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Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience [Paperback]

M. R. Bennett , P. M. S. Hacker
4.8 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (5 customer reviews)
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Book Description

25 Mar 2003 140510838X 978-1405108386
In this provocative survey, a distinguished philosopher and a leading neuroscientist outline the conceptual problems at the heart of cognitive neuroscience. Surveys the conceptual problems inherent in many neuroscientific theories. Encourages neuroscientists to pay more attention to conceptual questions. Provides conceptual maps for students and researchers in cognitive neuroscience and psychology. Written by a distinguished philosopher and leading neuroscientist. Avoids the use of philosophical jargon. Constitutes an essential reference work for elucidation of concepts in cognitive neuroscience and psychology.

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Product details

  • Paperback: 480 pages
  • Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell (25 Mar 2003)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 140510838X
  • ISBN-13: 978-1405108386
  • Product Dimensions: 17.3 x 3.6 x 24.6 cm
  • Average Customer Review: 4.8 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (5 customer reviews)
  • Amazon Bestsellers Rank: 212,536 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
  • See Complete Table of Contents

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Review

“This remarkable book, the product of a collaboration between a philosopher and neuroscientist, shows that the claims made on behalf of cognitive science are ill–founded. The book will certainly arouse opposition... but if it causes controversy, it is controversy that is long overdue.” Sir Anthony Kenny, President of the British Academy, 1989–93 <!––end––> “This book was simply waiting to be written.” Denis Noble , Oxford University “Contemporary scientists and philosophers may not like Bennett and Hacker′s conclusions, but they will hardly be able to ignore them. The work is a formidable achievement.” John Cottingham, Professor of Philosophy, Reading University “Neuroscientists, psychologists and philosophers will be challenged – and educated – by this sustained and well–informed critique .” Paul Harris, Professor, Human Development and Psychology, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University "This book is a joy to read. It is the fruit of collaboration across disciplines and continents between a neurophysiologist and a philosopher. They have written a polemical work that is a model of clarity and directness. Distiniguished neurophysiologist M.R. Bennett of the University of Sydney, and eminent Oxford philosopher P.M.S. Hacker have produced that rarity of scholarship, a genuinely interdisciplinary work that succeeds. ... This is a wonderful book that will illuminate, provoke and delight professional scientists, philosophers and general readers alike." Australian Book Review "Bennett and Hacker have identified [conceptual confusions] with clinical precision and relentless good sense.... rich with philosophical insights ... thoughtful and wonderfully useful treatise ..." Philosophy "careful application in a host of cases ...is precisely what Bennett and Hacker provide in devastating critiques of psychologists and neuroscientists such as Blakemore, Crick, Damasio, Edelman, Gazzaniga, Kandel, Kosslyn, LeDoux, Penrose and Weiskrantz; and they also raise equally disturbing questions for philosophers such as Dennett, the Churchlands, Chalmers, Nagel and Searle. Whether this book leads to a reconfiguring of contemporary neuroscience and the philosophy associated with it will tell us much about the dynamics of contemporary intellectual life." Philosophy "The vast spectrum of material in philosophy and neuroscience that Bennett and Hacker consider is impressive and their discussion is thorough and illuminating." Human Nature Review 1. ‘[It] will certainly, for a long time to come, be the most important contribution to the mind–body problem which there is.’ G. H. von Wright 2. ‘everyone who thinks about the mind and consciousness should study Philosophical Foundations of Neurtoscience. ... it will ultimately contribute to a far better understanding of mind and consciousness within scientific thought as well as a better understanding of the limits of empirical investigation’, Arthur Collins, The Philosophical Quarterly, 2004 3. ‘Sweeping, argumentative and brilliant, this book will provoke widespread discussion among philosophers and neuroscientists alike’, Dennis Patterson, Notre Dame Philosophical Review, 2003 4. ‘...devastating critiques of psychologists and neuroscientists ... Whether this book leads to a reconfiguring of contemporary neuroscience and the philosophy associated with it will tell us much about the dynamics of contemporary intellectual life’, Anthony O’Hear, Philosophy 2003 5. ‘This book is a joy to read. ... a model of clarity and directedness... [Bennett and Hacker] have produced that rarity of scholarship, a genuinely interdisciplinary work that succeeds. ... This is a wonderful book that will illuminate, provoke and delight professional scientists, philosophers and general readers alike.’, Damian Grace, Australian Book Review, 2003 6. ‘clinical precision and ... relentless good sense ... [a] thoughtful and wonderfully useful treatise’, Daniel N. Robinson, Philosophical Quarterly, 2004 7. ‘mandatory reading for anybody interested in neuroscience and consciousness research. The vast spectrum of material in philosophy and neuroscience that Bennett and Hacker consider is impressive and their discussion is thorough and illuminating.’ Axel Kohler, Human Nature Review, 2003 8. ‘a delicious cake of a book in which Bennett and Hacker guide the reader through a conceptual minefield of confusions repeatedly made by neuroscientists and philosophers alike.’ Constantine Sandis, Metapsychology 2003 9. ‘Anyone who has ever framed a theory or explained one should read this book ‑ at the risk of forever falling silent.’, The Rector, University of Sydney, Obiter Dicta 2003 10. ‘... impressively lucid ... Bennett and Hacker unquestionably succeed in making us challenge our own concepts, examine them for dross, and strive to home in on fundamentals.’ Neil Spurway, Journal of the European Soc for Study of Science and Theology. 11. ‘...the fruit of a unique cooperation between a neuroscientist and a philosopher ... an excellent book that should be read by all philosophers of cognition and all researchers in the cognitive neurosciences.’ Herman Philipse, ABG #2, De Academische Boekengids 2003 12. `...there are, I think, grounds for hope that this book will do an enormous amount of good, both in correcting philosophical confusion within neuroscience and in promoting a new style of dialogue between neuroscience and philosophy′ David Cockburn, Philosophical Investigations, 2005

