Poland Betrayed: The Nazi-Soviet Invasions of 1939 (Campaign Chronicles) [Hardcover]

The Polish campaign which opened the European theaters of the second World War has, inexplicably, been one little examined by the military historians of the last 60 years. This is inexplicable in that it was this campaign that led to many of the military innovations and developments in operational theory, as well as tactics that were used later in the war by Nazi Germany as well as other belligerants. For some reason though, the lessons learned militarily have up till recent years almost assumed to have been 'majically' developed and in place within the Wehrmacht prior to the invasion. What has been needed is rectification of that myth as well as the corresponding one that claims Polish inferiority in arms.

Poland Betrayed is a solid effort that begins the process of rectifying this rather undeveloped area of modern military history. Although I would not agree with other reviewers that this book is anywhere approaching a comprehensive work, Dr. Williamson's narrative is most effective as a concise and fairly well researched overview of the the Polish campaign. He's done a creditable job as well: 1)Describing the political/diplomatic lead up to the war 2)The efforts of the Polish Armed Forces to modernize under the percieved threat of first the USSR and then Nazi Germany. 3)The actual campaign as it developed and played out in September 1939, including the Red Army's 'contributions' to the Polish collapse after 17 September. His writing is crisp and to the point and the editing for the most part is solid, with only the occasional typo or error.

For the sake of this review, the area of the most importance, as I see it, is in simply dispelling the myth of the vaunted Wehrmacht, fighting with superior tactics and operational elan against a backwards Polish Army. Repeatedly, Dr. Williamson provides examples of Polish planning, counter attacks as they happened. Furthermore, he apptly describes the Bzura counter-offensive which, the author convincingly argues, with better resources would have stood a good chance of lengthening the campaign significantly as well as seriously damaging several German divisions. Another area in which he refutes conventional wisdom regarding the campaign is the supposed inferiority of Polish Air Force Pilots. He gives several solid examples based on primary sources of how at least one fighter group gave as good as it got and how it was primarily the Polish equipment in this case that wasn't up to the task.

Where the author is less successful is in two areas: describing how Gen Edward Smygly Rydz was in part responsible for the the debacle on the ground and in providing sufficient maps with which to follow the course of the campaign. In regards to Smygly Rydz, there is very little space spent in detailing how exactly he was to blame; merely accusations made at a few points in the narrative. As far as the map issue goes there are two large scale maps provided at the beginning of the book that provide little if any support for following what proves to be a rather confused and swirling battle(as opposed to the rather straight-forward defeat that has been described by most historians regarding the campaign).

In closing, this is a very solid introduction to the invasion of Poland by Germany and, later, the USSR. It is well written and fairly well edited. Whats more, it will definitely wet the appetite of anyone reading it for a more comprehensive analysis of this campaign...as soon as one is actually written.

There seems to be a tendency for reviewers with some connection to the Polish community to give virtually anything about Poland 5 stars. There is a corresponding dearth of review, and more synopsis and/or promotion, endorsement or testimonial. This is not a 5 star book. It has some flaws, but it is most definitely a 4.
While I applaud anything that will dispel the myths surrounding Polish experience in WW II, and promote a better understanding of their significant contributions, not everything is worthy of accolades. The author is an expert in German history, having published an impressive amount of scholarship on the German experience in both world wars. Having said this, his present effort couldn't decide whether it should be history or something published for more of a mass market audience. So, while he provides a list of sources, he does not provide endnotes, which to my mind would have added a great deal. To be sure, he is careful to source much of his material, but endnotes are not simply vehicles to list where a scholar procures material, but are also used to contextualize and explain what may not always be clear to readers.
In a valuable contextualization Williamson goes back to the Pilusdski years and his post WW I legacy in setting the stage for the territorial ambitions of both Russia and Germany with respect to Polish land. He also goes to great lengths to dispel some of the most enduring and ridiculous myths about the Polish Calvary and the Polish air force. Bravo for that effort, the enduring effort at making Poles look like yokels with respect to warfare must be contained and the more the myths are dismissed and illuminated for what they are, the better.
Bravo also to Williamson for being faithful to Polish names with all their diacritics. In contradistinction to Norman Davies, Williamson has enough respect for his audience to not resort to ridiculous linguistic "dummying down." He is also a much, much better writer than Davies; being far more accessible and less boring. He focuses on the military aspects of the Soviet and Nazi invasions of 1939 bit he also introduces a human element. The reminiscences of the survivors in his aftermath section are rich and adding a human face, they enhance the history of the time and the aftermath of the betrayal of Poland.
The photos are most informative; especially the one of a POW camp/detention center in Kutno. My father was in such a center in Dzialdowo (Amazon does not recognize diacritics -- my apologies for the L) after the fall of Modlin from which he escaped. Until I saw this photo, it always puzzled me as to how he could have in his words "walked out."
Having said that, I think that he pays short shrift to the betrayal aspect and does not develop that theme in a particularly robust way. Moreover, there are some editing hiccups. For example, in one section the word Angers is used in lieu of Anders. Also, in listing General Anders in his Appendix, he has his rank as Lieutenant General. He erroneously calls the Russo-Polish War (of 1919-20) the Soviet-Polish War. The Soviet Union was not founded until 1922.

