Bernard Fall: "Street without joy".
Reading "Street without joy" was like welcoming back again an old friend, who had been away for forty years. Bernard Fall's writing style slips easily between writing the academic, journalistic and popular genres. Pick up the book, start reading and be transported back in time to Indochina.
Fall relates the war from the French side, but was immensely respectful of Giap and the Viet-Minh. In the French war effort he saw tremendous courage, Quixotic behaviour and bad decisions. You cannot read this book and not be impressed by the fierceness of the battles and bravery of the French and Viet-Minh troops. The terrible losses that were suffered slowly became unacceptable as the French counted the cost of holding its former colony.
In 1954 the French had only 15 helicopters in Indochina and their reliance on road transport was fraught with danger. Later, in Algeria the French relied heavily on their 600 helicopters (p. 265). The story of Groupe Mobile 100 in the Central Highlands (Pleiku, Dak To) was a harbinger of what was to come in the next 20 years of war. The handover of the French wounded by the 803rd Division showed rare humanity in a bloody and savage campaign.
One of the saddest aspects of the war was the abandonment of the Indigenous hill tribes, collectively referred to as the montagnards, who supported the anti-communist forces. Whether it was the French or the CIA providing logistical support for a better, independent existence, the end result was always going to be the same. The montagnards would always face communist retribution for backing the wrong side. The stories a loyal supporters left behind in the highlands flay the consciences of those who were prepared to live among them, and those who set up the interdiction guerrilla programs.
Fall wrote about Dien Bien Phu only briefly, and it was covered more completely in "Hell in a very small place". The French commitment to a set piece battle in Laos ate the French resources and reserves in Vietnam and Fall said: "But reinforcements were nowhere to be had. Dien Bien Phu was eating the entrails of the French army in Indochina like a cancer...." (p. 205). The author recognised three errors in the French planning: the distance from French support structures; underestimation of the enemy's capabilities; and the unfortunate placement of the French task force within artillery range.
The book is compulsory reading for anyone interested in guerrilla warfare, and it relates the transitions in tactical and strategic warfare in second half of the Twentieth Century.