From the Back Cover

In this provocative work, a distinguished philosopher and a leading neuroscientist outline the conceptual problems at the heart of cognitive neuroscience. Writing from a scientifically and philosophically informed perspective, the authors provide a critical overview of the conceptual difficulties encountered in many current neuroscientific and psychological theories, including those of Blakemore, Crick, Damasio, Edelman, Gazzaniga, Kandel, Kosslyn, LeDoux, Penrose and Weiskrantz. They propose that conceptual confusions about how the brain relates to the mind affect the intelligibility of research carried out by neuroscientists, in terms of the questions they choose to address, the description and interpretation of results and the conclusions they draw. The book forms both a critique of the practice of cognitive neuroscience and a conceptual handbook for students and researchers.

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
27 of 28 people found the following review helpful
By Dr. Matthew Broome VINE™ VOICE
Format:Paperback
This is an excellent and important read. The authors (a philosopher and a neuroscientist) discuss cognitive neuroscience. The authors commence with a genealogy of our concepts before moving onto conceptual problems in various areas of the neuroscientific study of psychology. Such areas include emotion, consciousness and volition. The work is commendable as it engages both with contemporary neuroscience (LeDoux, Damasio and many others)as well as contemporary philosophers (Dennett, Searle).

This is essential reading for any experimental cognitive neuroscientists as it helps both study design and what research may achieve but also how we should interpret any data thus obtained into a wider psychology. In addition, the book is of interest to clinicians such as neurologists and psychiatrists who perhaps are vulnerable to incorporating the findings of neuroscience uncritically into their own disciplines. Lastly, there is a tendency of scientism in analytic philosophy and an unfortunate conflation of cognitive neuroscience with philosophy of psychology to which this book is a remedy.

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28 of 31 people found the following review helpful
Format:Paperback
What are you, a ghost in a machine or a living human being? In this excellent book, the authors, a neuroscientist and a philosopher, answer the question.

They say that Rene Descartes' ideas still cause many muddles. He thought that we were all ghosts in machines, two things in one. This was because he believed that there were two basic kinds of thing, mind and matter (a theory called dualism), and that what we are depends on what our minds do (idealism).

The authors show that commonsense clears up the muddles. We are all living human beings. "The person ... is a psychophysical entity, not a duality of two conjoined substances, a mind and a body."

The authors show that dualism - the ghost in the machine - can never explain how our minds relate to our bodies. Our minds are not things, so they cannot cause changes by acting on our brains.

