from its website. The main point is that the rich (typically defined as the top 1% of earners) control a very large and rising share of national consumer spending. Mark Zandi, the chief economist for Moody's Analytics uncovered that the top 5% of American earners account for 37% of consumer spending (up from 25% in 1990). This same group has also the lowest savings rate at 1.4% vs 8% for the rest of Americans. Therefore, their spending habits have a disproportionate impact on the overall economy including our savings rate and related Current Account Deficit.

Robert Frank advances the Plutonomy theory further by tying Ajay Kapur's work with the working paper of two Northwestern University economists, Jonathan A. Parker and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen titled "The Increase in Income Cyclicality of High-Income Households..." Fusing those two works, Robert Frank states that since 1982 the rich have become risk takers and gamblers. This is because starting in 1982 government policies have favored risk taking by lowering interest rates, inflation, and taxes, and deregulating the financial markets. The combination of those policies contributed to an excessive extension of real estate credit and a succession of real estate and stock market bubbles caused in part by the High-Beta Rich exploiting the mentioned government policies.

One of the most powerful insights from this book is that the High-Beta Rich are very vulnerable and associated with a rapid turnover among their ranks. Among the top 1% of American earners (income > $380,000), only half made the cut more than once over a ten-year period (pg. 217). Frank also shows two charts early in the book that compare the gains and losses in income of the top 1% in the U.S. vs all taxpayers. Before 1982, the fate of both groups was similar. Then, after 1982 the two groups diverged radically. Whether up or down, the changes for the top 1% became a high multiple vs the norm. The top 1% boosted their income a lot more during expansions. But, their loss was also far greater during contractions. This is because the High-Beta Rich have a surprisingly low savings rate and are very leveraged. Their leverage does multiply both their gains and their losses. The mentioned economists uncovered that before 1982, the top 1% had a Beta of less than 1 (meaning they took less risk than the general population and their fortune was less volatile). But, after 1982 their Beta jumped to between 2 and 3 as they took on far more risk than the general population. Their high Beta is due to a greater concentration of their wealth in volatile assets such as stocks and real estate and a greater leverage.

The High-Beta Rich volatile income causes chronic Budget Deficits at all levels. In California the top 1% of earners were paying 41% of taxes during the dot.com boom in the late 90s. Capital gains taxes accounted for a large share of tax receipts. When the dot.com Bubble burst California tax revenues tanked and it experienced chronic State Budget deficit crises in the early 2000s. However, by 2007 the top 1% of earners were accounting for an even greater share of CA State tax receipts at 48% (nearly half!). This was due to a recovery in the stock market (capital gains tax) and the housing boom (property tax). The ensuing financial crisis caused the rich income to drop by three times as much as the general population (Beta of 3). By 2011 California tax revenues cratered associated with a $26 billion budget hole. The same is true for New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut with many High-Beta Rich. It is true at the Federal level as the top 1% earners pay more than 38% of federal income taxes.

Frank states that the financial behavior of the High-Beta Rich contributes to exacerbating business cycles with more bubbles and ensuing crashes of greater magnitude and greater frequency than otherwise. Large concentration of wealth may be both a cause and effect of bubbles. Speculative asset bubbles correspond to periods of highest inequality. By 2007, the US top 1% controlled 34% of the nation's residential real estate. Between 1989 and 2007, they increased their relative exposure to real estate by 50% by quadrupling their mortgage debt level over the same period.

If you want to further study the impact of deleveraging, the best book on the subject is Irving Fisher The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions. Originally published in 1933, it also better explains the current financial crisis than most current books.

"The smell of espresso and freshly basked croissants fills the private-jet terminal of Orlando Sanford International Airport." This visual detail makes Robert Frank's writing vivid and convincing. He goes on to describe how a Repo Man and his partner recover assets from the rich. Amazing skills they have to pick up private jets and luxury yachts that have fallen into the hands of creditors.
The stories are scary - a reminder of how easily fortunes are made and lost. The book is peppered with quotations, statistics and charts. "In 2007,..., the richest 1% of Americans held more than $3.5 trillion in residential real estate, or about 34% if the nation's total." The author highlights the spending differences between rich and poor Americans. The top 1% earn 20% of the US's income and pay 38% of federal income taxes.

A particularly sad story is the demise of stores in the Rocky Mountain resort of Aspen and the corresponding drop in house prices. From a small town, the author moves to the state of California. The analysis of state income follies and overspent budgets is shallow, but highly readable.

Finally the author gives some ideas for surviving in highly volatile stock markets. He encourages savings and rainy day funds.

This books dire warnings and heartbreaking examples should be read by all who want to avoid a financial catastrophe. Thorough research and clear writing makes this a great book for anyone interested in wealth, from butlers to billionaires.

Robert Frank is a good journalist. He knows how to write a sentence and manages to get people to open up and say things they probably shouldn't say. Frank has found a few colorful people who made a ton of money and lost it all in the 2008 crash to open up the doors of their half built mansions and rundown pickups and tell their life stories. These are engaging individuals and Frank mines their stories well. These people were all hard workers who benefited from the real estate boom in the 1980s to 2000s before their wealth went poof.

Where Frank comes up short is in his attempts to tie these personal stories to his thesis that the wealthy today are far less risk averse in their investing than those in the past. They are "high-beta" rich, making more money during boom years and losing more money during recessions. His examples don't come from a broad swath of the wealthy. All of them are real-estate based tycoons. The Great Recession was hard on real estate, which unlike the stock market has yet to recover. The unanswered question is how common and widespread is the catastrophic wealth loss detailed in this book. I believe that those that invested in travel related real estate - time shares and vacation homes for the rich, which was the source of wealth for the handful of people examined here - suffered greatly. But those in other sectors of real estate and finance seem to be managing just fine by and large. Frank may be cherry picking to try to make his point.

Frank relies on data that show, on average for the last 30 years, the wealthiest one percent of this country have done worse during recessions and better in good times than the rest of the population. But those are averages and they mask details. A small percentage of billionaires losing it all (and making it all during economic booms) could easily skew results.

High fliers have always existed in America. I've seen them in real estate (my childhood best friend's father went boom and bust in real estate in the 1950s). I've seen them in finance. What is different today in comparison to the 1970s is that conspicuous consumption is considered to be not only socially acceptable but desirable. The nature of investing has changed dramatically as well. Frank would like you to believe that the way the billionaires of today invest puts this country in peril. But that isn't quite right. It isn't individual investing that's the real driver. It's the institutional investors representing charities, pension funds, et al. That's where the money driving the markets is principally coming from and to the extent that they buy risky investments they put both this country and their benefactors in peril.

Frank documents all the lavish spending taking place among the mega-rich in a lively way. He makes their lives sound both comical and tragic. The attempt to go from the particular examples shown here to the nationwide implications of the spending and asset loss of the wealthiest one percent is probably mostly hyperbole.