Return to Bull Run: The Battle and Campaign of Second Manassas [Paperback]

My few little quibbles are:

1) with the maps, which although numerous, very timely and well placed, can be a bit cluttered when brigades/divisions/etc are placed on top of roads, rivers, cities. Basically, the area is not cleared out, but rather the block is placed right on top. It takes a little getting used to but at the first few glances looks like mixing up letters in a scrabble bag.

2)the background leading into the campaign was a little rushed, imo. I now realize that 2nd Manassas was a very complex battle with several skirmishes and engagements leading into the actual battle. I suspect to spend another 40-50 pages on "the build up" probably would have made this book gigantic beyond what it already is. Not a big hassle if you're well informed on the 7 Days and Cedar Mountain battles and the circumstances as to why the armies found each other where they first did, but it would have been nice to have gotten a little more depth (similar to Coddington covering Chancellorsville, restructuring of the armies, etc. Afterall, the first 2/5 of Codd's book does not even touch on Gburg)

3) it could be that I was in a bad mood when I first started the book, but the initial 75 pages or so seemed to be "thicker" reading than the rest of the book. Sort of like a term paperish style. I found myself re-reading several passages because I lost my place or didn't grasp the point.

That being said, the book really is brilliant. No one will doubt Hennessy's knowledge and to my delight, his writing style opened up and became a breeze to read. To his credit, something he was able to do which Coddington did not do often is cover many regimental level actions. They are described in great detail and very easy to follow. For this he gets the 5 stars (otherwise maybe a 4.5)

Most of the information is presented in a very neutral, matter of fact way. There is a bit of opionated tone with McClellan, but that is clearly understandable. I like his explaining of the various controversies. After all, that's what most intermediate and advanced students of ACW like to talk about. We like to question the what ifs and what went wrongs, and Hennessy does a great job of defining what these topics of discussion should be.

I read this immediately after reading Sear's To the gates of Richmond. So comparing apples and oranges here, Hennessy might do just a little bit better job of injecting a little life in his writing, but no doubt his knowledge of the subject separates him from an author who writes about a subject rather than lives and breathes it. You'll notice I gave Sears 4 Stars, while this clearly gets 5.

Bravo. Please bring your talents to other campaigns.

This was Robert E. Lee's first full campaign as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia and the Federals gave Lee the strategic initiative in Virginia by abandoning the Peninsula. The book details Lee's campaign from the Rapidan to the battle at Manassas. Many interesting and critical events prior to the Manassas are described. While the two armies were stalemated on the Rappahannock, Stuart's raid striking Pope's rear is narrated followed by an account of Stonewall Jackson's August 25 flanking movement which resulted in the burning of Bristoe Station and the capture of Manassas Junction August 27th. The author notes that throughout these actions Pope's cavalry failed to produce intelligence about Lee's movements and intentions but rather "stood ragged and impotent"

John Hennessy details the bloody battles on August 28, 29 and 30. The author writes "Pope's decision to attack Jackson near Groveton was both momentous and fateful, for Pope was committing to fight a battle on Jackson's front and Jackson's terms. It was a battle that need not have been." The book describes how the Union commanders under Pope launched attacks against Jackson which often breached his lines but lacking coordination and support from other units, after much gallantry failed with heavy losses. For example, the text states "Grover's regiments had indeed performed admirably, but the more important point was that they fought alone, and were doomed to ultimate failure." The author provides an excellent analysis of each engagement plus

gives both the background and an evaluation of the commanders involved stating that Pope never provided the leadership for the required coordinated action and support for these attacks to succeed.

The arrival on August 29 of Longstreet's Corps in support of Jackson and the failure of McClellan to support John Pope dramatically changed the tactical and strategic situation. The author notes that by 5 PM on the 29th "Longstreet suggested that the major effort be postponed until morning" and Lee laid the groundwork for "what he hoped would be a decisive attack the next morning...." Most interestingly, Pope concluded "the enemy was retreating; indeed the battle might be won!. ... quickly decided to mount a pursuit." The text continues "History could hardly have conjured more disparate--and ironic--reasoning ....Pope thought the Confederates in wild retreat; Lee sought to lay the groundwork for the battle's climatic attack. No other incident of the campaign more succinctly demonstrates the diverging quality of command each side enjoyed, or, in the case of the Federals, suffered." Hennessy writes that after waffling all morning on the 30th and rejecting what information he received, Pope ordered General Porter to attack what Pope believed to be retreating Confederates. After a gallant and tenacious effort, Porter's troops had to retreat. An interesting story from this fight was the stone-throwing by some Confederates after their ammunition was gone. The text notes, amazingly Pope failed to recognize the danger to his left and continues "With Porter long since gone from his threatening position ....Longstreet recognized his opportunity to completely envelop the Union left.To accomplish this, Longstreet selected as the objective of his attack the old battleground of Henry Hill."

At 4 P.M. on the 30th, Longstreet attacked the Union left. The author notes that "Union defeat seemed a certainty. Only the magnitude of the defeat remained in doubt." and he continues "The position most important to the safety of the Union army was Henry Hill" The author provides an excellent account of the fighting for Chinn Ridge and Henry Hill; and states that the Confederates captured Chinn Ridge but due to Union General McLean's fierce defense, precious minutes were gained allowing the Federals time to organize the defense of Henry Hill. With only an hour of daylight remaining, the battle for Henry Hill ceased. The Confederates had not captured Henry Hill thereby allowing the Federals to retreat, but the Union left was turned and crushed; Pope had been outmaneuvered and out fought.

The book describes the Union retreat, the subsequent fighting with a final battle at Chintilly, and Pope's withdrew to Washington DC. The Epilogue gives an analysis of the campaign stating "The well-oiled performance of the Confederate army contrasted sharply with the disorganized toil of Pope's Army of Virginia. Few Yankee soldiers of any rank emerged from the disaster at Second Manassas with enhanced reputations...." except for General McLean on Chinn Ridge.

For the Confederates the text notes "Second Manassas represented James Longstreet's most important contribution to any of Lee's victories." Hennessy notes "The Second Manassas Campaign also marked the emergence of Robert E. Lee. it represented the happiest marriage of strategy and tactics he would ever attain...." In summary he states "The Confederate victory at Second Manassas was primarily a triumph of maneuver and timing abetted greatly by Yankee mismanagement."

The author concludes "That John Pope lost this campaign to R.E. Lee was the fault, primarily, of John Pope....He utterly failed in the basic responsibilities of commanding an army on the battlefield."