For a comprehensive, balanced, and extremely readable introduction to the German armoured forces in WW2, this book is unbeatable. In less than 300 pages it manages to combine a brief history of the development of tanks in WW1 and the interwar period, the emergence of German Panzer forces and philosophy, all the major campaigns undertaken by the German army and Waffen-SS in WW2, pen portraits of such luminaries as Heinz Guderian, Erwin Rommel, Gerd von Rundstedt, Hans Hube, Hermann Balck, and Hyazinth von Strachwitz, descriptions of all the important armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), and analysis of the lessons learned. There are 11 campaign maps, 50 black and white photographs of men and machines, bibliography, glossary, index, and three appendices giving details of equivalent ranks, Panzer division establishments, and brief histories of the leading Panzer divisions.
The authors have a deep knowledge of their subject, and don't pull any punches in exploding myths and misconceptions. For instance, they pour scorn on William L Shirer's awed description of the fully mechanised German army that invaded Poland, with self-propelled guns travelling at 40 mph - pointing out that only a tiny fraction of the German troops got to ride in vehicles, while the great majority were left to march "with no better mobility than Napoleon's armies". (And no tank during WW2 could do much better than 20 mph, even on good roads - which were the exception). They explain how the Panzerwaffe contributed to the Polish, French, and Russian campaigns, and make clear just how narrow was the margin between success and failure on many occasions - such as the British/French counterattack at Arras which routed the Totenkopf division and was only defeated when Rommel personally brought up 88mm anti-aircraft guns, the only German weapons that could destroy the robust British Matilda tanks.
All the important campaigns are explained, with special reference to the role played by armoured forces. The authors bring out clearly the frustration and harm caused to the German armoured units by Hitler's stubbornness and his failure to understand the dynamic nature of tank warfare - leading to debacles such as Stalingrad and Kursk. They explain how German superiority cannot be attributed solely to superior weapons, as they were often outclassed qualitatively (for instance by the Russian T34 and KV1 tanks) or quantitatively (the British often had ten times as many tanks as Rommel in North Africa), but arose mainly from better organisation and planning. By 1943-4, however, the Panzerwaffe's best days were behind it (paradoxically, just as its best AFVs such as the Tiger, Panther, and Jagdpanzer IV were reaching the front lines). The Allies could produce far more tanks, and besides their overwhelming air superiority meant that any concentration of armoured forces was simply obliterated by bombing. In the end, the Germans were put to the sword by their own Blitzkrieg tactics turned against them by the Allies.