Mud, Blood and Poppycock: Britain and the Great War (CASSELL MILITARY PAPERBACKS) [Paperback]

Nearly a century after it started, the First World War continues to provoke major debates among historians. One major and rather popular contention has been that it was a futile war, fought by incompetent generals, who were happy to cover their shortcomings and sheer lack of imagination by feeding more and more men into the hellish mincing machine of the Western Front. In the classic description of the British Army by German General Hoffmann, the British Army were "lions led by donkeys". This was typified by "The Donkeys" of Alan Clark.

However, a cursory reading of WW1 histories reveals that, while there was indeed incompetence and lack of imagination in plenty (on both sides), things were never this simple. A long time ago, John Terraine pointed out that WW1 was unique in that, for the only time in history (a) armies were so big that a commander could not see the whole battlefield, and (b) there was no way of effective communication with the army. Thus, once an attack was set in motion, there was no way to control it, or even to stop it if it went wrong. More recently, Niall Ferguson has pointed out that, contrary to popular myth, many soldiers had a "good" war, and even enjoyed the experience.

Both sides were operating in completely unknown territory; they had envisioned a war of movement, with the outflanking movements beloved of generals since before Alexander (just look at the Schlieffen Plan), and both were taken by surprise when they found themselves stuck in a version of siege warfare in which outflanking was impossible, apart from attacking somewhere else entirely (e.g. Gallipoli). So, when your enemy digs in and goes completely on the defensive and his flank can't be turned, your options are limited. The British Army in particular, a tiny regular force (Bismarck famously said that, if it ever invaded Germany, he'd have the Berlin Police arrest it), had to adapt to a situation that it could never have imagined and for which it was not at all prepared. And it had to expand enormously to do it.

Gordon Corrigan's point of view can be summarised in the following sentences from his closing chapter:

"In this book I have tried to show that the Great War of 1914 to 1918 was a just war, which Britain was right to join...The New Army's first encounter with all-out war on the Somme was inevitably shocking. The Army learned, and improved continuously as time went on... Haig and the general may not have been the best team that the British Army has ever produced, but they were pretty good and did their best with what they had in a war whose like had never been contemplated."

This provocatively-titled book thus seeks to present the case for the defence of the war (so to speak), that it was necessary to fight it and that, given the circumstances, the British High Command made as good a fist of it as could be expected. Much of this ground has been covered before, but Mr. Corrigan brings it all together in a rather well and clearly presented summary. Moreover, he says that Hoffmann's "lions led by donkeys" was never uttered by Hoffmann at all, but invented by a British journalist!

So, how does he do? In my estimation, quite well. Of course, Corrigan, a former soldier, sees the war through soldier's eyes and one wonders whether he perhaps feels the need to stick up for the soldiers (he is scathing about the interfering politicians, especially Lloyd George). So, one can't help wondering whether there are things that he doesn't mention. For example, initially he attacks the myths very aggressively. However, when it comes to the Somme, the first day of which was described by someone as "the greatest British military disaster since the Battle of Hastings", the tone changes and is more careful, almost as if he feels the need to build his case very carefully. And at this point, one wonders whether he is telling everything. Although he dismisses the 60lb packs allegedly carried at the Somme as a myth, he is silent as to the "slow walk", in orderly ranks, across the battlefield, in a manner that would have been fine at Waterloo, where there didn't happen to be machine guns.

One myth that it is good to see despatched is the contribution of the USA. Popularly dismissed as too little, too late to have any real effect, Corrigan shows that the doughboys made an enormous contribution to victory. The Allies may have won the war without the entry of the USA, but it would have taken a lot longer and cost even more lives. The Americans had to learn some hard lessons very quickly, but they benefitted from the experience of the Allies and very quickly became a highly effective fighting force and an essential part of the hammer blows which made even Ludendorff (mistakenly rendered as "von Ludendorff") realise that the game was up. The US contribution to the Great War is largely forgotten, even in the USA (at the time of writing, I believe that there is only one old doughboy left), and it's good to see it remembered.

So, all in all, apart from minor shortcomings, this short volume adds an interesting perspective to a war that is now just on the fringes of living memory, and, whether you agree with it or not (and I confess to reservations, which may just be my ignorance talking) is well worth reading.

Corrigan's book is an excellent effort to try and debunk some of the myths surrounding WW1 and in particular, to defend the British General Staff's handling of it.

One face value, this would seem to be a difficult job - one would feel it would be easier to defend Harold Shipman than Field Marshal Haig, but Corrigan makes an excellent attempt at it, supporting his views by statistics.

He also tries to give the reader "the big picture", that the British effort on the Somme was required to take the pressure off the French at Verdun; and that acting as part of a coalition the British staff were not always given a free hand.

Nonetheless, like all revisionist histories, this book cannot be read in isolation. It is true that whilst the British generals were not the "donkeys" of popular myth; they still made some gruesome mistakes. 1st July 1916 on the Somme was still a disaster.

I would recommend that this book is read in conjunction with other histories of the war. Basil Liddell Hart's is very much a "standard" text giving the traditional viewpoint. Another good read is Heinz Guderian's "Achtung Panzer!". As well as his prophetic work on armoured warfare, this gives a German view of the British in WW1 and is an excellent companion to Corrigan's book.

There's a lot worth reading in this book for anyone seriously interested in WW1. The author brings his military experience into good use in describing a lot of things many authors take for granted the reader knows - the structure of armies, the various ranks, how trenches were constructed, and so on. For someone like me who has never done any form of military service, this was very enlightening.

Also his analysis of army records to find out how soldiers actually did in the trenches - their rotas, use of reserve lines, R&R etc -was, to me, completely new. (He does, however, cite them uncitically, assuming that the records reflect the reality, which may not always be true)

So why the modest rating?

Firstly, this is not a well-written book. I found the author's style stiff and stuffy, with his attempts at humour all falling flat.

More serious, though, is that the author seems hell-bent to defend absolutely everything the army did in WW1. I have long been a convert to the "revisionist" view of WW1 - I agree entirely with the author that the "lions lead by donkeys"/"senseless slaughter & stupid generals" view of WW1 should be consigned to the dustbin of history - but time after time, the author seems to simply ignore any evidence contrary to his book's thesis.

I could cite many examples of this, but three will suffice:
(1) In the "Kangaroo Courts" chapter, the author apparently rubbishes any claims of misjustice. He partially does this by one of the oldest tricks in the book, i.e. putting up a straw man to demolish, in this case the cases of three executions "often cited" as unjust. The author rubbishes them and proceeds, with faulty logic, to virtually dismiss all claims of injustice. (The last case, the "Stone case", was recently featured on a TV documentary; it was interesting to see some of the facts that the author left out, particularly the correspondence between Haig & his generals clearly stating the view that there was a need to "made an example of" some men.)

(2) In the section on the Somme, the author glosses over the disastrous first day of the campaign, ignoring all the evidence of strategic confusion and tactics based on hope rather than experience. Read Huw Strachan or John Keegan's books on this for a contrast.

(3) In a lighter mode, read the section on the infamous General Cameron Shute and marvel at the naivety with which the author dismisses Shute's critics by pointing out how much training he'd had, then search the Internet for some naval documentation on Shute.

The author seems to have prejudices which often sppear to come to the surface - his low regard for Australians & the Irish, and his soldier's incomprehension about political realities is a recurring feature.

Personally, I doubt if this book will make many converts to the "revisionist" cause, as it is too blatantly biased. Try Gary Sheffield's "Forgotten Victory" instead.