This book simply is not a good introduction to paradoxes for those capable of actual thought. The treatment is brutally bad in spots, and does not convey a sense of the true recalcitrance of many of the paradoxes. As one example, take an entry in the book, Achilles and the Tortoise. Clark seems to take the line that since we can sum infinite series, there is no more paradox:
"So the sequence of partial sums is 1/2, 3/4, 7/8,... It goes on for ever, getting closer and closer ('converging') to 1. In this case 1 is the limit, and so the sum, of the series. Achilles gradually closes in on the tortoise until he reaches it."
What? The "explanation" continues by simply explaining limits. This is inane hand waving. Worse still, Clark cites Salmon's excellent collection of articles on Zeno's paradoxes (of which Achilles and the Tortoise is one). A main theme of many of the articles in Salmon's book is that limits do NOT dissolve the paradox.
In the same entry as Achilles, Clark discusses Thomson's Lamp, where the dominant line taken today is that there is no spatio-temporal continuity through an infinite sequence of tasks. "But the description of the supertask entails nothing about the lamp's state at one minute..."
So be it. But then in "explaining" Achilles, Clark writes, "Why then is Achilles at the limit, 1? ... The answer is that, if he is anywhere, as surely he is- he must be at 1."
The problem is the "as surely he is." This echoes Thomson's own, "Surely the lamp must be on or off." If there is no (spatio-temporal) continuity through an infinite task, as was just explained to dissolve Thomson's Lamp, how is there continuity in the case of Achilles? Put differently, why does a limit process tell us about Achilles but not the Lamp? That Thomson's sequence (0,1,0,1...) i.e. (off, on, off, on...) does not have a limit is precisely his point.
There may be a response involving discrete versus continuous tasks, or some other explanation. But the reader is not told this. In general, my problem with the book is that the treatment is superficial and often presents the paradoxes as though they no longer present problems, when in fact they do. An intelligent reader may also be left bewildered by some of Clark's "explanations."
I wonder for whom this book is intended. I think that this book would make a terrible introduction to paradoxes, but may very well serve as a good reference book for those already acquainted with many of the paradoxes.