Moral Realism: A Defence [Paperback]

Another strength of this book is its comprehensiveness. While this is a work of original scholarship and not an introduction to contemporary meta-ethics, Shafer-Landau covers enough ground for this book to function as an advanced introduction to most of the subject matter. He discusses all the major areas in contemporary meta-ethics, and he does so by drawing on a vast knowledge of the relevant literature. Furthermore, he does an excellent job of encapsulating the major debates and most influential arguments in contemporary meta-ethics. Consequently, the book can serve as an entry to much of the contemporary literature in meta-ethics.

I'll now briefly describe the view Shafer-Landau is defending. As I said above, he defends non-naturalist moral realism. Moral realism is the thesis there are objective moral facts. In other words, it is the thesis that there are moral facts, and they are not constituted by what any actual or possible person (or any actual or possible group of persons) thinks, feels, believes, etc. Shafer-Landau argues that these objective moral facts are non-natural facts. The moral facts are sui generis, and in particular they are not a sort of natural facts. His non-naturalism also includes a thesis about moral language: that it cannot be analyzed into the language of the natural or social sciences.

In explaining his position, Shafer-Landau emphasizes that it does not commit him to the existence of strange, inexplicable moral stuff. His position is that the moral facts are wholly constituted by non-moral (probably wholly natural) facts, though they are not identical to any non-moral facts. This rests on a form of property pluralism according to which moral properties, though not identical to non-moral properties, are realized by non-moral properties. Things have moral properties that are not identical to natural properties, and therefore moral facts (i.e. facts about which things have which moral properties) are wholly constituted by natural facts but are not themselves natural facts.

I can't summarize the rest of Shafer-Landau's position or his arguments for it here, so I'll simply explain the structure of his book and provide a bare summary of his main conclusions.

The book is divided into five parts. The first part is a defense of the two major components of moral realism: that there are moral facts, and that these facts are objective. He first argues against noncognitivism, which he takes to be a form of nihilism (i.e. the view that there are no moral facts). He then argues against constructivism, according to which there are moral facts but they are not objective. Constructivists maintain that moral facts are constituted by what real or idealized people or groups of people think, feel, believe, etc. He argues that both noncognitivism (i.e. nihilism) and constructivism fail to capture certain important aspects of morality, and that realists are better able to capture these features. When we fully understand ordinary moral practice and thought, realism is the default position. Given these facts, we ought to prefer realism--unless it faces insuperable problems.

In the remainder of the book, Shafer-Landau attempts to show that realists face no such problems. He discusses what he considers to be the major problems facing realists, and he wants to show that none of them pose an especially grave threat to their views. The responses to these problems also provide Shafer-Landau with room to elaborate and explain his own views.

The first problem is metaphysical. What are moral facts like, and how can we make sense of there being such facts? He considers the sort of non-naturalism I described above to be a good response to these questions.

The second problem concerns motivation. How can realists explain the connection between moral judgment and motivation? Many argue for the view that there is an internal (i.e. conceptual) connection between moral judgment and motivation. If this is the case, then moral judgments must express conative states rather than beliefs; and so realism is false. Shafer-Landau argues that for motivational externalism; that is, he argues that there is no such connection to be explained.

The third problem concerns connection between reasons and moral judgments. How can realists explain the connection between moral judgments and reasons for action? Shafer-Landau argues for a sort of rationalism: that moral facts necessarily provide reasons for action. This, he thinks, accounts for the normativity of moral facts. However, he rejects reasons internalism, according to which a person's reasons depend on her commitments, desires, aims, projects, etc. He thinks people can have reasons for action even if those reasons do not depend on these things.

Another problem is the existence and persistence of moral disagreement. Why, if there are objective moral facts, do people disagree about moral issues in the way they do? Here Shafer-Landau exploits some traditional responses to this argument, but his favored argument points to similar disagreements in philosophy and religion, and to the fact that we still take these areas to be objective. Why, then, should we think this is not the case in ethics?

Finally, there are problems of moral epistemology. How can a realist explain the possibility of acquiring moral knowledge? He argues that some moral truths are self-evident, and that we can defend a reliabilist moral epistemology for other moral truths.

So far as I know, this is the most detailed and comprehensive contemporary treatise defending a form of non-naturalism. For that reason alone, I'd recommend it to anyone interested in serious study of contemporary meta-ethics. But, as I said above, I think this book can serve as a useful advanced introduction to the subject matter, and so I'd also recommend it to anyone with some philosophical background who is interested in these issues.