Visiting Moscow on the way to the airport I surprised the Intourist guide asking if I could stop the bus. I wanted to see the monument marking the point at which the Germans got closet to Moscow. She was puzzled "You are interested in that?" Yes, I have always been fascinated in twentieth century Russian history, politics, economics and society - events on an enormous scale and the enigma that is the Russian spirit. It is really hard to write a dull book about Russia, "Moscow 1941" isn't but you have to look at the subtitle "A City and Its People at War" to appreciate what Rodric Braithwaite is writing about.
This is a not hard-core military account, it is more a social commentary. Moscow is never going to have the impact of Stalingrad or siege of Leningrad (900 days, 1 million died). But "by one measure- the number of people involved -the battle for Moscow was the greatest battle in the Second World War therefore the greatest battle in history." Although 926,000 were killed this is more than the battle for Moscow as the armies of the centre manoeuvred. The city was never taken; it was in danger for a comparatively short period (effectively out of the front line by December 1941) and bombed less intensively than London. Moscow had enormous importance to the Soviet economy, with a huge concentration of war industries so for the Germans it's capture was more than symbolic. The city did suffer; living under a totalitarian communist regime as well as enduring the German invasion. At the most critical of times there were purges and self-inflicted cruelty - business as usual for the secret police.
Braithwaite provides a wider perspective on communist Russia. I can appreciate it might be seen as tangential having little to do with Moscow in 1941. Here is evidence on how well totalitarian states adapt well to military crisis. Braithwaite's technique is to provide hundreds of vignettes of Russians, the great and the good, the ordinary and humble and sketch how the events of 1941 - the invasion and German advance on the capital - impacted on them. Even his accounts of the Generals are as humans rather than technicians. This is about the human experience of war; a psychologist could find a wealth of material here.
It helps to have a reasonable understanding of Russia, specifically the state that emerged after 1917 to take this book on. One aspect is how Stalin overruled his generals with disastrous consequences. "Stalin's wishful thinking had become a catastrophic obsession" (p 60). It is generally accepted Stalin gave his commanders considerable tactical autonomy, unlike Hitler and a critical factor in beating the Germans. But at this stage he was meddling. In planning a counteroffensive far too early in 1942 (page 325) failure was expensive and pointless. Braithwaite, when he does attempt to address military matters is not good, for example when he makes inconclusive remarks on the effectiveness of partisans.
This is a book about people in a war and the great German gamble that assumed - when confronted by overwhelming might and detesting the Stalinist regime - that the Soviet people would implode. This book shows the resilience and spirit of the Russians, willing to somehow hold together and drown the invader in their own blood. An immense sacrifice in defence of the motherland.