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Review
'Underneath the hilarious anecdotes, the elegant epigrams, and the graceful turns of phrase, Kindleberger is deadly serious. The manner in which humans beings earn their livings is no laughing matter to him, especially when they attempt to do so at the expense of one another. As he so effectively demonstrates, manias, panics, and crashes are the consequence of an economic environment that cultivates cupidity, chicanery, and rapaciousness rather than a devout belief in the Golden Rule.' - From the Foreword to the Fourth Edition by Peter L. Bernstein, author of The Power of Gold
'Deep knowledge and a pragmatic approach to financial history qualifies Robert Aliber to provide this desperately needed sixth edition of Charles Kindleberger's classic study of financial manias and crashes. It comes in the immediate aftermath of the biggest and most dangerous global financial crisis since the 1930s. But that, alas, was no isolated event. It was, instead, the culmination of four waves of crisis over 40 years. The latest crisis is most unlikely to be the last. It may even be the precursor of a still bigger crisis in the years ahead. Read. Learn. Weep.' -Martin Wolf, Financial Times
'Alas, both the need for a book such as Manias, Panics and Crashes, and the coverage of its material, keep on increasing, almost exponentially. So much has happened in the last few years that this is now Bob Aliber's book, as much as, perhaps more, than Charles Kindleberger's. Aliber has enhanced the prior high standards that Kindleberger set. This is an easily accessible book, filled with fascinating historical vignettes, and one that everyone from the experts to newcomers to the field should read and would profit greatly by doing so.' - Charles Goodhart, London School of Economics,UK
'Every so often financial markets fly off the rails of rationality. Manias, Panics and Crashes brilliantly explains these crises and warns us that as each one fades into the past, the lessons are eventually lost, and investors again come to believe that trees grow to the sky.' - David Laibson, Harvard University, USA
'Deep knowledge and a pragmatic approach to financial history qualifies Robert Aliber to provide this desperately needed sixth edition of Charles Kindleberger's classic study of financial manias and crashes. It comes in the immediate aftermath of the biggest and most dangerous global financial crisis since the 1930s. But that, alas, was no isolated event. It was, instead, the culmination of four waves of crisis over 40 years. The latest crisis is most unlikely to be the last. It may even be the precursor of a still bigger crisis in the years ahead. Read. Learn. Weep.' -Martin Wolf, Financial Times
'Alas, both the need for a book such as Manias, Panics and Crashes, and the coverage of its material, keep on increasing, almost exponentially. So much has happened in the last few years that this is now Bob Aliber's book, as much as, perhaps more, than Charles Kindleberger's. Aliber has enhanced the prior high standards that Kindleberger set. This is an easily accessible book, filled with fascinating historical vignettes, and one that everyone from the experts to newcomers to the field should read and would profit greatly by doing so.' - Charles Goodhart, London School of Economics,UK
'Every so often financial markets fly off the rails of rationality. Manias, Panics and Crashes brilliantly explains these crises and warns us that as each one fades into the past, the lessons are eventually lost, and investors again come to believe that trees grow to the sky.' - David Laibson, Harvard University, USA
Product Description
This sixth edition has been revised and expanded to bring the history of financial crisis up to date, covering such topics as speculative manias, the lender of last resort and the case of Lehman Brothers. This highly anticipated volume has been hailed as 'a true classic...both timely and timeless.'
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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
2 of 2 people found the following review helpful
An examination of credit-fuelled bubbles, financial contagion and the role of the lender of last resort
23 Dec 2011
Format:Paperback
This volume is extremely topical, engaging and entertaining, and is highly pertinent to the Eurozone sovereign credit and banking crisis. The bulk of the book concerns itself with credit bubbles, banking (financial) crises, and the role of the lender of last resort. The sixth edition has been updated to cover the burst of the subprime mortgage credit bubble and subsequent Lehman Brothers implosion, and also some of the developments taking place in Europe (e.g. Greek government debt). When I first read this book (the fourth or fifth edition) around 2000, when the dot-com bubble had burst, I was more interested in the model described in the text explaining how bubbles grow and eventually burst, and the implications for stock markets. Re-read in November 2011, I realise that its focus is much wider.
The authors first explain how manias, panics and crisis start - through pro-cyclical changes in the supply in credit. In short, asset bubbles result from the rapid growth in the supply of credit. A stylised model of credit expansion, speculation (manias), financial distress and panic is presented. Easy credit, fuelled by the apparently easy gains to be had through rising property prices and speculation, fuels the bubbles.
