Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World [Paperback]

I found this book a pleasure to read, since it deals with some fascinating history. Nixon's trip to China in 1972 was an iconic event. A brilliant diplomatic stroke, it melted decades of deep freeze between two of the world's great powers and realigned the geopolitical triangle with the Soviet Union. It was a savvy political move too, clinching Nixon's image at home as a foreign policy virtuoso and helping ensure his reelection later that year, despite his inability to solve the quagmire in Vietnam. Nixon's trip to China was one of those rare political coups that seemed utterly impossible beforehand and unavoidably logical afterward.

Yet more than anything, it was terrific theater. To see Nixon, that beady-eyed communist-hater, toasting the Mao suits in the Great Hall of the People, climbing the Great Wall and meeting Mao Tse-tung himself in the Communist Party's inner sanctum -- it was mesmerizing. No one cared that the visit was largely symbolic and light on content. It was great symbolism at play.

The scene was unforgettable: China, though still embroiled in a violent paroxysm called the Cultural Revolution, appeared serene and enchanting to American viewers. A gaggle of U.S. reporters followed Nixon to scenic spots and his meetingw with China's happy workers and smiling schoolchildren. The cast of characters was top-notch: Nixon, Mao, Henry Kissinger and Premier Chou En-lai, each with his own individual brand of psychosis, paranoia and dastardly political skill. The intermingling of these four, in a complex diplomatic mating dance that could easily have gone wrong, is a historian's dream.

It's no wonder that the trip inspired an entire Western opera and a permanent place in our lexicon, as in "It was a Nixon-goes-to-China moment." What is a wonder is that it has taken until now for a general history to be written about this diplomatic milestone.

In "Nixon and Mao," Margaret MacMillan draws together the colorful strands of the drama, with all its inherent chanciness and tension. MacMillan is strong on diplomacy but weak on Chinese politics. The structure of her book, with a timeline that bounces around, is not optimal. Yet she's a fine writer, and she delivers an illuminating account.

MacMillan's previous book, "Paris 1919," is a history of the intricate negotiations involved in the peace treaty negotiations after World War I. She crafted a richly satisfying narrative that conveyed the far-reaching effects of those negotiations while giving a full flavor of its primary players, including Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau.

In "Nixon and Mao," MacMillan opens with the flight to Beijing. Nixon was anxious; he knew he was taking a big risk. If the trip failed, he could be blamed for making a colossal blunder. The draft diplomatic agreement between the two countries was still far from complete, and there was no guarantee it would be signed by the end of the trip. There was no commitment by the Chinese that Nixon would even meet Mao, who was said to be having difficulty getting out of bed or leaving his chamber.

Nixon had studied hard, as he always did, knowing that true diplomatic success would require a subtle understanding of the politics of the leaders he was meeting. He practiced using chopsticks so he wouldn't look silly at banquets. His advance team worked hard as well, to get the best camera angles for the U.S. media. MacMillan also shows us how Nixon was concerned with petty problems, like keeping his secretary of state, William Rogers, out of major meetings with Mao and Chou. Nixon worked better with Kissinger, who shared his love of stealth.

In fact, MacMillan shows us that Nixon and Kissinger insisted on secrecy at every step of planning for the visit. On Kissinger's previous trip to Beijing to lay the groundwork for the rapprochement, Mao and Chou -- no slouches in clandestine matters -- were baffled by American demands to keep all quiet. Nixon and Kissinger claimed that the right wing in Washington would sabotage their plans. Relying on interviews, research and newly available documents, MacMillan persuasively challenges this view: Nixon and Kissinger, she suggests, were just addicted to secrecy.

Mao was much like Nixon in his paranoia, his inability to make friends and his brilliant interpretation of history and politics. For Mao, deciding to open relations with the United States marked a sharp turn from his fanatical leftism and his ultra-isolationist foreign policy. MacMillan stumbles here. She sees Mao as a patriot, concerned with the good of his nation, when what he really cared about was the good of Mao. For decades, he missed few opportunities to destroy his country.

Mao drove foreign policy to meet the imperatives of his own domestic politics; in 1972, that meant restraining leftists in his midst. As chairman of the Communist Party, Mao was like a mob boss, appearing to be totally in charge but perpetually at work to keep his captains off-balance, lest one challenge him. It was precisely that fear that generated Mao's feud with his No. 2, Lin Biao, whose mysterious death offers a haunting backdrop to the time period when Nixon's trip was being planned.

Vietnam became a fascinating sideshow to the trip; leaders in Hanoi turned apoplectic at the sight of their main enemy shaking hands with their supposed patron in the north. In the months afterward, Mao was impatient with Hanoi and tossed its leaders a simple suggestion: Sign a peace treaty, regroup until after most Americans have left and then roll in. "That is, in effect, what happened," MacMillan observes.

It was Taiwan that presented the toughest impediment to a joint agreement on Nixon's visit. Kissinger labored to come up with language that would satisfy China's insistence that American support eventual reunification and still allow for a U.S. demand for peaceful change. It was treacherous diplomatic territory, and only on the final day of the visit did both sides agree to what became known as the Shanghai Communiqué.

