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12 of 13 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Dense and fascinating, but a little scattered, 18 Jul 2006
What I mean by "scattered" is that the book could use a sharper focus. Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Ron Suskind waded through mountains of documents and transcripts and notes from interviews and then published this as quickly as he could. He wanted to include all the important details he uncovered while they were topical, but he didn't really have the time to properly meld them into the narrative. The result is the book is a little less readable and engaging than it might have been.
Nonetheless, this is a fascinating account of how the Bush administration operates.
The "One Percent Doctrine" that forms the centerpiece and focal point is from Vice President Dick Cheney. Here's an example of how Cheney articulated it: "If there's a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping Al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response." Cheney added, "It's not about our analysis, or finding a preponderance of evidence... It's about our response." (p. 62)
Looked at carefully this doctrine is really just a rationale for the Bush administration to do what it wants to do. The key point is the "one percent." If "it's not about...a preponderance of evidence," how do we know that there's a one percent chance? How do we know that it's not one tenth of one percent or one thousandth of one percent or a googleplex of one percent? We don't. And that is exactly the point of the Cheney Doctrine. As Suskind puts it, "A key feature of the Cheney Doctrine was to quietly liberate action from such accepted standards of proof... Suspicion...became the threshold for action." (p. 163)
Looked at in terms of our invasion of Iraq, the utility of the Cheney Doctrine to the Bush administration becomes clear. Was there a one percent chance that Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction? Psychologically, since WMD are so scary, the answer was yes. But as far as evidence goes, the answer was no. Suskind writes: "...Cheney's doctrine was an audacious challenge to international legalities. Where once a discernible act of aggression against America or its national interest was the threshold for a US military response, now even proof of a threat is too constraining a standard." (p. 214)
I just wish the Cheney Doctrine had been applied to such things as global warming or stem cell research. Is there a one percent chance that the US will fall woefully behind the rest of the world in developing disease prevention and cure because we will not fund stem cell research? Is there a one percent chance that global warming is caused by human activities? In terms of the invasion of Iraq, perhaps Cheney and Bush ought to have asked, is there a one percent chance that invading Iraq will increase jihadist recruitment and will turn world opinion so against the US that we will lose effectiveness in our ability to fight terrorism?
It could also be said that by the logic of the one percent doctrine we really ought to have invaded North Korea and Iran.
Although Ron Suskind's assault on the Bush administration is not frontal, make no mistake about it, this book is yet another indictment. Much of the barrage comes from the experience of professionals in the intelligence community, most particularly from the experience of George Tenet who was director of the CIA until Bush allowed him to resign in June of 2004. The main thrust of Suskind's intent is to show that the Cheney Doctrine allowed the Bush administration to accept "as a guiding principle...that suspicion was an adequate threshold for preventative action" and thereby justify the invasion of Iraq.
Along the way, Suskind shows how the Bush administration also justified torture of detainees, how it lied to the American people and the world about the "evidence" for WMD in Iraq, how it made a phony connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, and how in general secrecy and mendacity became hallmarks of the Bush administration.
There is a lot of insider knowledge in this book that could only have been gotten from people in the know whom Suskind does not identify. (Too bad.) He remarks in an "Author's Note" toward the end of the book that he'd like to mention their names and offer public thanks, but--to a one--I think they'd rather I not." (p. 350) Clearly this is the strength of this book, the sort of horse's mouth type of veracity that comes only from actually talking to those "deep inside."
One point that I found particularly interesting is the evidence here that Al Qaeda was responsible for the anthrax mailings that killed several people shortly after 9/11. (See pages 70-72 and 251-252.) We have not been made aware of this apparently because the Bush administration considers such knowledge too scary for consumption by the general public.
I also appreciated Suskind's statement that the neocons in the White House, led by Wolfowitz and Feith, thought that Saddam Hussein "was an easy mark...a demonstration model to show the new resolve of the United States and its postmodern rules of international behavior" (p. 214)--that is, to show that preemptive strikes were now policy, and aggressive wars might be in the offing from here on out. Actually this is the main reason for invading Iraq, that is, to flex new muscle and show the world that we will actually use our military strength.
One final observation from Suskind: "Cheney's nickname inside CIA was 'Edgar.' As in Bergen. The President would, by implication, be in the Charlie McCarthy role [that is, in the role of the puppet]. This isn't fair, but it is at least half true." (p. 213)
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11 of 12 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A scary book, 3 Sep 2006
I was expecting an anti-Bush polemic, but instead I got this rational, essentially fair volume, which is much more scary. The world's superpower, it seems, is in the hands of screwballs. At the top, a President who doesn't read much, who is more interested in loyalty than facts and who goes with his gut. Underneath him is a bunch of guys, the neocons, who do his thinking for him, according to their agenda. The "one percent" of the title comes from the Prince of Darkness itself, Dick Cheney - if there is only a one percent chance that a country will attack America, that country must be attacked. Evidence? Don't be silly, that's old-fashioned and not for the world's superpower and regent of Heaven on earth. Suspicion (real or imagined) is sufficient. Some of the revelations are quite startling. There's an Australian expression that someone is unfit to manage a country dunnee (outside toilet). The USA has become one giant dunnee - read this book and find out how it happened, and why the USA is flushed, but not with success.
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11 of 13 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Brave New World?, 15 Jul 2006
This superb book is prefaced with Thomas Jefferson's musings that only informed people can be entrusted with their own Government and one wonders what the result of the 2004 presidential elections would have been if The One Percent Doctrine was mandatory reading for every American voter.
Suskind's authoritative and mostly impartial narrative cuts through the hyperbole, scare stories, leaks and cover-ups that have defined the Bush Administration's assessment of the 'War On Terror'. Using first-hand sources who have worked deep inside the hidden heart of the intelligence led war Suskind's breathless, thriller-style narrative drives the action from the West Wing to the teeming slums of Karachi.
The One Percent Doctrine reveals startling and previously top secret insights including Jihaddist WMD plots, the use of torture at CIA 'Black Sites' and, most terrifyingy of all, the Bush Administration's hypocrisy, deceitfulness and utter incompetence.
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