International financial contagion is covered in depth. Aliber makes the case that there is something special about the four waves of crisis in the last 30 years (Latin America in the 1980s, Japan in the late 1980s and early 1990s), South East Asia in the late 1990s and the current US subprime/Lehman andEuropean sovereign credit crisis.) He explores the interactions between these events and the contagion from one country to another. If bubbles appear in multiple countries at the same time, it is highly likely that there are common origins. In fact, the authors major on financial contagion, showing that it nothing new and there have been successive instances of a banking panic spreading from one country to another. In particular, Aliber explores the modern role of large capital flows in triggering expansions in credit supply - the phenomenon of `hot money' sparking a bubble and augmenting economic imbalances and volatility, and comes to the conclusion that these flows are excessive and should be curbed.
How to deal with crises, through a lender of last resort, is the third large block in the book. The authors detail at length how this role has come about, who has performed it different historical situations, whether there should be such a lender (i.e., the risks of moral hazard), and how it should operate. They further extend their analysis, initially from a domestic context to the international arena, and highlight the problems in attempting to ensure global economic and monetary stability. The authors conclude that an international lender of last resort, if it had existed, would not have prevented the current crisis.
The authors rightly point out that an increase in credit supply (say banks more willing to lend) is matched with its concomitant rising demand for credit-linked securities. However, they fail to discuss adequately how this demand increases. Who were the new providers of credit and why were they so keen to lend? Why were they happy to lend to banks (or to buy securities issued by banks)? Why did German investors buy peripheral European government and private mortgage debt? Why was there an appetite for higher-yielding securities? Who wanted to buy the new AAA-rated subprime mortgage-backed paper? And why were China, Japan and other Asian economies buying US treasuries and agency bonds? In fact, I find it a great omission that the book does not cover the accumulation of reserves post Asian crisis. For example, China is only mentioned four times in the index, and only one refers to the accumulation of trade surpluses.
Two final topics I would flag are structure and the final words. The book's structure and editing repeats certain ideas again and again, and occasionally you get full sentences and paragraphs reproduced twice. In the epilogue, Aliber warns that regulatory reform in the US to prevent a repeat of the 2007-08 financial crisis is likely to be ineffective and result in another property-led crisis by 2020. He doesn't go further into examining whether the next financial crisis could happen elsewhere, in a different geography or asset class. This, however, does not detract from the overall quality and message of the book.
I would also recommend reading this book in conjunction with Reinhart and Rogoff's This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly(focusing more on the aftermath of crises and on sovereign defaults), and El-Erian's When Markets Collide: Investment Strategies for the Age of Global Economic Change (majoring in the changes in the global economic and institutional changes and the implications for investors' portfolios).
The authors first explain how manias, panics and crisis start - through pro-cyclical changes in the supply in credit. In short, asset bubbles result from the rapid growth in the supply of credit. A stylised model of credit expansion, speculation (manias), financial distress and panic is presented. Easy credit, fuelled by the apparently easy gains to be had through rising property prices and speculation, fuels the bubbles.
International financial contagion is covered in depth. Aliber makes the case that there is something special about the four waves of crisis in the last 30 years (Latin America in the 1980s, Japan in the late 1980s and early 1990s), South East Asia in the late 1990s and the current US subprime/Lehman andEuropean sovereign credit crisis.) He explores the interactions between these events and the contagion from one country to another. If bubbles appear in multiple countries at the same time, it is highly likely that there are common origins. In fact, the authors major on financial contagion, showing that it nothing new and there have been successive instances of a banking panic spreading from one country to another. In particular, Aliber explores the modern role of large capital flows in triggering expansions in credit supply - the phenomenon of `hot money' sparking a bubble and augmenting economic imbalances and volatility, and comes to the conclusion that these flows are excessive and should be curbed.
How to deal with crises, through a lender of last resort, is the third large block in the book. The authors detail at length how this role has come about, who has performed it different historical situations, whether there should be such a lender (i.e., the risks of moral hazard), and how it should operate. They further extend their analysis, initially from a domestic context to the international arena, and highlight the problems in attempting to ensure global economic and monetary stability. The authors conclude that an international lender of last resort, if it had existed, would not have prevented the current crisis.
