Peter Thomson is angry. Even after more the passage of more than 60 years, in reading his prose, you still feel angry yourself at the tales of incompetence, bungling and petty wrangling that marked Britain's disastrous exit from the Malayan peninsula and Singapore at the hands of the much more competent Japanese.
Through extensive eyewitness accounts, interwoven seamlessly with his narrative, Thomson's passions at times fairly burns off the pages.
An ultimately depressing tale it is too - despite the heroism of many individuals. In a few short weeks, a much smaller Japanese army out-thought, out-flanked, out-marched and out-fought British, Indian, Australian and other troops. Yamashita's 25th Army seemingly easily conquered Malaya and Singapore - Britain's supposed invincible fortress in the Far East.
The book starts slightly slowly with an extensive run-through the characters - civilian and military - who will play a role in the coming debacle, but it is when the action gets going and the Japanese invade that Thomson is at his best.
It is hard to believe the endless blunders on the British side, even though the lack of resources that Britain was able to spare for Singapore ultimately doomed the island. The Far East came a poor third in strategic terms for the hard-pressed British after defence of the UK itself, and supplying the army in North Africa.
There were not any first-rate fighter aircraft in the region - Spitfires or Hurricanes - which could stand up to the Japanese Zeros.
There were no tanks at all anywhere, and not enough anti-tank weapons to blunt the Japanese tank assaults which caused so many problems for the British troops.
But these seem to pale when set against the multitude of high level blunders.
There was never a properly unified military/civilian command.
Too often the generals, admirals and air commanders were squabbling with each other.
When the Navy's Force Z sailed out (and got sunk by the Japanese air force) there was no air cover provided.
The commander of the British land forces, General Percival was woefully ill-equipped to impose his will on his sub-ordinates, and must fully share the blame for not using the labour resources available to fortify the northern approaches to Singapore in Johore state in southern Malaya. He famously said "defences are bad for morale". Possible, but poor generalship is much worse for morale...
Still, it wasn't just Percival that shares the blame. The Australian senior commander, Bennett, was of equally dubious worth. The civilian Governor, Thomas, was also somebody who should have been removed from office at an early stage.
Yet we can at least dispense with one myth - the guns of Singapore COULD fire landward as well as seaward (though they probably didn't have enough high explosive).
In the end the British deserved to lose. The could have made a much better fist of it, though with the resources at hand at the start of the campaign in December 1941, they might well still have lost.
However in losing they left the Malays, Chinese, Indians - as well as the captured Europeans to the brutality of Japanese occupation.
If there is one minor quibble, it is that we don't learn enough about the Japanese army's fight. Quite clearly Peter Thomson has wanted to tell the tale from the British side of things, but it would have been nice to have a bit more from the Japanese side.
Despite this, this is a book well worth reading.