Manstein: Hitler's Greatest General [Paperback]

When I first read that biography of General-Field Marshal Erich von Manstein was about to be published I was elated. When I learnt the said work was to be written by a senior British military analyst and historian I literally couldnt wait to get the book.

I was not to be disappointed.

This book is an indepth and articulate historical study of the man who in the humble opinion of this reviewer was the last great tactical genius of conventional warfare, and was long overdue for a serious study and biography.

Western historians and military figures have traditionally swallowed German wartime propoganda(mostly Goebbels work) and assumed that the likes of Rommel and Model were german military geniuses, while the standout German military leader was in fact Erich von Manstein. Hitler admired Manstein ability but loathed his attitude and aristocratic background, and saw von Manstein as a threat. Hence his promotion of individuals such as Rommel.

Although von Mansteins name is well known to serious students of military history it is less known to historians and the public at large. This book quite rightly seeks to address that lack of knowledge about this talented and complicated individual.

From the conception of the successful invasion of France to the capture of the Crimea, and holding the Red Army at bay - as much as was possible - as the German Army retreated after Stalingrad, Manstein was the man behind all these successful military ventures, in both the planning or operational levels.

The author has not attempted to gloss either the good or bad parts of the Field Marshals character or experiences.
This is not a journalistic piece with an 'axe to grind' or an ideology to expound. Rather it is a study of man whose profession was war, and one in which he excelled at a level that few of his contemporaries - Allied or Axis - could match.

Issues such as his lack of support for the German Military Resistance to Hitler, and why he never resigned in the face of National Socialisms destructive effect on Germany(and Europe) are explored by the author, and he successfully and clearly explains von Mansteins thinking.

One of the pleasures is the ease with which one can read the military maps, which is something civilians such as myself often have trouble understanding the intricacies of. Obvious attention to details and patience was taken to provide maps of great clarity which can be understood easily.

The author writes with ease, and draws the reader very effectively into Manstein and his world. And whilst the grand military and tactical skills of the man are made clear so are the details of his life: domestic, political and cultural.

If history - especially of controversial and bloody periods - is to be studied objectively, correctly and most important of all truthfully, then it needs more books of this calibre.

Field Marshal Von Manstein called his war-time memoirs- "Lost Victories".Unlike them this book by Major General Melvin is a most definite victory!Manstein,(unlike the much inferior Rommel) is little known in the west, because apart from the latter part of the French campaign, he spent the entire war on the Eastern Front.Major General Melvin makes a convincing and highly readable case that he was probably the greatest general and strategist on either side in the second world war.Inevitably, the book concentrates on Mansteins military career.His personal life is not omitted- but it was farly conventional for a man of his time and class.Born into an East Prussian land-owning family- Manstein marries married a woman of similar background, was happily married to her for 46 years and had 2 sons and a daughter- the eldest son being killed in action on the Eastern Front.Mansteins liking for Motzart, fine cognac, and cigars as well as his skill at chess are all covered.We also see ,in a letter to his wife, his almost childish delight , when ,during a visit by Hitler to his HQ- his small pet dachshund chases off Hitlers alsatian, "Blondi" not once but twice.
However, as you would expect, the bulk of the book is devoted to Mansteins campaigns- a subject General Melvin is well qualified to write on.Mansteins military greatness is based on 3 things,
1. His devising of the "Sichelschnitt" plan ,which defeated the French in the summer of 1940.
2.His 1942 campaign in the Crimea- culminating in his capture of Sevastopol.
3. The 3rd "Battle of Kharkov" -Feb.1943.This campaign is deservedly studied at military academies around the world as an example of how to retrieve a disate
rous situation and shore up a collopsing front.After the defeat of Stalingrad Manstein was able to lure the Red Army on and then ,when they advanced too far ,slice them off with his famous "back-handed stroke"- an action which stabilised the Eastern Front for 6 months.
Of course, Manstein was only able to do this because Hitler had been so numbed by the defeat of Stalingrad that he gave up ,for several months, his normal interference with his commanders.
Manstein was not always victorious- he failed to relieve Stalingrad in December 1942- but -given the situation and the time of year-it is unlikely anyone else could have done better.
General Melvin also uses Stalingrad to make 2 points of contemporary relevance.
1.Hitler was not the only politician given to making claims of premature victory- against the advice of his professional advisers.
2.Hitler was not the only politician who tried to get his soldiers to hold isolated outposts ,where whatever, the troops on the ground manage to achieve, success is just not possible due to overwhelming strategic and operational odds.(Hitler believed such odds could be overcome by superior will and courage-he was wrong!-what Bush and Blair believed -we do not know.
Manstein spent the last year of his command- arguing with Hitler about wether to manouevre in the East or stand fast- before Hitler finally sacked him in 1944.Manstein always believed that if Hitler had given him a free hand in the East- he could have forced the Soviets to a stalemate in the East.Given the overwhelming Soviet superiority in manpower -it seems unlikely he could have done more than delay the inevitable for a few months.
The July plotters approached Manstein to get him to join them but he refused -saying-"A Prussian Field Marshal does not mutiny".However, he did not betray those who approached him to the Gestapo.
After the war -Manstein was convicted by a British court of war crimes and served a shrt term of imprisonment until being released in 1953.General Melvin points out that what he was convicted of were sins of omission -not commission.That he did not want to know too much about what was happening to the Jews behinnd his lines.He also did not worry unduly about the fate of the Russian peasants whose crops he burned during the retreats of 1943-44.
Manstein always denied serving Hitler."I did not serve under Hitler- I served my country" -he said .
On release from prison, he advised the post-was West German government on setting up a new army- wrote his memoirs and finally retired-he died in 1973 -aged 87.You will not find a better- written book on Manstein and the Eastern Front than this. As for Manstein- let Adolf Hitler have the last word- "This man is not to my liking- but he knows how to get things done"

This is an impressive book, primarily because Mungo Melvin has here perfected the art of demonstrating that the principles of successful operational art can be smuggled into a fast-paced, interesting narrative, without the general reader being aware of it. Accordingly, there is as much here for the campaign planner as there is for the man on the Clapham omnibus. Both will walk away with a satisfying surfeit of rich things. The book provides a fascinating reminder that genius in the application of operational art is ultimately futile if the grand strategy is wrong, as it surely was in Hitler's plans for the subjugation of the East. The Soviets feared Manstein as their greatest opponent, but in the end his genius could not build more tanks, recruit more soldiers or replace the battle casualties (both human and mechanical) that constant warfighting in the East was to consume in the face of the long term Soviet superiority in this area.

The clarity of Melvin's explanation of the principles of operational manoeuvre, and of Manstein's mastery of it, is superb, but the author carefully avoids the pitfall of hagiography, presenting the man 'warts and all', not shying away for instance from issues around the systemic abuse of the rules of war by the Wehrmacht.

This book is an impressive achievement and is highly recommended.