The authors rightly point out that an increase in credit supply (say banks more willing to lend) is matched with its concomitant rising demand for credit-linked securities. However, they fail to discuss adequately how this demand increases. Who were the new providers of credit and why were they so keen to lend? Why were they happy to lend to banks (or to buy securities issued by banks)? Why did German investors buy peripheral European government and private mortgage debt? Why was there an appetite for higher-yielding securities? Who wanted to buy the new AAA-rated subprime mortgage-backed paper? And why were China, Japan and other Asian economies buying US treasuries and agency bonds? In fact, I find it a great omission that the book does not cover the accumulation of reserves post Asian crisis. For example, China is only mentioned four times in the index, and only one refers to the accumulation of trade surpluses.
Two final topics I would flag are structure and the final words. The book's structure and editing repeats certain ideas again and again, and occasionally you get full sentences and paragraphs reproduced twice. In the epilogue, Aliber warns that regulatory reform in the US to prevent a repeat of the 2007-08 financial crisis is likely to be ineffective and result in another property-led crisis by 2020. He doesn't go further into examining whether the next financial crisis could happen elsewhere, in a different geography or asset class. This, however, does not detract from the overall quality and message of the book.
I would also recommend reading this book in conjunction with Reinhart and Rogoff's This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly(focusing more on the aftermath of crises and on sovereign defaults), and El-Erian's When Markets Collide: Investment Strategies for the Age of Global Economic Change (majoring in the changes in the global economic and institutional changes and the implications for investors' portfolios).
1 of 2 people found the following review helpful
Format:Paperback
I purchased the book because it was referenced in Bethany McLean's "all the devils are here", and I'm willing to try anything Bethany deems interesting, but boy, what a complete and utter disappointment it was.
"Manias, panics and crashes" is the 6th edition of a book written decades ago, and it painfully shows. In terms of structure, the book resembles a selection of randomly selected paragraphs, with no reference to each other. Even though the subject is naturally poised for simple and elegant chronological, crisis-after-crisis continuity starting with South Sea bubble and ending with present day, the authors and editors clearly deemed this idea too simplistic, and instead went for incoherent mix of dates, facts and ideas.
That in itself might not fully discredit the book, but the little there was left to ruin, was ruined by the narrative. "Manias, panics and crashes" redefines boring, I doubt anyone actually proof-read this edition before publishing. I didn't manage to get all the way through the book, despite enormouse interest in the topic, I simply gave up. I would advise everyone considering a purchase of this book to choose something else on the topic in order to a void a boring and costly disappointment.
"Manias, panics and crashes" is the 6th edition of a book written decades ago, and it painfully shows. In terms of structure, the book resembles a selection of randomly selected paragraphs, with no reference to each other. Even though the subject is naturally poised for simple and elegant chronological, crisis-after-crisis continuity starting with South Sea bubble and ending with present day, the authors and editors clearly deemed this idea too simplistic, and instead went for incoherent mix of dates, facts and ideas.
That in itself might not fully discredit the book, but the little there was left to ruin, was ruined by the narrative. "Manias, panics and crashes" redefines boring, I doubt anyone actually proof-read this edition before publishing. I didn't manage to get all the way through the book, despite enormouse interest in the topic, I simply gave up. I would advise everyone considering a purchase of this book to choose something else on the topic in order to a void a boring and costly disappointment.
Most Helpful Customer Reviews on Amazon.com (beta)
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5 reviews
16 of 16 people found the following review helpful
The 6th Edition of a Classic Study of the Anatomy of Financial Crises.
27 Sep 2011
Format:Paperback|Amazon Verified Purchase
This book provides an analytical treatment of the process of speculation and monetary expansion that has sometimes led to a variety of historical crises. These major crises don't necessarily occur frequently within a human lifespan, so it is important to study these historical episodes in order to gain a better understanding of some of their common characteristics. It was written by "literary economist" Charles Kindleberger through the first four editions in 1978, 1989, 1996 and 2000, and subsequently updated by Robert Aliber in the fifth and (this) sixth edition in 2005 and 2011. Kindleberger passed away in 2003 at age 92. Specifically, Kindleberger and Aliber identify and discuss common attributes of the speculation and crisis cycle using material from lots of historical episodes. This is not a chronological story of crisis after crisis, like Charles MacKay's classic 19th century work, "Memoirs of Extraordinary Delusions and the Madness of Crowds," which I recommend. Rather, it is a highly readable discussion of the processes in play, with observations and analyses developed from a wide variety of historical crises.
