Seeing What's Next: Using the Theories of Innovation to Predict Industry Change: Using Theories of Innovation to Predict Industry Change [Hardcover]

Seldom do I remember a book that totally replaces the old and popular business literature quite as effectively as Seeing What's Next does in superceding The Innovator's Dilemma and The Innovator's Solution. If you have not read either of those books, you can skip them now and read Seeing What's Next instead. If you have already read those books, you will be delighted to see how much more practical the advice is in Seeing What's Next than in the earlier two efforts.

Before going into the details of what the book covers, I want to especially compliment Professor Christensen for overcoming in Seeing What's Next two of the three most serious weaknesses of The Innovator's Solution -- the lack of discussing business model innovation and the omission of leading technology business model innovation examples.

In Seeing What's Next, the authors take on the challenge of helping executives and managers consider the likelihood of disruptive technology changes occurring and how they should evaluate their potential responses in light of current information. The analysis looks at both the perspective of the companies that will be disrupted and displaced as well as those who are leading the disruptions.

The book is a remarkable combination of theory, process suggestions and detailed case histories to explain the suggested process. As a result, this book will be the most practical guide available for technology executives until Professor Christensen brings out the next installment of his thinking in a future book.

In Part I, the authors use existing theories about disruptive innovations to suggest which signals to pay attention to as suggesting that opportunities exist, how to determine if competitors will be a factor in disruption, choosing an appropriate response and considering how government and other nonmarket influences can affect the result.

In Part II, the process of applying the Part I theories are exemplified in higher education, commercial aviation, semiconductor customer benefits, health care productivity, non-U.S.-based innovations and strategies, and the telecommunications industry.

The book also contains a stimulating conclusion and helpful summary of key concepts in the appendix.

As usual, Professor Christensen and his colleagues have provided many interesting and valuable footnotes. I usually found them to be as interesting as or more interesting than the text.

Having said so many nice things, you are probably wondering what the book's weaknesses are. I found a few that are worth considering before you start reading the book . . . which everyone should do.

1. The proposed analysis of signals and competitors is extremely elementary. It reminded me of the state-of-the-art in strategic thinking in 1971 when I first started as a strategy consultant at The Boston Consulting Group. Today, much better sources of information and means of analysis are available. I was surprised to see such primitive suggestions to such important questions.

2. In the competitive analysis, the book assumes rational competitors who understand where they are. In my experience, innovative situations have everyone confused and they mill about aimlessly . . . often acting against their own rational best interest.

3. The authors take the rationalist view that the future can be predicted well enough in one direction that you can plan and act based on that. Most experienced business people would not agree with that assessment. The opposing view is that you should develop scenarios of what might happen along a number of different extreme lines, and then look for directions that leave you better off regardless of which scenario occurs.

4. While the authors do a wonderful job of describing many disruptive innovations, they do a relatively poor job of discussing how to develop, nurture and accelerate the impact of such innovations. Hopefully, the next book will be much more of a "how to" effort in this direction.

5. Finally, while business model innovations are described in abundance, there's little connection in the book to a process for pursuing business model innovation along with technical innovation. As a result, the table is set . . . but no meal is served in this area.

How good is this book? Many people tell me that Good to Great is the most helpful business book they have ever read. I found Seeing What's Next to be a vastly better and more useful book. Try it.

Opinions are divided as to whether or not it is possible to "predict industry change" but it is certainly possible to maintain a system by which to rigorously monitor developments in relevant industries, measure the nature and extent of probabilities, and then formulate appropriate contingency plans in anticipation of them. (FYI, Peter Schwartz in The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World and Kees van der Heijden in Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation also have much of substantial value to say about that process.) Together with Erik A. Roth and Scott D. Anthony, Clayton M. Christensen offers in this volume further development of core concepts previously discussed in The Innovator's Dilemma and The Innovator's Solution. However, there is a substantial amount of new thinking and an abundance of new material. Although I strongly recommend that the two earlier works be read first, that is not a requirement to derive full benefit from Seeing What's Next.

According to Christensen, "While the two previous books were aimed at managers [in italics] inside firms who wanted to defend again or attack with a disruption, Seeing What's Next is written for those who watch industries from the [in italics] outside, and who must make important decisions based on what they see. It will help executives, analysts, investors, and others who have a stake in a specific industry to evaluate the impact of innovations, the outcomes of competitive battles, and the moves made by individual firms -- and to make smarter business decisions, forecasts, and stock recommendations based on those evaluations. The goal here [in Seeing What's Next] is to dramatically increase the odds of getting things right in the arena where wrong decisions could be devastating."

The authors carefully organize their material as follows:

In Part I, "How to Use Theory to Analyze," they identify the "signals of change" which indicate where the best opportunities are; explain how to size up competitors; how to identify which strategic choices are of greatest importance; and then explain how nonmarket factors influence innovation.

