Andy Clark
A refreshingly progressive recipe for laying wide the doors of sensation
Daniel Dennett
Humphrey's account leaves open the prospect of a conscious robot
Valerie Gray Hardcastle
Humphrey has the insight that the ways we describe both our mental states and our brain states are probably wrong
Carol Rovane
Humphrey's account of the position of qualia in mental life is the most promising and fertile I have seen. I am especially impressed by his pivotal idea that sensation is itself a species of affect-laden intentional activity. This is a genuinely new idea with enormous appeal and explanatory potential, the full measure of which I suspect not even he has taken.
Robert van Gilick
Humphrey's essay is full of intriguing and original suggestions, pointing out new directions for investigation and probing deep beneath the surface.
Book Description
The mind is the brain. Each mental state -- each hope, fear, thought -- can be identified with a particular physical state of the brain, without remainder. So argues Nicholas Humphrey in this highly readable yet scholarly essay. He offers strong support for his "identity theory" from evolution. His controversial claim is discussed and challenged in contributions by popular authors such as Andy Clark (Being There, 1997), Daniel Dennett (Consciousness Explained, 1991; Darwin's Dangerous Idea, 1995) and Ralph Ellis (Questioning Consciousness, 1995). Humphrey rounds off the book with a response to his critics. An excellent short introduction to the mind-body problem and the study of consciousness.
About the Author
Nicholas Humphrey is author of the widely-read A History of the Mind (1992) and other books including Consciousness Regained and Soul-Searching. He is senior research fellow in evolutionary psychology at the London School of Economics.