In 1972, few could imagine that Taiwan would today be a thriving democracy, that China would enjoy one of the biggest economic expansions in world history, that the Soviet threat would be a distant memory, that Vietnam would be welcoming American investors. MacMillan does not do justice to all those historical dynamics, or fully explain just how Nixon's trip changed the world. Yet those dynamics, in varying ways and degrees, all grew from seeds planted the day Nixon's foot landed on Chinese soil.

Margaret MacMillan, a University of Toronto historian, is well-known for having written "Paris 1919," which explored some crucial moments following the First World War. Now she has produced another first-rate work of an event that changed the course of history. She is apparently a follower of the "great men" school of history which attaches central importance to the agency of a few key players. The dramatis personae of Paris 1919 as well as those of Beijing 1972 all had a strong vision of what they wanted the future to look like and all had the requisite egos to pursue those visions. What these events set in motion, however, was unforseen by most parties. In Beijing 1972, it was as Nixon said, "a week that changed the world," but in ways that he never imagined.

MacMillan's account focuses not only on Nixon and Mao, but also on Kissinger and Zhou Enlai. These two arch-realists worked behind the scenes to negotiate the terms of this new diplomatic understanding that later became the Shanghai Communique.

Memories of "ping pong diplomacy" and "playing the China card" are distant but Macmillan does an excellent job of resurrecting this period. She delves deeply into what motivated Nixon, a life-long anticommunist and red-baiter, to open diplomatic relations with China. It was a time when the US was mired in an unwinnable war in Vietnam, as well as dealing with race riots and antiwar protests at home; Nixon was looking for a dramatic gesture. A trip to China was an extremely risky political undertaking whose success was by no means guaranteed.

Mao was also desparately in need of a win; not only was China's economy in shambles due to his mismanagement, the country was also on the brink of war with the Soviet Union. MacMillan does not give a flattering portrait of Mao. He had turned a country with great potential into an isolated, impoverished, and paranoid state.

Looking back and applying the logic of the enemy of my enemy is my friend, the Sino-American diplomatic reconciliation seems like a natural step insofar as both were enemies of the Soviet Union. At the time, however, it was still unthinkable by many and due to its highly sensitive nature, many allies were kept out of the loop. It essentially reshuffled the Great Power relations that eventually led to the demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of China as a superpower.

The new Sino-American friendliness certainly startled the Vietnamese, who were a Chinese client state of sorts. It also went a long way in silencing some of Nixon's critics at home and helped him get reelected that same year. The Europeans and the State Department complained loudly for not being kept informed.

What is interesting about this book is the new light it sheds on why Nixon and Kissinger were so secretive. The backroom negotiations that Kissinger had with Zhou Enlai already acknowledged that the US would eventually pull troops out of Vietnam in return for China getting the Vietnamese to sign a peace treaty. It was a classic exercise of moral unclarity for which realists are famous would have outraged the right-wing back home. In fact, William F Buckley, who was one of the entourage, but not involved in negotiations, was already disgusted by the friendliness that Nixon was showing toward Mao at the official gatherings.

And speaking of unforseen consequences, Nixon told Kissinger not to spend too much time negotiating trade issues, since it represented such an insignificant part of their respective economies - and at the time it did. But who would have predicted that this meeting would lead to a $250 billion annual trade deficit 25 years later? It was definitely a week that changed the world.

Margaret MacMillan, previously known for her book on the Paris peace negotations ending the first world war, has given us an interesting look at Nixon's historic trip to China in 1972.

The trip was only a week in duration, and hardly seems worthy of an entire manuscript unless the historian is able to provide a comprehensive analysis of the ramifications of Nixon's visit. MacMillan, however, does not provide us with this evaluation.

She writes a rich story, filled with wonderful images and colorful characters, but fails to fully analyze the significance of Nixon's journey. Her book provides us with a nice portrait of Mao Tse-Tung, the Chinese leader whom Nixon met with (only once) during his journey to China, Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security advisor, and Chou En-Lai, Kissinger's primary contact in Beijing.

MacMillan's details about the trip are amazing, and certainly indicative of strong research abilities - she profiles Nixon in such a way that his paranoia and self doubt are on full display (see chapters 1 and 2 for a nice discussion on how nervous Nixon was as he prepared for the meetings). She also throws in lively quips to remind us just how human the participants were (giving us an image of Nixon parading around his hotel room in his undergarments, or a request made by Nixon for the phone number of ladies in a black book - not for himself, but for Kissinger). This is the highlight of her writing, and she does a fantastic job of giving us the details that allow us to remember the participants as people rather than just politicians.

Overall, however, the book is incomplete - it just does not explain why the meetings changed the world in enough depth to justify the title ("Nixon and Mao: The Week that changed the world"). I recommend the book to anyone looking for a biographical evaluation of the participants in these historic talks, but if one is seeking a profound scholarly analysis of the topic, this is not the right book to read.