Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (Unabridged) [Audio Download]

The book builds on this idea and discusses the familiar arguments about military spending and the differing views on multilateralism and international law that separate American from Europe. At the same time, Mr. Kagan suggests an original idea to explain the split in the West: the European Union, he argues, is predicated on the notion that institutions can resolve deep historical conflicts; if European were to accept the Hobbesian view, Mr. Kagan argues, they would deny the revolutionary nature of their project, as well as its implications for other regions of the world.

Still, this book is selective: there is little mention of Somalia, where Americans withdrew to avoid casualties, or Rwanda, where French forces moved in before UN peacekeepers. The British intervention in Sierra Leone and the French one in Cote d'Ivoire are similar examples of the European attitude to force, which hardly coincide with Mr. Kagan's view.

Mr. Kagan has argued, in essence, that the Europeans lack the collective capacity to act; but their attitude to power might not be as scornful as Mr. Kagan suggests. Still, it is impossible to study the relationship between Europe and America, and their respective roles in the world today, without reading this book.

Kagan's basic premise is that the two power bases have long been more different than either was willing to admit (mostly in terms of the relative reliance on force vs. diplomacy), and that the differences were masked by the Cold War rather than a product of the conclusion of it, and that is a point he backs up well. In fact, if one remembers that these words were based on a Policy Review essay written in the middle of last year -- before the current crisis between the U.S. and Germany/France -- the author's insight seems even greater.

My criticisms of the book come from part of the conclusion Kagan makes. He says, for example, that the difficulties between the U.S. and Europe would have shown themselves no matter who was in charge and no matter what else happened in the world, yet I cannot believe that is true. Would a more cosmopolitan and diplomatic team in the White House have so easily galvanized European anti-Americanism? If Sept. 11 not happened, would the situation have boiled over so quickly? Would Schroeder have been so vocally anti-American if he had not faced re-election as the Iraq problems started to develop? Would Chirac have taken such a strong stance if he did not feel France's power slipping in other areas? At times, the conclusion Kagan draws seems to show some of the eagerness for simple explanations to complex problems that he criticizes elsewhere.

Also, I find the price for such a slim volume more than a bit high, and the opportune release of the book at a moment when the Atlantic divide dominates the world's editorial pages is a testament to Alfred A. Knopf's business acumen.

But none of that is a reason to skip this important book. The tome is full of meaty ideas to chew on, and in speaking with friends involved in politics on both sides of the Atlantic, I can attest to the powerful impact that Kagan's ideas are having. It is a must read for anyone looking to understand the events shaping the western world ... or even those simply looking to participate in cocktail party conversation with those who are.