Munich: The 1938 Appeasement Crisis
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Review
'A sparkling and perceptive account of events that still resonate seventy years on' -- D. R. Thorpe
Review
'A brilliant recreation of a year which I imagined (quite wrongly) I knew everything about'
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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
13 of 13 people found the following review helpful
Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase
This is an absorbing, detailed, if somewhat lengthy account of the period leading upto and after the Munich Crisis of 1938.
Sadly, it exposes the weakness and vascilation of the then European leaders, led mainly by Britain's Neville Champerlain. These sincere but weak men spent much of their time by partly squabbling amongst themsleves or acting behind each others backs, thus allowing Adolf Hitler to absorb territories that he coveted, without his armies hardly firing a shot.
It is understandable that they wished to avoid another carnage like WW1 which was then so recent in time, but it makes one wonder what might have been if between them they has shown just a little defiance in the face of Hitler's bluster.
Sadly, it exposes the weakness and vascilation of the then European leaders, led mainly by Britain's Neville Champerlain. These sincere but weak men spent much of their time by partly squabbling amongst themsleves or acting behind each others backs, thus allowing Adolf Hitler to absorb territories that he coveted, without his armies hardly firing a shot.
It is understandable that they wished to avoid another carnage like WW1 which was then so recent in time, but it makes one wonder what might have been if between them they has shown just a little defiance in the face of Hitler's bluster.
11 of 11 people found the following review helpful
Format:Paperback
Firstly the book was easy to read and very informative on all aspects that took place in 1938. I have studied this area in brief before, so had some prior knowledge on the main events but never really understood the in depth political side, which in turn has enhanced my knowledge, especially form a British perspective with the difference in opinions over Chamberlains appeasement policies. The book is written in a way that does not confuse and because of its easy reading nature, I never wanted to put the book down. This book would be ideal and informative for anybody who has no prior knowledge on the appeasement year of 1938 and the many events such as the Munich Conference. Excellent.
9 of 9 people found the following review helpful
Format:Paperback
David Faber: Munich
The Munich agreement of 1938 is generally regarded as the nadir of British foreign policy. More than seventy years on, its memory still exerts a giant emotional influence over British politics. Munich and appeasement (the policy which produced it) have become permanent terms of abuse.
The central narrative of Munich is simple: its motivation is still in dispute. The British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, attempted to purchase peace with Hitler at the expense of Czechoslovakia, a small, democratic state in alliance with Britain's main ally, France. He pursued this policy with increasing desperation but two personal meetings with Hitler failed to produce a settlement and it seemed certain that Britain and France would go to war in September 1938. With last-minute melodrama (carefully manipulated by Chamberlain to influence Parliamentary and public opinion) the Munich conference averted war by dismembering Czechoslovakia, which was not even invited. Chamberlain's only resistance to Hitler's demands came over the loss of Czech farmers' cows, and even this was soon abandoned. Chamberlain then privately secured Hitler's signature (for all the world like an autograph hunter seeking out a movie star) to a meaningless declaration - hyped up for British voters as "peace in our time."
Some defenders of Chamberlain suggest that his policy was chosen from reluctant necessity. Britain was desperately weak in 1938: Munich bought a year of precious time for rearmament.
David Faber suggests otherwise. His lucid and compelling narrative Munich uses a wealth of British sources to show that Chamberlain believed totally in his policy - and in himself. In the run-up to the Iraq war, Tony Blair used the name of Neville Chamberlain to attack his critics. In fact, Blair's conduct of policy on Iraq presented many echoes of Chamberlain were intensely self-righteous, both men preferred cronies to experts, both men used spin doctors to plant propaganda on friendly journalists and put pressure on unfriendly ones, both men bypassed their Cabinets - pointlessly, since these Cabinets displayed little independence. By coincidence, each man suffered one resignation.
Munich still has the power to excite passion. David Faber's family history is closely linked with Munich: his grandfather Harold Macmillan and his great-uncle (by marriage) Leopold Amery were among the rare Conservative politicians who resisted Chamberlain's policy. He might have been tempted into refighting their battles. Instead, he lets the facts speak for themselves and the effect is to make Chamberlain seem far more dislikeable, and his policy far more misguided and disastrous.
