The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 (Galaxy Books) [Paperback]

Gordon Craig is the doyen of America's historians of Germany. Now retired from academic life, he is highly respected at home and in Germany, and is sought after for sound and temperate reviews and commentary in the media. No other survey has superceded The Politics of the Prussian Army, although it is now over 40 years old. (However, Gerhard Ritter's important, multi-volume "Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk" covers a lot of the same ground, with a more conservative viewpoint. There's an English translation) There are two basic reasons for this, I think. One is of course the book's very high quality. Craig became throughly familiar with all the most important source material available, and his fundamental conclusions are unquestioned: that the army was the keystone and guardian of the Prussian monarchy and its conservative social order, and always at work to hinder the progress of democracy and the achievement of popular over monarchical sovereignty. The authoritarian (N. B.: as distinct from totalitarian!) sympathies and traditions of the Prussian officer corps survived after the end of the Prussian monarchy in 1918 and carried on in the Reichswehr of the Weimar Republic, and then in the Wehrmacht. Eventually the officer corps sold its soul to the "Austrian corporal" (Hindenburg's disdainful reference), Hitler, believing they could control him for their own ends, and that he was in any case the best available political option. But Hitler was nobody's fool, and his ultimate aim always remained to undermine the social authority and prestige of the regular army and in its place install himself, his party, and an absolutely fanaticized and obedient military force (the Waffen-SS). A sense of duty not to Hitler but to the German people and their civilization flamed up and extinguished in the assasination attempt of Oct 1944, led by Wehrmacht officers of the old Prussian nobility. Recent research (in English, cf. for example Omer Bartov) has tended to see more ideological sympathy for Nazism in the officer corps of the Wehrmacht more than Craig does here, though his focus is less on ideology than on the army's involvement in political machinations at the highest level. German historians and journalists are debating this issue at the moment, as new publications argue that the Wehrmacht committed war crimes on a greater scale, esp. on the Eastern front, than previously admitted, and that it fought unrestrained by professional ethos or conscience. A second reason for the book's longevity is that most of the Prussian military archive was destroyed in a 1945 bombing raid, which makes significant new discoveries impossible for the period before World War II. One has to rely on published sources, and as I noted, Craig read the most important of them. New histories of the Prussian army would be new interpretations of the same sources. One could, for example, to take a more sympathetic view of the army's 19th-century ideology and ethos - that it was defensive - in view of Prussia's vulnerable geographical position, the hostility of its neighbors, and the rise of the socialist movement. But in the early 20th century Germany was far and away the dominant power in Europe, and the question arises of what "went wrong" and led to Germany's (in my view) unprovoked attack and reckless strategy in World War I. Note: Despite the title, the book is really a history of the army after 1806, with an introductory chapter on the period before.

This book is a close look at the political role of the Prussian army in German society. It is heavily skewed towards covering the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and I wish more had been devoted to the seventeenth and eighteenth (this period occupies only the first 20% of the book). But that aside, what it *does* choose to cover, it covers well. Professor Craig teases apart the various determinants of the Prussian army's historical behavior--the Junker social origins, the political relationship with the crown, the ideological and pedagogical atavisms, the institutional and technological innovations, and, ultimately, the Prussian army's forceful veto power over the historical aspirations of the German masses. This book cannot be ignored by anyone curious about the course of German history.

Gordon Craig's history of the Prussian officer corps and its relationship with the state it served is a true classic of military history. The primary focus of the book is on the civil-military relations of the Prussian state beginning with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and tracings its evolution and influence to the Second World War when Hitler and the Nazis crushed the political influence of the officer corps. In addition, the book also addresses a number other issues in exquisite detail, including the formation of the German General Staff, the strategy developed before the First and Second World Wars, and the social conflict of the unified German states.

Craig's conclusions on the Prussian officer corps, their reforms and their performance are rather "standard" as far as historical interpretations go - but that is due in no small part to the fact that the author in many ways set the standard. The most salient theme of the book is that for all the German military got right in planning, strategy and innovation, it was never able to effectively solve the civil-military relationship issue, and it was that failure that led to the disasters of the First and Second World Wars.

In Craig's opinion, the opportunity for success was formulated but squandered early in 19th century. After the devastating defeat at Jena in 1807 at the hands of Napoleon, the once vaunted Prussian military had to assess how and why the disaster had occurred. The solution presented by the great military reformer Scharnhorst was the institutionalization of military genius in a centralized, elite general staff and the accountability of the armed services to the German people through an oath of allegiance to a republican constitution, rather than personal fealty to the monarch. The former was adopted and proved a stunning success, especially in the wars against the Danes, Austrians and French in 1866-1872. However, the conservative officer corps' unwillingness to embrace the more liberal reform set forth by Scharnhorst kept the military at odds with the nation it served and ultimately led to the military's political dominance in World War I and political subjugation in World War II.

If you have a keen interest in civil-military relations, German history, or the development of the General Staff system this book is simply indispensable.