This book, as part of the Osprey "Campaign" series, is relatively short. It is 96 pages in length, about a third of which consists of illustration. One would think that this short length restricts the book to a very rudimentary discussion of its topic. However the author, Steven Zaloga, a very prolific writer of books in the Osprey series (he has written over 80), does an excellent job at providing much more than this despite the restrictions imposed on him by this format.
Mr. Zaloga does an excellent job at succinctly summarizing the important parts of this campaign in a manner superior to even full length books on the series. This short book compares very favorably with Samuel Mitcham's almost 400 page book "The Battle of Sicily: How the Allies Lost Their Chance for Total Victory". Mr. Zaloga even betters Mr. Mitcham in that he mentions many relevant facts that Mr. Mitcham does not in his own book. For example, both books discuss many of the weaknesses of the Herman Goering division such as the fact, because it was a very newly formed unit, that it was missing a variety of its components (i.e., many artillery and pioneer sections), it had never worked together as a group and that it had little practice in combined armed operations, as a formed group, albeit its cadre consisted of many experienced men and officers with significant experience and very good morale. Mr. Zaloga, unlike Mr. Mitcham, however points out the very important fact that many officers in that division did not have the requisite experience or skill sets to lead this division which was so important in Sicily's defense. As a result quite a few were relieved of their commands after the first encounters with allied troops. Mr. Mitcham, in his book, also does not discuss why the allies were not more aggressive in using their naval forces to prevent the axis escape across the straights of Messisna. Mr. Zaloga, on the other hand, does provide an assessment (i.e., allied indecisiveness along with a fear by the English Commander, Cunningham, of suffering major losses in confined losses - not an unfounded fear considering axis military forces in the area along with Cunningham's experiences with the Royal Navy at Gallipoli [this is something Mr. Mitcham does not mention]).
Mr. Zaloga's book follows the typical Osprey format in providing an overview of the strategic picture, for both sides, leading to the campaign, the commanders, the forces available and then how the campaign followed through. It is well illustrated with both maps highlighting the major battles and contemporaneous photographs that do a very good job at showing major equipment involved, leaders and men and, of course, the topology that so favored the defenders.
In short an excellent book that, despite its very short length, provides an impressive synopsis of the campaign. Five stars.