Quite frankly, this is the most original collection of essays I have ever read. In full agreement with Halden (the other reviewer below) this book is a true testament to the learning and wisdom of Robert Jenson, a senior scholar for research at Princeton.
Dealing with philosophers like Hegel, Heidegger, Plato, Aristotle, Sartre, and theologians like Augustine and Luther, Jenson creates an illuminating world of reflection on various topics including: Death, Consciousness, Reality, Love, Wickedness, and Freedom. All of these topics are adressed in a specifically trinitarian manner, meaning not only are they related to the Triune God, but, through Jenson's awe-inspiring thought processes, we see that the Trinity is not some puzzle to be solved, but indeed, "the framework through which all Christian puzzles may be worked out."
For example, the problem of attempting to think about ones own death seems quite impossible. In the third person it is more simple, we can, for example, see that "Mark is dead," and our evidence would be Mark's lifeless body, lack of heartbeat, and so on... However when one comes to thinking one's own death, the only way to think about it is some form of extended life (e.g. sleep, or perpetual darkness) Hence (borrowing the German terms from Hegel) our death is a begriff (that is an understanding) which has no vorstellung (roughly speaking, without an object or reflection that may be fitted to it.) Indeed, truly the evidence for me of my death would be the cessation of consciousness, which is impossible as this again presupposes a consciousness to be conscious of the lack of consciousness, which is precisely the thing that is not suppose to be there. This, Robert Jenson points out, is part of the seduction of idealism, as it seems the cessation of my consciousness for me means that the world dissapears and never was (he mentions too that we even have to drop the "for me," because it is precisely "I" that am missing for such reflection.) Hence the nonbeing of consciousness is as such the nonbeing of everything.
And the solution? In short, Jenson turns to an explanation derived from the Trinitarian perichoretic life. He says that it is the nature of the SOn to submit to the will of the Father, and in so doing, He is the Son (and conversly, the Spirit and the Father are defined in this way as well) Just so this type of submission and mutual reciprocation is the very ground of God's inner Triune life, and just so is the basis also for the lives we live. Hence, Jenson sees in Christ's subordination to the Cross the ultimate expression of Christ's submission to the Father, and so Christ's death, in which He enters into nonbeing, is an extension of the very basis of the life of God (in their mutual reciprocity and distinction) so that Christ's death is the foundation of our life. In this way, Jenson sees the Christian material of a Trinitarian explanation as the basis for seeing death not as the nihilation of consciousness, but rather a movement that stems in the very nature of our relationship to God. (Obviously this raises some tough questions, as in, if death grounds our life, what would have happened if Adam and Eve, or anyone, had never sinned? That question, Jenson remarks in his systematic theology, is quite beside the point because God has tied His character to this history, and so any questions of abstract speculation are simply that--speculation. This is a point that I struggle with, but one that is treated fuller in his systematics.)
Another example I found intriguing is how consciousness relates to community. I wont go into an explanation, so as to not ruin the surprises awaiting. But I will mention an interesting critique of the Cartesian conception of the self-contained cogito that serves as an indubitable foundation for knowledge (a critique familiar to anyone who has read Sartre's Being and Nothingness) That is namely, that when we think, there is a sheer focus of consciousness IN which our thoughts are percieved. Whenever this sheer focus (which Jenson likens to Kant's "transcendental unity of apperception,") reflexively attempts to turn back and notice itself, it creates and posits an I (ego). The problem with this is that Descarte then took this I to be self evident that he existed rather than what Jenson sees as the more appropriate conclusion: "consciousness happens". Sartre and Jenson's criticism is that the "I" is always found WITHIN the focus of consciousness that thinks, and so is derivative and secondary, never actually being the thinker that thinks, but a composite of secondary self reflection. Just so the "I" that we may find of ourselves has no gaurantee of its authenticity. I'll leave you with that little piece to hopefully spurn you on to buy, or at least check out, this incredibly lucid book.
This is, again, one of the most fantastic books you could ever read on philosophical theology regarding these topics, especially considering how condensed and short the essays are (for the many of us who have somewhat truncated attention spans.)