My reference to Kindleberger as a "literary economist" means two things: First, Kindleberger has focused on a discussion of key theoretical concepts in a language (clear English) that the intelligent lay reader can understand, not on the more widely used language of mathematical economics and econometrics that is so common in the field today. Second, in addition to writing in English rather than math, Kindleberger writes in a sufficiently engaging and interesting style that it shouldn't put you to sleep. Indeed, this is a very interesting work that addresses some of the most irrational bubbles in history (see below). History doesn't always repeat exactly, but it does rhyme.
My first encounter with this book was back in the early 1990s, when I read the second edition. When I pulled my old copy off the shelf and reviewed it prior to taking up the latest edition, I noticed I had forgotten that Kindleberger devoted several pages to the work of Hyman Minsky, whose work has really come into fashion in the last five years. Basically, the Minsky Instability Hypotheses states that periods of prolonged economic stability lead to a reduced awareness of risk, which then leads to periods of instability when the risk that has been ignored finally presents itself on our doorstep. Put more simply, economic stability leads to economic instability. I mention this because it suggests that as a result of his research into speculation and financial crises, Kindleberger was keenly aware of the kinds of conditions that would ultimately play out in 2007 - 2009 and beyond.
In this sixth edition Aliber covers the new ground of more recent crises, making it a very nice update, and he includes his listing of the top ten financial bubbles:
1. The Dutch Tulip Bubble, 1636.
2. The South Sea Bubble, 1720.
3. The Mississippi Bubble, 1720.
4. The late 1920s stock price bubble, 1927 - 29.
5. The surge in bank loans to Mexico and other developing countries in the 1970s.
6. The bubble in real estate and stocks in Japan, 1985 - 89.
7. The 1985 - 89 bubble in real estate and stocks in Finland, Norway, and Sweden.
8. The bubble in real estate and stocks in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and several other Asian countries in 1992 - 97 and the surge in foreign investment in Mexico, 1990 - 99.
9. The bubble in over-the-counter stocks in the United States, 1995 - 2000.
10. The bubble in real estate in the U.S., Britain, Spain, Ireland, and Iceland between 2002 and 2007--and the debt of the government of Greece.
Late in this edition, Aliber devotes a chapter to "The Lehman Panic," which he refers to as "an avoidable crash."
Given the events of recent years, the latest edition is well timed to address the growing interest in systemic issues of speculative manias and monetary expansions that contribute to the national and international crises we see in panics and crashes that central banks and other lenders of last resort must struggle with. The authors devote two chapters to national and international lenders of last resort and their difficult decisions. As this book describes financial crises, they are "hardy perennials," so we have a lot to gain from understanding some of the common attributes of historical periods of speculation and crisis. As a clear, well-written and solid study of the whole process, this book deserves your serious consideration.
My reference to Kindleberger as a "literary economist" means two things: First, Kindleberger has focused on a discussion of key theoretical concepts in a language (clear English) that the intelligent lay reader can understand, not on the more widely used language of mathematical economics and econometrics that is so common in the field today. Second, in addition to writing in English rather than math, Kindleberger writes in a sufficiently engaging and interesting style that it shouldn't put you to sleep. Indeed, this is a very interesting work that addresses some of the most irrational bubbles in history (see below). History doesn't always repeat exactly, but it does rhyme.
My first encounter with this book was back in the early 1990s, when I read the second edition. When I pulled my old copy off the shelf and reviewed it prior to taking up the latest edition, I noticed I had forgotten that Kindleberger devoted several pages to the work of Hyman Minsky, whose work has really come into fashion in the last five years. Basically, the Minsky Instability Hypotheses states that periods of prolonged economic stability lead to a reduced awareness of risk, which then leads to periods of instability when the risk that has been ignored finally presents itself on our doorstep. Put more simply, economic stability leads to economic instability. I mention this because it suggests that as a result of his research into speculation and financial crises, Kindleberger was keenly aware of the kinds of conditions that would ultimately play out in 2007 - 2009 and beyond.
In this sixth edition Aliber covers the new ground of more recent crises, making it a very nice update, and he includes his listing of the top ten financial bubbles:
1. The Dutch Tulip Bubble, 1636.
2. The South Sea Bubble, 1720.
3. The Mississippi Bubble, 1720.
4. The late 1920s stock price bubble, 1927 - 29.
5. The surge in bank loans to Mexico and other developing countries in the 1970s.
6. The bubble in real estate and stocks in Japan, 1985 - 89.
7. The 1985 - 89 bubble in real estate and stocks in Finland, Norway, and Sweden.
8. The bubble in real estate and stocks in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and several other Asian countries in 1992 - 97 and the surge in foreign investment in Mexico, 1990 - 99.
