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‘What distinguishes Popper from a great dull army of philosophers of science is that reading him is good for us’ Donald MacKay in Nature
Review
?What distinguishes Popper from a great dull army of philosophers of science is that reading him is good for us? Donald MacKay in Nature
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IN THIS introductory chapter, the problem of induction is treated more fully and in a wider setting than in my Logic of Scientific Discovery (L.Sc.D., for short) to which the present work is a sequel: here I shall discuss all its more interesting ramifications of which I am aware. Read the first page
Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index | Back Cover
IN THIS introductory chapter, the problem of induction is treated more fully and in a wider setting than in my Logic of Scientific Discovery (L.Sc.D., for short) to which the present work is a sequel: here I shall discuss all its more interesting ramifications of which I am aware. Read the first page
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Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index | Back Cover
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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
2 of 2 people found the following review helpful
Format:Paperback
This book is Popper's most complete exposition of the mature form of critical rationalism. In this volume Popper writes about hypotheses being criticall compared to one another and of this practice being all that is necessary for rationality. There is also a lot of other interesting material on criticisability of metaphysics.
Having said this, anyone who wants an introduction to Popper's philosophy of science might find Conjectures and Refutations (Routledge Classics): The Growth of Scientific Knowledge or Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach easier going. Also, it doesn't contain any political philosophy. For that, you would have to go to The Open Society and Its Enemies: Volume 1 (Routledge Classics): Vol 1.
Having said this, anyone who wants an introduction to Popper's philosophy of science might find Conjectures and Refutations (Routledge Classics): The Growth of Scientific Knowledge or Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach easier going. Also, it doesn't contain any political philosophy. For that, you would have to go to The Open Society and Its Enemies: Volume 1 (Routledge Classics): Vol 1.
2 of 2 people found the following review helpful
Format:Paperback
This is a masterful, clear and, as always from Karl Popper, a well-written philosophical argument, expressing a distinctive and original approach to the problems of philosophy; in this case, the problem of explaining how science progresses.
In part I, of 'Realism and the Aim of Science', Karl Popper argues for his theories of demarcation, corroboration, verisimilitude and the hypothetico-deductive method. Part II concerns the propensity interpretation of probability.
The central theme of realism is argued principally against subjectivism, especially the belief in induction and the subjective interpretation of probability. Realism is central to a rational epistemology, which is central to a rational philosophy. Though it is not subjectivist, the frequency interpretation of probability is rejected as less realistic than Popper's own propensity interpretation of probabilities. The propensity interpretation has, perhaps deservedly, not been widely taken up but Popper's criticism of the logical, subjective and frequency interpretations makes good sense.
The fundamental principle of Karl Popper's philosophy is fallibilism: the fact that we are likely to make errors and the optimistic fact that we can learn from our errors. Three principles of Popper's philosophy follow from this: rationality (expressed as a belief in human reason, rather than the belief that man is essentially rational); `enlightenment' or self-liberation through knowledge (which implies the importance of truth); and the dignity of man, which may be Popper's most central ethical idea. The dignity of man requires us to affirm rationality, personal responsibility, individualism and liberalism. Implicitly, the dignity of man contradicts reductionist materialism, determinism and all soggy mysticism.
Anyone interested in a rational (and Darwinian) approach to the philosophy of science, thus critical of both induction by repetition and the relativistic sociology of knowledge, will gain from this book.
In part I, of 'Realism and the Aim of Science', Karl Popper argues for his theories of demarcation, corroboration, verisimilitude and the hypothetico-deductive method. Part II concerns the propensity interpretation of probability.
The central theme of realism is argued principally against subjectivism, especially the belief in induction and the subjective interpretation of probability. Realism is central to a rational epistemology, which is central to a rational philosophy. Though it is not subjectivist, the frequency interpretation of probability is rejected as less realistic than Popper's own propensity interpretation of probabilities. The propensity interpretation has, perhaps deservedly, not been widely taken up but Popper's criticism of the logical, subjective and frequency interpretations makes good sense.
The fundamental principle of Karl Popper's philosophy is fallibilism: the fact that we are likely to make errors and the optimistic fact that we can learn from our errors. Three principles of Popper's philosophy follow from this: rationality (expressed as a belief in human reason, rather than the belief that man is essentially rational); `enlightenment' or self-liberation through knowledge (which implies the importance of truth); and the dignity of man, which may be Popper's most central ethical idea. The dignity of man requires us to affirm rationality, personal responsibility, individualism and liberalism. Implicitly, the dignity of man contradicts reductionist materialism, determinism and all soggy mysticism.
Anyone interested in a rational (and Darwinian) approach to the philosophy of science, thus critical of both induction by repetition and the relativistic sociology of knowledge, will gain from this book.
Most Helpful Customer Reviews on Amazon.com (beta)
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2 reviews
28 of 31 people found the following review helpful
Most impressive defense of Popper's epistemology
12 April 2000
Format:Paperback
Popper has presented his controversial views of induction and the nature of scientific discovery in a number of essays and books, but no where does he advance some of his seemingly paradoxical views better than in "Realism and the Aim of Science." At first blush, Popper's views of the nature of scientific inquiry seem to defy common sense. He believes, for instance, that the distinguishing mark of scientific theories are their falsibiability, rather than verifiability; that audacity, rather than caution, is the essence of science; that irrefutability is not a virtue in a theory but a vice; and that no scientific theory ever becomes more probable when evidence is discovered in its favor but must always remain infinitely improbable. What makes this book so remarkable is the brilliant arguments Popper advances for these seemingly absurd views. Popper demonstrates why these views are necessary in order to have a rational view of science, arguing that the opposite view of knowledge, the view that regards verifiability as central to scientific inquiry, tends to blind those seeking the truth from facts which would refute their theories. Hence Popper's belief that, instead of trying to prove our theories, we should try to falsify them instead. That way, if there are facts out there which would disprove them, we are much more likely to find them.
12 of 14 people found the following review helpful
The other shoe falls - after 50 years
5 Mar 2002
Format:Paperback
During the 1950s, while "Logik der Forschung" was being translated to become "The Logic of Scientific Discovery" Popper prepared almost a thousand pages of manuscript for publication as a companion volume to be called "The Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discover: After 20 Years". The 20 years was the time from the original publication of "Logik". It eventually became almost 50 years. For various reasons publication was delayed until William W. Bartley undertook the task of editing the large manuscript. At last The Postscript appeared in three volumes (with further additions) in 1982 and 1983. Volume 1 is "Realism and the Aim of Science", volume 2 is "The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism" and volume 3 is "Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics".
This is probably the least enjoyable of Popper's works, though it offers an important corrective to the widespread idea that Popper's ideas were superseded by Kuhn and Lakatos. In the first part, "The Critical Approach" Popper replies to Kuhn and Lakatos and shows that they never really offered significant criticisms (or alternatives) to the critical approach or to Popper's theory of conjectural objective knowledge. They did identify some problems with "falsification" and these were widely regarded as serious criticisms of Popper's ideas, even though he had recognized the problems some decades before and answered them. For example, Popper had always realised that falsification was only logically decisive (in a way that verification was not) because in real life observations are fallible and they need to be interpreted in the light of theories.
In the second part of the book Popper outlines his thoughts on the propensity interpretation of probability. This is his effort to overcome the defects of subjective theories of probability and the challenge of providing a theory of the probability of single events. This is an important but technical area of his work which some people find engrossing and others approach with a kind of mental block. I suggest that you ask David Miller to comment on Part II.
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