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Edwin Jaynes was a great scientific writer and his breadth of learning, concern for real-world applications and wit clearly show through in this book. His comments on opposing views are very harsh by academic standards, but Jaynes' writing shows up how bland and how disconnected from real-world problems the academic writing on Bayesianism usually is.
This book combines two principles and shows how they can produce a Bayesian mathematical system which illuminates and unifies problems of reasoning and decision. His examples are sometimes delightfully original and range from court-room decisions to complex engineering problems.
The first principle is the Cox Proof, explained at length in Chapter 2. Probability is normally justified in terms of rational betting behaviour or in terms of sensible preferences between options. The Cox Proof, by contrast, derives probability from consistency constraints on the form of a system of inference. Hence non-probabilistic systems (such as those in orthodox statistics or fuzzy logic) are inconsistent; a very important result.
The other principle is the idea that one's expectations have an information content, which can be measured using the mathematics of Information Theory. Ideally, your beliefs should contain no more information than what is allowed by the evidence you have so far. Spelled out mathematically, this gives what is known as the Maximum Entropy (or "maxent") principle.
As a doctoral student in the philosophy of science, I found this the most useful source about induction, probability and statistics. Even though a lot of the maths was too advanced for me, Jaynes puts the mathematical proofs in context and explains why they are so important for science.
If more philosophers would read the first few chapters of this book, then a lot of collective misconceptions about probability would be cleared up and a lot of "new" discoveries would be shown to be already part of Jaynes' sophisticated system. AI researchers interested in the representation of uncertainty will also find it essential.
Jaynes starts with some deceptively simple requirements for the rules of reasoning in the face of uncertainty. He then proceeds systematically and with confident ease, to deduce the rules and practice of probability theory, showing along the way how to avoid the controversies and paradoxes usually associated with this field. He shows that these rules are the only consistent ones and any method that violates them is necessarily inconsistent.
The bulk of the book is about inference, or inverse probability problems. It is therefore highly recommended for all users of probability theory for inference. (This specifically includes engineers working on all types of automatic speech processing.) The reader is freed from the restrictive frequency interpretation of probability and can then start to develop a deep understanding of inference.
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