On Killing: Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society [Paperback]

Grossman has impeccable credentials. He rose from the rank of private to lieutenant colonel and served in the 82nd Airborne, 7th Infantry Division and the U.S. Rangers and as a psychology professor at West Point.

After the Second World War, the British and Americans studied the phenomenon of non-firers. American studies confirmed that in battles on 15-20% of the troops fired to kill. In some situations where several riflemen were together firing at the enemy, others in the group would take on supporting roles (getting ammunition, tending the wounded etc.). There was a conspiracy of silence over the non-firers and those involved in a conspiracy to miss, even when their lives were endangered. The British confirmed that among the Argentinean troops in the Falklands, there was a similar rate of non-firers.

However, by the time of the Vietnam War, training techniques had been changed and the firing rates were around 95%. Herein lies the root of the problem. As a result of the non-firers, training methods were re-designed to remove the moral dilemma of taking human lives. Recruits were trained to shoot body shaped targets, not bullseyes and recruits were rewarded for "kills". At Puckapunyal (Recruit Training, Australia), recruits for Vietnam were instructed to aim for the chest, so if the enemy doesn't die they become a burden for their medical support teams. Bayonet training, which had probably remained unchanged for over 100 years, was designed to massively damage the enemy soldier's abdominal-thoracic region with a steel instrument possessing two specifically designed blood grooves. And, as the RDI said, "If you are unlucky enough to bayonet the enemy in the head and can't get your bayonet out, discharge a round and it should split the head open." In, out, on guard! Kill, kill! The NCOs and officers job in combat remains to get the troops to kill. I cannot agree with Grossman's observation that British officers do their jobs better because of the class distinction between themselves and their men, which allowed them to make more objective decisions (p. 168). The "fragging" phenomenon in Vietnam occurred because of this perceived indifference to the suffering of the troops.

Killing another human being is not a natural act, contrary to what the movies would have us believe. Grossman argued that only 2% of the troops are natural killers (psychopaths/sociopaths), the others need a variety of support strategies to overcome the feeling of guilt that eventually emerge. Perhaps a strongpoint of this book is the excellent diagrams, which capture the essence of key points in this treatise. The diagram showing the predisposition to kill (p.188) is a good example of Grossman's clarity of thought. He shows that the demands of authority, training and conditioning, experience, target attractiveness and group support all come into play before the trigger is pulled.

So, what made Vietnam different to previous and subsequent wars? Firstly, the training was different and the re-socialisation of recruits, particularly those conscripted into the military, was designed to make certain that the troops would kill. The troop rotations generally had new members of units arriving and leaving as individuals, thus denying them the support and absolutions for what they had taken part in. Thirdly, there was no safe rear area and troops had to be battle ready always. The Swank and Marchand research of 1946 showed that after 25 days troops suffered combat exhaustion, with a reduction in their effectiveness and ending after 50 days in a vegetative phase. Fourthly, the lack of support from the home communities turned many Vietnam veterans into pariahs and it took over a decade to begin this dreadful oversight. As a result, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) manifested itself in many returning troops who often left Vietnam and were expected to be civilians again within 12 hours. It was interesting that the British sent troops home from the Falklands by boat to overcome this specific problem.

For me, this book was an interesting read, but importantly it made me understand myself a little better.

Neil MacNeill, 31 Charlie.