The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Wars of the United States series) [Paperback]

The book is at its best on the early Republic and the era from the Civil War to WWI. Later chapters are slightly weaker, possibly becase there is a plethora of books on the run-up to WWII, the conflict itself and its aftermath.

What is fascinating is watching the evolution of a nation deeply suspicious of a standing army (something inherited both from the British tradition, and from the experience of the Revolution), and looking for quick and easy solutions ro defend its seaborne commerce. In fact, Thomas Jefferson bleieved in strong coastal defences, and small ships equipped to defend ports. This was a disastrous strategy which misfired in the War of 1812. The British showed that command of the sea was command of the coast -such an invader could pick his spot for a landing, and proceed.
The North itself used this strategy in the Civil War.

For many years, Indian fighting was the main occupation of the army, usually supplemented by local volunteers. However, the foundation of West Point led to a significant improvement in that a cadre of trained officers were now available. In the Civil War, most of the high command (and one of the Presidents) were West-Point trained, and performed well (with exceptions) as tacticians and strategists compared with European contemporaries.

In Weigley's view (and I disagree with him slightly) Grant and Sherman emerge as the two best military strategists of the Civil War period. My only cavil is that he possibly is too hard on Grant, crediting him with a mistaken emphasis on mass and concentration that led to the bloody battles in Virginia (1864 - Wilderness, Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor) which bled the Confederates white but also severely mauled Grant's own army.

True, Sherman had an instinctive grasp of the turning movement and the destruction of enemy resources as a strategy of attrition. But he learned this from Grant, and Grant's own aberrant attacking mode lasted only three months, thereafter he also went back to turning movements. In fact, his crossing of the James after Cold Harbor was probably the boldest and most effective stroke of the war (better even than Vicksburg) but went unrewarded due to poor execution by his subordinates. Some of this was Grant's as his senior generals were exhausted after three month's hard fighting, but one wonders what would have happened if Phil Sheridan had been in command of the lead corps and taken Petersburg in July 1864. Richmond would surely have fallen, leaving the Confederacy facing into a bleak winter without Atlanta or Richmond.

Weigley rightly traces the influcence of Grant in the approach of the Americans to WWII strategy and defends Eisenhower against the charge that he had backed away from this strategy rather than give the British the lead role in the advance on Germany.

The naval counterpart to Grant was Alfred Thayer Mahan, and one of the best chapters in the book is the description of Mahan's influence on naval Pacific strategy before and during WWII.

I am now reaching the end of the book, and it badly needs a revision to take account of post-Cold War events. Hopefully, Weigley might do this - after the Gulf War and Sept 11, there would be a ready market for such a work.

Weigley is a great writer on military history - his 'Age of Battles' is about Pre-napoleonic warfare, and is possibly a better book this one. I recommedn both books.

I have never enjoyed reading an academic war history, before. I will probably give copies of this book to selected friends. It is on my "top ten of the genre" list. Americana at its best.