David Faber only hints at the scale of that disaster and it is a pity that he denies himself any speculation about the alternative scenario for 1938. The British Prime Minister resists Hitler's demands and makes clear that he will stand by France over Czechoslovakia. Hitler is faced with the prospect of war with them and with Russia. Does he back down and endure humiliation? Does he fight? Does he get overthrown by conspirators? Whatever happens, it looks a better prospect than confronting Hitler in September 1939 - after losing the Czech army and its huge arsenal and armaments factories and turning Russia into an unfriendly neutral.
Munich is essential reading not just for students of the 1930s but as a case study in what can happen to the British state when it falls into the hands of an all-powerful Prime Minister with a deluded policy.
The Munich agreement of 1938 is generally regarded as the nadir of British foreign policy. More than seventy years on, its memory still exerts a giant emotional influence over British politics. Munich and appeasement (the policy which produced it) have become permanent terms of abuse.
The central narrative of Munich is simple: its motivation is still in dispute. The British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, attempted to purchase peace with Hitler at the expense of Czechoslovakia, a small, democratic state in alliance with Britain's main ally, France. He pursued this policy with increasing desperation but two personal meetings with Hitler failed to produce a settlement and it seemed certain that Britain and France would go to war in September 1938. With last-minute melodrama (carefully manipulated by Chamberlain to influence Parliamentary and public opinion) the Munich conference averted war by dismembering Czechoslovakia, which was not even invited. Chamberlain's only resistance to Hitler's demands came over the loss of Czech farmers' cows, and even this was soon abandoned. Chamberlain then privately secured Hitler's signature (for all the world like an autograph hunter seeking out a movie star) to a meaningless declaration - hyped up for British voters as "peace in our time."
Some defenders of Chamberlain suggest that his policy was chosen from reluctant necessity. Britain was desperately weak in 1938: Munich bought a year of precious time for rearmament.
David Faber suggests otherwise. His lucid and compelling narrative Munich uses a wealth of British sources to show that Chamberlain believed totally in his policy - and in himself. In the run-up to the Iraq war, Tony Blair used the name of Neville Chamberlain to attack his critics. In fact, Blair's conduct of policy on Iraq presented many echoes of Chamberlain were intensely self-righteous, both men preferred cronies to experts, both men used spin doctors to plant propaganda on friendly journalists and put pressure on unfriendly ones, both men bypassed their Cabinets - pointlessly, since these Cabinets displayed little independence. By coincidence, each man suffered one resignation.
Munich still has the power to excite passion. David Faber's family history is closely linked with Munich: his grandfather Harold Macmillan and his great-uncle (by marriage) Leopold Amery were among the rare Conservative politicians who resisted Chamberlain's policy. He might have been tempted into refighting their battles. Instead, he lets the facts speak for themselves and the effect is to make Chamberlain seem far more dislikeable, and his policy far more misguided and disastrous.
David Faber only hints at the scale of that disaster and it is a pity that he denies himself any speculation about the alternative scenario for 1938. The British Prime Minister resists Hitler's demands and makes clear that he will stand by France over Czechoslovakia. Hitler is faced with the prospect of war with them and with Russia. Does he back down and endure humiliation? Does he fight? Does he get overthrown by conspirators? Whatever happens, it looks a better prospect than confronting Hitler in September 1939 - after losing the Czech army and its huge arsenal and armaments factories and turning Russia into an unfriendly neutral.
Munich is essential reading not just for students of the 1930s but as a case study in what can happen to the British state when it falls into the hands of an all-powerful Prime Minister with a deluded policy.
Most Recent Customer Reviews
Munich 1938 an excellent book
I musts say I loved this book and found it very hard to put down. I actually found myself agreeing with the appeasement policy or indeed any policy to avoid the war I knew was... Read more
Published 26 days ago by Appeaser
The Shame of Appeasement
Faber's forensic analysis of the 1938 Munich Crisis is the best since On Borrowed Time. Although I have studied this period and arrogantly believed myself to be well versed in... Read more
Published 11 months ago by J. R. Fowler
Marvelous history
David Faber has crammed in lots of information but somehow has managed to tie it all together to make the story of this grey period of our history riveting. Read more
Published 15 months ago by Kevin Taylor
AN EXCELLENT NARRATIVE OF THE APPEASEMENT TRAGEDY
David Faber has meticulously researched one of the most tragic years on the eve of the Second World War,namely:1938. Read more
Published on 29 May 2009 by Paul Gelman
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