- Hardcover: 256 pages
- Publisher: MIT Press; First Edition, First Printing edition (20 Sep 2005)
- Language English
- ISBN-10: 0262182475
- ISBN-13: 978-0262182478
- Product Dimensions: 15.2 x 1.5 x 22.9 cm
- Amazon Bestsellers Rank: 2,158,879 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
Neither Brain nor Ghost
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Review
"This book is an essential read for those interested in the nature of mind; for those of usalready sympathetic to the project, the book enriches the view with historical antecedentsfrom some unlikely places and offers a progressive scientific program for how to explore thenew view of mind empirically." Journal of Philosophy of Science
Product Description
In this highly original work, Teed Rockwell rejects both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory. He proposes instead that mental phenomena emerge not merely from brain activity but from an interacting nexus of brain, body, and world. The mind can be seen not as an organ within the body, but as a "behavioral field" that fluctuates within this brain-body-world nexus. If we reject the dominant form of the mind-brain identity theory -- which Rockwell calls "Cartesian materialism" (distinct from Daniel Dennett's concept of the same name) -- and accept this new alternative, then many philosophical and scientific problems can be solved. Other philosophers have flirted with these ideas, including Dewey, Heidegger, Putnam, Millikan, and Dennett. But Rockwell goes further than these tentative speculations and offers a detailed alternative to the dominant philosophical view, applying pragmatist insights to contemporary scientific and philosophical problems.Rockwell shows that neuroscience no longer supports the mind-brain identity theory because the brain cannot be isolated from the rest of the nervous system; moreover, there is evidence that the mind is hormonal as well as neural. These data, and Rockwell's reanalysis of the concept of causality, show why the borders of mental embodiment cannot be neatly drawn at the skull, or even at the skin. Rockwell then demonstrates how his proposed view of the mind can resolve paradoxes engendered by the mind-brain identity theory in such fields as neuroscience, artificial intelligence, epistemology, and philosophy of language. Finally, he argues that understanding the mind as a "behavioral field" supports the new cognitive science paradigm of dynamic systems theory (DST).
Inside This Book
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First Sentence
It is usually assumed that when we say "the mind is the brain" we are taking a concept from neurophysiology (brain), and saying that it translates to a concept from common sense (mind). Read the first page
Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index
It is usually assumed that when we say "the mind is the brain" we are taking a concept from neurophysiology (brain), and saying that it translates to a concept from common sense (mind). Read the first page
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Concordance
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Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index
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3 reviews
6 of 6 people found the following review helpful
a good read
7 Mar 2008
Format:Paperback|Amazon Verified Purchase
You'll find this one hard to put down. Rockwell writes very well: his self-confidence is invigorating without being excessive, and his use of friendly sarcasm toward many of the big names in philosophy of mind gives the reader a vivid point of entry into the chief problems of the field (I now feel a lot smarter about all the disputes Rockwell covers than I did before reading his book, which took less than 24 hours amidst numerous other activities).
The book makes two major claims, and I find the first a lot more interesting than the second (hence 4 stars rather than 5):
1. Mentality is not linked only with the brain. Numerous events that go on in the nervous system and hormonally have to count as mental. Pushing things still further, Rockwell argues that since mentality involves interactions with the environment, we cannot really restrict the mental realm to an "inner" sphere of the human body. This is all quite fascinating.
2. Rockwell justifies his theory on the basis of the pragmatist metaphysics of Dewey. This initially serves as a refreshing basis for his relational theory of the mind, but it eventually leads him into deeper waters where he merely asserts the more extreme metaphysical consequences of pragmatism... nothing has intrinsic qualities, it's unclear whether the world can exist without humans, etc. Granted, this was not explicitly meant as a work on metaphysics, but the antirealist underpinnings of his relational theory of mind come off as a bit facile.
Nonetheless, the book is a pleasure to read.
The book makes two major claims, and I find the first a lot more interesting than the second (hence 4 stars rather than 5):
1. Mentality is not linked only with the brain. Numerous events that go on in the nervous system and hormonally have to count as mental. Pushing things still further, Rockwell argues that since mentality involves interactions with the environment, we cannot really restrict the mental realm to an "inner" sphere of the human body. This is all quite fascinating.
2. Rockwell justifies his theory on the basis of the pragmatist metaphysics of Dewey. This initially serves as a refreshing basis for his relational theory of the mind, but it eventually leads him into deeper waters where he merely asserts the more extreme metaphysical consequences of pragmatism... nothing has intrinsic qualities, it's unclear whether the world can exist without humans, etc. Granted, this was not explicitly meant as a work on metaphysics, but the antirealist underpinnings of his relational theory of mind come off as a bit facile.
Nonetheless, the book is a pleasure to read.
Interesting Proposal for Embodied Cognition
22 Feb 2012
Format:Kindle Edition|Amazon Verified Purchase
This book makes a very interesting proposal in the area emerging within philosophy of mind known as "embodied cognition". This is basically the view that 'mind' or 'mental events' should not be identified with the brain, but rather with the whole body. Most embodied views also make the claim that 'mind' extends beyond the body. That is, in fact, the view of Rockwell taken in this book. He describes 'mind' as a 'behavioral field' which supervenes on the 'brain-body-world nexus'.
He spends a few chapters at the end of the book critiquing computational models of cognition (especially as it has manifested itself in the construction of computers as 'artificial intelligence') and proposes 'connectionist networks' as a more plausible model of human cognition.
Anyone interested in this book should know that it is fairly technical and presupposes some understanding of philosophy of mind. It would also be advisable to find a book that overviews connectionist networks so that you don't have to rely solely on his explanation (which also gets somewhat technical).
Overall a great read and an intriguing contribution to embodied cognitive theory.
He spends a few chapters at the end of the book critiquing computational models of cognition (especially as it has manifested itself in the construction of computers as 'artificial intelligence') and proposes 'connectionist networks' as a more plausible model of human cognition.
Anyone interested in this book should know that it is fairly technical and presupposes some understanding of philosophy of mind. It would also be advisable to find a book that overviews connectionist networks so that you don't have to rely solely on his explanation (which also gets somewhat technical).
Overall a great read and an intriguing contribution to embodied cognitive theory.
5 of 8 people found the following review helpful
Pushing the envelope clearly
8 May 2007
Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase
Concise, clear tour of the field of mind, brain, language studies - pushing the envelope back to Dewey and then ahead with the dynamic systems theorists & connectionists. Exemplary. He is at the forefront of philosophers working to understand the continuities of mind and environment.
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