Robert L. O'Connell concurs with the subject quote from Serge Lancel, in his categorization of the Second Punic War, at least in so far as the Mediterranean basin is concerned. The Punic wars, and there were three in total, were fought between Carthage and Rome, with the second one being in the late second century, B.C, between 218 to 202. This war involved numerous Roman generals and leaders attempting to stop one of history's all time military genius: Hannibal. The author draws the reader in on the first page by stating that their were more battle deaths on August 2, 216 B.C., at the battle of Cannae, than the United States suffered in the entire Vietnam War. In fact, on that day more soldiers died in combat than any other single day in the entire history of Western warfare. Previously, I had assumed that horrific record belonged to the British and their losses on the first day of the Battle of the Somme, July 1, 1916. But the grim British number of 21,000 was "only" 40% of those who died at Cannae. Although I've read my share of history, I knew I was quite weak in terms of the ancient world, and have struggled to keep the Peloponnesian and Punic wars separated. After reading this excellent history, that will never be a problem again.
O'Connell convincingly addresses two key questions at the beginning: How do we know what we know?, and for events this old, Why should we care? He draws heavily on the account of Polybius, who was born during the last year of the war. He was of Greek origins but raised in Rome, and knew some of the key individuals involved, or their children. O'Connell also repeatedly references Titus Livy, who wrote an account almost 200 years after the Second Punic War. The author says that Livy presented the "cinema graphic" pictures of the ancient world. And yes, there is at least one graphic image of the battle at Cannae that I will never forgot. The author also reviews contemporary scholarships, judiciously weighing all the theories and new evidence on these events.
Cannae is clearly the climatic moment of the book, but like any good historian, O'Connell provides a thorough explanation of the antecedents, starting with the establishment of Carthage in the 9-10th century B.C. by the Phoenicians. He provides the nitty-gritty of military history, with an explanation of the weapons, tactics, and leadership in the battles, and places that within the context of the larger political forces. There were no B-52's bombing peasant populations at Cannae; in other words, on an overall basis, the men and equipment were fairly evenly matched, with the Romans having somewhat of a numerical superiority on the battlefield. Yet when the battle was over, the Carthaginians had killed almost 8 Romans for each of their own killed. How could this be possible? Largely one man's genius, fielded against weak Roman commanders. So why do we not study the Carthaginian Empire today? After Cannae, O'Connell presents a 100 page denouement, with a familiar theme, particularly for Americans today: You can win all the big battles, but still lose the war, and Carthage did indeed lose.
O'Connell's style is measured and balanced, but livened with modern references, such as, "the right stuff, and "drinking the Kool-Aid." He also has a dry wit. Consider, in regards to Sophonisba, a Carthaginian who turned her charms on Masinissa, an allied leader of the Romans, whom she married: "That's no Punic subverter of Rome's allies; that's my wife!" The one image many have of the Punic Wars is Hannibal managing to get his elephants through the Alps, and the author has a droll proclivity for alliterative pachyderm phrases like: "panzer pachyderms," "pachyderm pandemonium" and "pachyderm panic." And how many historians can readily reference Flaubert's
Salammbo (Classics) (aka Salambo)?
Cannae is the metric bar of military history, with numerous other generals referencing this battle, and developing their own strategy based upon trying to duplicate Hannibal's success. In the epilogue, the author includes Count Alfred von Schlieffen (of the German plan for winning World War I,) Heinz Guderian and Edwin Rommel in WW II, as well as Dwight Eisenhower on the American side and later Norman Schwarzkopf during the first Gulf War.
There are all the caveats issued about this being an advanced copy, but you would think, surely, Random House could run the text through `spell-check' prior to issuing it: there are 20-30 errors that this program would have easily corrected before it was foisted upon reviewers. It's just plain sloppy. If I were the author, I'd be unhappy with the shoddy workmanship which needs a lot of cleaning up before "prime time." Also, the correct phrase is: FLOAT like a butterfly, and sting like a bee" (p 87).
And the "ghosts"? No, they are not the dead, but the living Roman veterans of a losing battle that Rome no longer wanted any part of, and for 15 years they were essentially exiled in Sicily. They were eventually "rehabilitated" by Scipio Africanus, and he lead them in the final victory over Hannibal in 202 B.C. Ancient history? As O'Connell says: "The conscience of a nation is often revealed by the fate of its veterans, particularly veterans of defeat. Belatedly we Americans have done what we can to rehabilitate our Vietnam vets and expunge the memory of their lonely return, vowing it will not happen again to those coming back from Iraq. Rome's example argues that this is not simply a matter of compassion but a matter or prudence." I'm in the "amen corner" on that one.
An excellent 5-star read, and I'll never confuse the "P" wars again.
(Note: Review first published at Amazon, USA, on May 02, 2010)