- Hardcover: 592 pages
- Publisher: University of Chicago Press (27 Mar 1996)
- Language English
- ISBN-10: 0226851753
- ISBN-13: 978-0226851754
- Product Dimensions: 2.4 x 1.6 x 0.5 cm
- Average Customer Review: 4.6 out of 5 stars See all reviews (7 customer reviews)
- Amazon Bestsellers Rank: 662,972 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- See Complete Table of Contents
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Product Description
Product Description
The explosion of space shuttle Challenger on January 28, 1986, and the death of the seven astronauts aboard had a major impact on American culture, with many people still vividly remembering exactly where they were and what they were doing when they heard about the tragedy. Journalists and investigators have historically cited production problems and managerial wrong-doing as the reasons behind the disaster. The Presidential Commission uncovered a flawed decision-making process at the space agency as well, citing a well-documented history of problems with the O-ring and a dramatic last-minute protest by engineers over the Solid Rocket Boosters as evidence of managerial neglect. Why did NASA managers, who not only had all the information prior to the launch but also were warned against it, decide to proceed? In retelling how the decision unfolded through the eyes of the managers and the engineers, this book uncovers an incremental descent into poor judgment, supported by a culture of high-risk technology. The author reveals how and why NASA insiders, when repeatedly faced with evidence that something was wrong, normalized the deviance so that it became acceptable to them. No safety rules were broken. No single individual was at fault. Instead, the cause of the disaster stemmed from the banality of organizational life. This work explains why the Challenger tragedy must be re-examined and seeks to offer a warning about the hidden hazards of living in this technological age.
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First Sentence
NASA's Space Shuttle Challenger originally was scheduled for launch January 22, 1986. Read the first page
Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index | Back Cover
NASA's Space Shuttle Challenger originally was scheduled for launch January 22, 1986. Read the first page
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Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index | Back Cover
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Customer Reviews
Most Helpful Customer Reviews
6 of 7 people found the following review helpful
Format:Hardcover
This book reviews in great detail the processes that went into
(and predated) the decision to launch the space shuttle Challenger.
It takes a potentially "new" view of this decision, namely
outlining how the problem wasn't 'a few bad managers willing
to explicitly sacrifice safety for the sake of getting this
particular shuttle off the pad' {my words}. Instead, the
problem was an entire culture, at NASA, at Morton Thiokol, and
in the country as a whole, that emphasized the production
schedule, normalized deviance (i.e. rationalized the aberrant
behavior of the O-rings in the joints of the booster), and
constructed the "risk assessment" to suit a wide variety of needs.
This book will join the shelf with a very few other works on
decision making in high-hazard environments, particularly Perrow's
NORMAL ACCIDENTS, and Scott Sagan's LIMITS OF SAFETY.
(and predated) the decision to launch the space shuttle Challenger.
It takes a potentially "new" view of this decision, namely
outlining how the problem wasn't 'a few bad managers willing
to explicitly sacrifice safety for the sake of getting this
particular shuttle off the pad' {my words}. Instead, the
problem was an entire culture, at NASA, at Morton Thiokol, and
in the country as a whole, that emphasized the production
schedule, normalized deviance (i.e. rationalized the aberrant
behavior of the O-rings in the joints of the booster), and
constructed the "risk assessment" to suit a wide variety of needs.
This book will join the shelf with a very few other works on
decision making in high-hazard environments, particularly Perrow's
NORMAL ACCIDENTS, and Scott Sagan's LIMITS OF SAFETY.
5 of 6 people found the following review helpful
Format:Hardcover
Be warned -- this book is not an easy read! This is an outstanding book on the culture of decision making and not a simple de-layering of what happened to Challenger. It is painstaking, revelatory and thorough -- and probably should be required reading for all those whose actions commit others to hazardous events.
5 of 6 people found the following review helpful
Format:Hardcover
As I read this book I found myself drawing relationships between the events of the Challenger disaster, and some technical projects I have worked on. Fortunately I have never work on a project that has suffered the type of cataclysmic failure that happened to the Challenger, however I have seen the same type of interaction between the "techies" and management. I have heard (almost verbatim) the same conversations that the engineers had in this book when faced with potentially dangerous problems and pressing deadlines. Anybody who works in very complicated disciplines knows that the explosion was not the disaster, but the culmination of a flawed process.
If you manage, or are involved in a technical process I would encourage you to read this book. It is a good case study of how subtly the seeds for a disaster can be planted. Although dry and tedious at times to read it is worth the effort.
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Most Recent Customer Reviews
A stunning safety book - though written by accident
This is the book that in 1998 convinced me to change from a career in aviation design to one in avation safety. Read more
Published on 8 Jun 2008 by Mr. Andrew Evans
Normalisation - making unacceptable risk acceptable
Imagine your safe white-collar decision making process applied to the launch of an incredibly complex machine such as the Shuttle. Read more
Published on 24 July 2000 by M. Wilson
Excellent Book
Should be read by all people who make decisions. Explains how well educated people can discommunicate when under pressure and make decisions that risk lives. Read more
Published on 1 April 1999
A Hard Read - Worth theEffort
A great book - many lessons for business in making decisions based on what you want to see and not what is really in front of you. Read more
Published on 21 Feb 1999
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