Nazis on the Run: How Hitler's Henchmen Fled Justice [Hardcover]

This book provides an excellent account of the escape of Nazis from post-war Germany. Steinacher includes original oral and documentary support for his theme and applies his own values to the evidence. Simon Wiesenthal's obsession with Nazi-hunting was understandable but his penchant for lying and exaggeration was unhelpful. He created the myth of ODESSA as a symbol to maintain public outrage of unpunished Nazi criminals. Steinacher dismisses Wiesenthal's claim that die-hard Nazis were conspiring to revive National Socialism and usher in a new era of conflict. The myth received world-wide publicity by Frederick Forsyth's 1972 novel The Odessa File which became a hit movie.

The US Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) examined all relevant evidence on Odessa, concluding that its origins were vague and based on hearsay. Similarly, Wiesenthal claimed that approval for the transfer of billions of Goldmarks to fund "the greatest fugitive organisation in world history" took place in Strasbourg in August 1944 which was attended by coal magnet Emil Kirdorf and steel magnates Fritz Thyssen and Gustav Krupp. However, Kirdorf died in 1938, Krupp was no longer actively involved in his company while Thyssen, who opposed the war, had been expelled from the Nazi Party in 1940 and was imprisoned in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp at the time the Strasbourg meeting allegedly took place.

The collapse of communism provided an opportunity to study previously inaccessible archives, highlighting the ODESSA myth and throwing new light on Nazi escape routes which were initially established by soldiers who had fought together. Such networks facilitated emigration and assisted fleeing Nazi war criminals. South Tyrol was an area which attracted many Nazis primarily because of its the ethno-Germanic culture. From South Tyrol fugitives were able to cross into Italy and hence to Spain, Argentina and other destinations. They were able to do so because of conditions which were specific to time and place. In addition they received assistance from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Roman Catholic Church and the intelligence services of the Western Allies.

The onset of the Cold War was critical in replacing Anti-Nazism with Anti-Communism. Technical expertise was a major factor, particularly in Argentina, while rocket scientist Walter von Braun went to America. German scientists captured by the Soviet Union travelled East where mass executions of repatriated soldiers provided a stimulus to cooperate fully. During the war the ICRC and the Vatican maintained what they considered were neutral positions for fear of Nazi reprisals against civilian populations. Although post-war opposition to "godless communism" represented real politik it served to demonstrate the collapse of each organisation's moral authority in not speaking out against Nazism.

The role of ICRC in helping fugitives has been acknowledged by the organisation itself. By 1951 it had issued 120,000 travel documents, some of them to notorious Nazis such as Adolf Eichmann, Josef Mengele and Franz Stangl albeit based on false information. ICRC travel documents were issued for six months only and were not intended for use as passports, although some countries were prepared to accept them as such. Steinacher contends the first postwar President of the organisation, Carl Jacob Burckhardt, was pro-German and latently anti-semitic but provides no evidence. Indeed, in considering the question of the extent of Burckhardt's influence on the ICRC's policies, he concludes "The question will remain on the table until further research on the biographies and decisions of the ICRC leadership is carried out."

Similar questions are asked about the Vatican which has refused to open its archives for the period after 1939. Bishop Alois Hudal was known for his admiration of Hitler's regime and convinced himself that an association between Catholic Christianity and National Socialism represented Europe's best hope against the spread of communism. His views were anathema to the Nazis because Hudal's theories envisaged a place for Christianity in the Nazi state whereas influential Nazis were trying to revive paganism. From 1937 onwards Hudal was kept in isolation inside the Vatican but used his external influence to operate one of the ratlines. After pressure from many quarters, including the Vatican, Hudal was forced into retirement in 1952. Notwithstanding his involvement in helping criminals flee (which he considered a pastoral responsibility) Hudal became a scapegoat for the Vatican's involvement in the ratlines.

Steinacher's description of the Vatican's dealings with the Croatian puppet state led by Ante Pavelic makes the same mistake as other historians by converting assertion into fact claiming that "it is hard to imagine that the top levels of the Vatican knew nothing of the presence and outward transfer of Croatian war criminals and Ustasa officers." This is entirely possible but does not amount to proof. It is known the Vatican drew up a list of Catholic priests involved in genocide against Serbs and Jews and expected them to accept responsibility for their actions . This was dropped when Tito took power. Many former Nazis were used by the CIC as sources of information, including Klaus Barbie, Karl Hass, Erich Priebke and the Belgian assassin Verbelen. Reinhard Gehlen provided expertise of Eastern Europe for the CIC, which used it as a weapon against Soviet expansion.

Steinacher notes, "although the truth about the escape of the Nazi war criminals has not changed since 1947, what we make of it certainly has." Postwar real politik trumped moral responsibility and human rights. Whether it was right to do so is moot. This conclusion does not favour one side or another, it confirms history is what happened not what ought to have happened. Guilt cannot be transferred through time. Ironically, the idea that it can lies at the heart of antisemitism. Better than most books on the subject, well worth reading. Five stars.