Then in Part II, "Illustrations of Theory-Based Analysis," they apply various TBA tools when examining the future of education, aviation, semiconductors, healthcare, and telecommunications; using the same tools, they also assess strategies for both corporations and countries. Then in the "Conclusions" section, they step back and recap where they have taken their reader, suggest areas for further investigation, and provide some final thoughts. I especially appreciate the Appendix in which the authors provide a summary of the book's key concepts.

All of the most important points made in this book help us to understand both the opportunities and (yes) the perils of disruptive innovation. They include: disruption is a process, NOT an event; disruption is a relative phenomenon in that what is disruptive to one company may be sustaining to another; different, even radical technology does NOT equal disruptive; disruptive innovations are NOT limited to high-tech markets. Re this last point, the authors carefully explain that disruption can occur in any product or service market and can even help to explain competition among national economies. (Please see Chapter Chapter 9, pages 207-223). Another substantial value-added benefit of this book is derived from the generously annotated "Notes" at the end of each chapter. Together, these sections (all by themselves) are worth far more the cost of this book.

Thus, in a single volume, the authors guide and inform decision-makers in all manner of organizations as they embark on the three-part process by which to (1) identify signals of change, (2) evaluate competitive, head-to-head battles between companies loosely classified as "attackers" and "incumbents" (please see the Glossary), (3) formulate appropriate strategic choices that can influence the outcome of competitive battles, and (4) meanwhile establish and then sustain an effective relationship between innovation and nonmarket forces such as government regulation. Christensen, Anthony, and Roth are to be congratulated for what I consider to be a brilliant achievement. Reluctant as I am to predict anything, I feel certain that Seeing What's Next will become a business book "classic."

Christensen's two earlier books ("The Innovator's Dilemma," and "The Innovator's Solution") provided great new insights into business history and strategic thinking. "Seeing What's Next" goes on to attempt to demonstrate implementation of these two books' insights, unfortunately with less than total success.

Early in "Seeing What's Next," Christensen uses Dell Computer to illustrate the "Value Chain Evolution" theory's golden rule: Integrate to improve what is "not good enough" (speed, customization, and convenience of PC ordering and acquisition), and outsource what is "more than good enough" (the PC computer's architectural design) - certainly a potentially helpful insight.

"Seeing What's Next" eventually moves on to examining several sectors and making predictions for the future. 1)Education: Christensen sees on-line services from the University of Phoenix (UOP) as an innovation that is likely to disrupt the higher-education market. However, even the UOP has had limited success with this innovation - the vast majority of its services are still provided via bricks-and-mortar classrooms. (Another major UOP problem is that increasing questions are aimed at its credibility - especially the strength of its instructors, and its very low graduation rate.) On the other hand, Christensen probably has it right in seeing community-colleges provide a much greater challenge to pupils currently "over-served" by higher-cost state universities. (This applies to businesses and the general public as well - the vast majority of "research" undertaken at major universities offers very little or no concrete value to society.)

Aviation is another sector examined. Here Christensen sees low-cost Southwest Airlines as in danger of being over-ridden by major airlines - certainly about as far from the ensuing reality as one could get. As for the semiconductor sector - Christensen sees overshot customers (eg. word-processor and spreadsheet users) as becoming vulnerable targets for less expensive/capable processors; again, however, this has been little sign of this. (Christensen's "problem" may be failing to recognize that users want only one operating system/CPU, and that combination should be able to handle most/all existing PC applications. Regardless, it is also noteworthy that Andy Grove, an enthusiastic endorser of Christensen's first two books, does not have an endorsement on this book's back cover.

Healthcare: Christensen observes a "do-it-yourself" trend with home pregnancy tests and glucose monitors. However, both are small components of a relatively trivial healthcare market not likely to sustain major innovation. His third example - cheaper/easier angioplasty replacing cardiac surgery, is an unfortunate one because the latest findings are that angioplasty is not generally an acceptable substitute. Finally, Christensen is totally correct in concluding that many patients are overserved by M.D. providers vs. eg. nurse practitioners - unfortunately, legal constraints are not likely to relax soon in this area. (This also limits "off-shore" provision of X-ray readings, etc., though combining tourism with cheaper Asian healthcare may grow into a much greater market.)

Finally, "Seeing What's Next" considers the wireless communication sector. VOIP is seen as a major challenge - not likely, in my opinion, due to users being physically tied to an on-line computer, and existing wireless providers already able to offer long-distance quite cheaply via national service plans and/or offerings of free calling on weekends and after 7 P.M. during weekdays.

Bottom Line: "Seeing What's Next's" greatest contribution is probably through demonstrating how difficult seeing into the future actually can be.