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The 1990's case studies are undoubtedly the core strength of the text, and are extremely well presented. The cases featured include the Iraq "no-Fly Zones", the U.S intervention in Somalia, the Rwandan Genocide, and the related cases of Bosnia and Kosovo. Presented in chronological order, they chart the history of action and inaction of the international community to incidents of humanitarian emergency over the course of the 1990's. As with the 70's cases, all the key facts and events are covered here, and are easily accessible to both the expert and the novice.
Perhaps the most intriguing and compelling aspect of the book is Wheeler's theoretical position on the subject of what constitutes a legitimate and successful humanitarian intervention. Anyone who has read the theories of humanitarian intervention expressed by other experts in the field will find this book makes a convincing and challenging contribution to existing debate. Wheeler somewhat controversially challenges many other thinkers on this subject by focussing on the outcome of an intervention as opposed to the motives of the interveners. Whilst Wheeler makes a good case for this approach in terms of his use of the case studies, his overall normative theoretical position taken from English School thinkers such as R. J Vincent and Headley Bull, demands by its very nature a central focus on the motives of the actor, and leaves a paradox at the heart of his theory which he never really manages to overcome. However, it is fair to say that this paradox is one that makes the book even more compelling, as one gets the feeling that if Wheeler could only have pulled off this trick, he would have created a theory of the most robust kind.
Overall, Saving Strangers is a must -read book on a subject close to the consciences of all engaged in both the study and practice of international affairs, and is a valuable contribution to our understanding of how the international community has dealt with humanitarian disaster, and how it should do so in the future.
India attacked and dismembered Pakistan, claiming self-defence. Vietnam genuinely defended itself against Pol Pot's attacks, which had killed 30,000 Vietnamese. Tanzania replied, claiming self-defence, to Uganda's 1978 invasion.
Resolution 688 of 1991, used by NATO states to justify their postwar intervention in Iraq, did not authorise the use of force to protect human rights. If it had, the Soviet Union and China would have vetoed it. Wheeler writes, "the longer-term benefits of the intervention remain fundamentally ambiguous."
In Somalia, the Security Council authorised armed intervention not on humanitarian grounds, but by claiming, falsely, that `international peace and security' were threatened. In Rwanda, the French government got the UN to authorise its intervention, but its troops only rescued its clients, who had killed a million Rwandans.
The UN did not authorise NATO's intervention in Kosovo: Russia and China would have vetoed any such resolution. Wheeler notes, "there were important US security interests at stake in the Balkans" and judges that this was `not a good model of humanitarian intervention'.
In sum, Wheeler rightly asserts that claims for humanitarian intervention were not accepted in the 1970s. He argues that a new norm of UN-authorised humanitarian intervention developed in the 1990s, but, as we have seen, the UN only authorised intervention on humanitarian grounds once, in Rwanda, which discredits, not supports, the policy. As the Foreign Office admitted in 1998, "There is no general doctrine of humanitarian necessity in international law." A fortiori, there is no new norm of unilateral humanitarian intervention: NATO's unilateral intervention in Kosovo threatened the whole international security system founded on the UN Charter.
Sovereignty, non-intervention and non-use of force are barriers against international, imperialist wars, so hugely destructive of human life. A new NATO norm of humanitarian intervention would increase the dangers of such wars.
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