Richard Aldrich is another British historian of intelligence who offers lots and lots of data, fact as well as myth, and adds his own opinions to sort of freshen the materiel. His 740-page The Hidden Hand is preceded by Stephen Dorrill's MI6 and several works by Christopher Andrew and some of Andrew's co-authors; he credits both Dorrill and Andrew for their support for his own project.
Aldrich tries to debunk some of the myths that are carried from one U.K. published espionage history to another - none more prevalent than that Harold Adrian Philby's betrayals destroyed much of the MI6 and CIA/OPC covert and often fatal dispatching of East Bloc exiles to do political mischief in their homelands, such as driving Albanian dictator Enver Hoxha to history's ashheap. By Aldrich's brief light, Philby was too important a spy for the KGB to allow him to be much involved in secret shoot-'em-ups. While it is to his credit for not totally swallowing the British - and too often American - myth about Philby, he misses some important details that grew the Philby legend; did Burgess truly courier Philby's purloined top secret papers to KGB case officers in New York City?
One overall element that bothered this writer is Aldrich's themantic approach. Too often a reader has to overuse the index to maintain one thread or another coherently. That is not to say the book is badly written, for it is not; rather it is merely inconvenient. In fact, there was little if any of the obvious mistakes that gatherers of huge volumes of factoids too often make. Finally, for this American, there is reason to credit Aldrich for his obviously huge amount of research effort. One must assume that he visited such backwater American presidential archives as the Truman Library at Independence, Missouri, and its even more isolated neighbor, the Eisenhower Library at Abilene, Kansas.
With both the British and American governments moving to release ever more Cold War era documents, there seems a certainty that more volumes on the fascinating 1950s West-East faceoff will surely be turned out. One can only hope that the myths that make up the history of Cold War intelligence 60 years after its beginning will one day be debunked by an availablity of solid evidence rather than merely by an author's guesswork.