Often neuroscientists wrongly ascribe to our brains the activities that Descartes and his followers like John Locke ascribed to our minds. But human beings - not our brains or minds - think, see, decide and feel. "The brain and its activities make it possible for us - not for it - to perceive and think, to feel emotions, and to form and pursue projects."
Too many neuroscientists trap themselves in idealism. For example, Francis Crick wrote, "What we see appears to be located outside our body. ... What you see is not what is really there. ... In fact we have no direct knowledge of the objects in the world."

But the authors reply, "What we see does not appear to be located outside us. What we see is necessarily located outside our body, unless we are looking at ourselves in a mirror, or at our limbs or thorax." We see what is really there, the real world, and we directly know objects in the world, which exist whether we see them or not....

This is materialism, which "In its simplest and warranted form amounts to a denial that there are mental or spiritual substances." Materialism does not mean that our minds are our brains. It does not mean that we explain things, even material things, by studying the matter of which they are made. Materialism does not reduce everything to physics, or reduce our minds to our nervous systems.

Colin Blakemore was wrong to write, "We are machines", Crick wrong to write, "You ... are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules." Our goals, motives and reasons - not our cells or molecules - explain our behaviour.

The authors show that scientists and philosophers do two different, useful jobs. Scientists analyse what's true and what's false. They create theories to explain and hypotheses to predict.

Philosophers analyse concepts and the rules for the use of words. They clarify what makes sense and what does not. And these authors have done this job superbly. Read more ›

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4 of 5 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars Excellent deconstruction of "nothing butery" 9 Dec 2007
By Dr. Nicholas P. G. Davies VINE™ VOICE
Format:Paperback|Amazon Verified Purchase
This is a fine and detailed book. Takes a lot of reading, and thinking.

It's a necessary book at this time, and it takes on those people who think that thoughts are "nothing but" electrical and chemical events in the brain.It's a necessary counterbalance to some of the somewhat reductive views of brain function being proposed at present.

A very useful contribution to debate for both philosophers and neuroscientists. Doctors engaged in mental health work will find it interesting as well.
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4.0 out of 5 stars Philosophical Critique of Neuroscience 2 May 2013
Format:Paperback|Amazon Verified Purchase
An interesting attack on the orthodox, usually unquestioned, manner of interpreting neuroscientific research. The authors emphasis the degree how the much trumpeted transcending of Cartesian dualism is not as it is reported,more a case of new dualism for old;not mind v body but brain v body.Central to the authors thesis is the merelogical fallacy, the attribution of whole person capacities to a part, the brain, based on a loss of the distinction between a necessary condition for something and a necessary and sufficient condition.
The approach is very much driven by Wittgenstein's 'Investigations' and so reads, as he does at times, as advocating logical behaviourism. Their criciticsm of Nagel's 'What is it like to be a bat?' seemed to me to to rely to much on the particular form of words and seems to imply that what does it feel like questions are illegitimate,which is mistaken.Later criticisms in book started so seem like verbal quibbles and so unconvincing.Still, worth a read.
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7 of 15 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars Brilliant, yet question-begging 24 Jan 2005
Format:Paperback
Although this is an extremely well put together critique, I can't help the feeling that there is something not quite right about it. The assumption from the outset is that we are mistaken in our direct ascription to the brain language that describes, or refers to, experiential states more properly attributed to the related concept of the 'person'. This is the 'mereological fallacy', and the authors take it as read that Aristotle had the right idea in using psychological predicates to refer to the 'form' of the individual as a whole, rather than internal events which may or may not be reducable to statements couched in neurological terms. However, for many people, this way of organising language which refers to experience is mistaken. Rather than seeing the language of experience as part of a conceptual apparatus which, logically speaking, can only properly be applied to the concept of the 'person' (which, it is argued, bears no direct relation with neurological events since WE as PEOPLE have the experiences that the BRAIN merely provides the material support for), perhaps we should consider that this entire conceptual apparatus is a tool which the social brain constructs and uses in order to gain a degree of control over a certain number of its own (particularly cortical) activities. This would mean considering the (rather odd sounding) possibility that 'we' don't use 'our' brain to achieve 'our' ends, but 'our' brain uses 'us' to achieve its ends.
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