This comprehensive work discusses such things as the background to WWII, the Poles' cracking of the "invincible" German ENIGMA Code, Polish alliances and preparations for war, the Polish Air Force and Navy, the course of the 1939 campaign, the German and Russian occupation zones of Poland, biographies of key figures, survivors' reminiscences, etc. Unlike most other books on this subject, Williamson gives significant details about the Russo-Polish war in eastern Poland in 1939, countering the mistaken notion that Poles offered almost no resistance to the invading Soviets.

No sooner had Poland been resurrected in 1918, in the wake of WWI, than the Germans and Russians began planning to destroy the new Polish state. Writing in 1922, at a time when Hitler was barely a blip on the political screen, General Hans von Seekt, the Commander-in-Chief of the German army, stated that Poland's existence was intolerable to both Germany and Russia, and that Poland must disappear. (pp. 6-7).

Although Polish industry was too small to even begin to match the modernity and quantity of German war production, a bright spot was the existence of a number of arms factories that earned the praise of British visitors. (pp. 27-29). For instance, the Stalowa Wola steel mills had been made from scratch just 18 months before Colonel Sword's visit, with the first gun rolling off the assembly line only several months later. It had a high standard of works and plant that was far superior to the parent Bofors equipment factories in Sweden. (pp. 28-29).

The author includes discussion of Polish civil defense before the war. He quotes a British observer who was impressed with it. (pp. 47-48).

Williamson debunks the myth of the Polish Air Force getting destroyed on the ground in the first day or two of the war. The planes had been scattered to secret airfields to avert such an occurrence. (p. 70). He provides examples of Polish aerial combat against the Luftwaffe and against German military objectives.

As for another perennial Polonophobic myth, Williamson comments: "Far from charging tanks and armoured cars, Polish cavalry was trained to withdraw to cover and use their anti-tank guns." (p. 83). Also: "The cavalry, far from indulging in useless deeds of derring-do, were often used effectively. Armed with anti-tank rifles and dismounted, cavalrymen were able to surprise and destroy German armoured units." (p. 167). Examples of cavalry success are included. (p. 88, pp. 93-94).

Several temporary Polish combat successes are noted, such as the Battle of Mokra and the Bzura counteroffensive. The Poles also managed to blow up the Tczew bridge near the Corridor despite the herculean efforts of the Luftwaffe and German commandos to prevent it. For this, the Germans later murdered 19 Polish officials and railwaymen in reprisal. (pp. 80-81).

Poland was overwhelmed by the two military giants. However, some 100,000 Poles managed to escape into Romania, Hungary, and the Baltic States. (p. 136). They continued the fight for Poland.

Williamson touches on the Polish forces fighting in 1940 France, and comments: "The final praise of the Polish fighting man was given by no less a person than Marshall Petain in June 1940, when he told Sikorski that he had witnessed the 1st Polish Division on the eastern front in France drive back four German divisions. He added that `if there had only been ten Polish divisions, victory would have been certain.'" (p. 169).