Abdel Bari Atwan, a Palestinian exile in London and editor at al-Quds al-Arabi, has written an interesting book on Al-Qa'ida. The book itself is a useful introduction to the Al-Qa'ida movement that in a matter of fact way gives the reader an insight into the grievances that brought Al-Qa'ida into existence, a description of the organisation and how it functions, its strategy and its methods.
It is obvious that the Muslim world in general has many legitimate grievances regarding western interference stretching over a number of decades: the lack of any meaningful intervention with regard to the Israel/Palestine conflict, the support for the dictatorial regimes of a number of states in the area - Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Saudia Arabia, etc, the sanctions (pre 2003) against Iraq and the subsequent invasion of that same country. In the authors opinion they do not hate us for what we are but for what we have done, or at any rate what our governments have done in our name. The grievances in short are real regardless of what you think of the methods of Bin Laden who evidently thinks that the bombings in London, Madrid, Kenya, Tanzania and the attacks of 9/11 are a price worth paying (ala Madeline Albright) in pursuit of his agenda.
The chapter on suicide bombers is probably the strongest piece of writing in the book. Atwan considers this phenomena in a number of places at different times: Sri Lanka, Palestine, Vietnam, Iraq and of course the 9/11 attacks on the United States. A number of myths regarding this practice, which Mike Davis (see
Buda's Wagon: A Brief History of the Car Bomb) calls the "poor mans airforce" are examined, the most widespread of which is that it a method that is particularly "Islamic" which it evidently isn't as a cursory glance at the list of countries where suicide attacks have occurred makes clear. Also covered are the formation of Al-Qa'ida and its roots in the U.S/Saudia Arabian/Pakistan sponsored Jihad in 1980's Afghanistan (Bin Laden being one of Ronald Regans "freedom fighters") and further back. Other chapters cover the interview the author had with Bin Laden and Al-Qa'idas operations in Saudia Arabia, Iraq and Europe. The chapter on "cyber Jihadis" was the least interesting but that might be more a function of this readers ignorance of the technical side of the Internet rather than the any failure on the authors part.
In short the book examines the Al-Qa'ida movement from a perspective that is sympathetic to the grievances that motivate them, not the methods that they use, and is as useful an introduction to the subject as I can think of. The shortcomings of the book are generic to this type of writing as Atwan, a journalist who has covered these issues for many years, on many occasions refers to sources which he is unable to make public. This is understandable given the subject he is reflecting and writing upon, though it always leave room for some doubt. To be fair to the author none of his claims seem dubious and other writers on Al-Qa'ida including Jason Burke (see
Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam) who called it "intelligent and informative".