9. The bubble in over-the-counter stocks in the United States, 1995 - 2000.
10. The bubble in real estate in the U.S., Britain, Spain, Ireland, and Iceland between 2002 and 2007--and the debt of the government of Greece.
Late in this edition, Aliber devotes a chapter to "The Lehman Panic," which he refers to as "an avoidable crash."
Given the events of recent years, the latest edition is well timed to address the growing interest in systemic issues of speculative manias and monetary expansions that contribute to the national and international crises we see in panics and crashes that central banks and other lenders of last resort must struggle with. The authors devote two chapters to national and international lenders of last resort and their difficult decisions. As this book describes financial crises, they are "hardy perennials," so we have a lot to gain from understanding some of the common attributes of historical periods of speculation and crisis. As a clear, well-written and solid study of the whole process, this book deserves your serious consideration.
10 of 10 people found the following review helpful
Another Book Review from the Aleph Blog
13 Nov 2011
Format:Paperback
This is the first book that I have reviewed twice. I reviewed the third edition of the book previously, but I am reviewing the sixth edition now.
Kindleberger places the manias, panics, and crashes on a common grid, to see their similarities, In it he draws on a number of common factors:
* Loose monetary policy
* People chase the performance of the speculative asset
* Speculators make fixed commitments buying the speculative asset
* The speculative asset's price gets bid up to the point where it costs money to hold the positions
* A shock hits the system, a default occurs, or monetary policy starts contracting
* The system unwinds, and the price of the speculative asset falls leading to
* Insolvencies with those that borrowed to finance the assets
* A lender of last resort appears to end the cycle
The advantage over the third edition is that you get to hear about the Asian crisis LTCM, the tech bubble, Madoff, and the present crisis (banking & housing, soon to be sovereigns).
The main point for readers is to beware when monetary policy is easy, banking regulation is lax, and many seem to favor buying the asset du jour, often with leverage. What is self-reinforcing on the way up will be self-reinforcing on the way down, but with greater speed and ferocity, as bad debts have to be liquidated.
Quibbles
Hindsight is 20-20. If the US Government had rescued Lehman, something else might have proven to be "too big to rescue," that the government might allow to fail, but miss the connectedness of the institution. I do think the US Government should have been a DIP lender to troubled firms, but not a buyer of equity.
Who would benefit from this book: Most investors would benefit from this book. It will make you more skeptical of assets that seems to be doing unnaturally well; it will also make you more skeptical about catching falling knives in the market.
Kindleberger places the manias, panics, and crashes on a common grid, to see their similarities, In it he draws on a number of common factors:
* Loose monetary policy
* People chase the performance of the speculative asset
* Speculators make fixed commitments buying the speculative asset
* The speculative asset's price gets bid up to the point where it costs money to hold the positions
* A shock hits the system, a default occurs, or monetary policy starts contracting
* The system unwinds, and the price of the speculative asset falls leading to
* Insolvencies with those that borrowed to finance the assets
* A lender of last resort appears to end the cycle
The advantage over the third edition is that you get to hear about the Asian crisis LTCM, the tech bubble, Madoff, and the present crisis (banking & housing, soon to be sovereigns).
The main point for readers is to beware when monetary policy is easy, banking regulation is lax, and many seem to favor buying the asset du jour, often with leverage. What is self-reinforcing on the way up will be self-reinforcing on the way down, but with greater speed and ferocity, as bad debts have to be liquidated.
Quibbles
Hindsight is 20-20. If the US Government had rescued Lehman, something else might have proven to be "too big to rescue," that the government might allow to fail, but miss the connectedness of the institution. I do think the US Government should have been a DIP lender to troubled firms, but not a buyer of equity.
Who would benefit from this book: Most investors would benefit from this book. It will make you more skeptical of assets that seems to be doing unnaturally well; it will also make you more skeptical about catching falling knives in the market.
7 of 7 people found the following review helpful
Financial Shenanigans Exposed & Currency Money Flows
7 Oct 2011
Format:Paperback
<Review of the 6th Edition>
Maybe not the definitive book on bubbles, speculation, and monetary expansion, but one can surely benefit from the knowledge obtained to avoid such casual financial distress to one's pocketbook. This 6th addition of Manics, Panics & Crashes is almost entirely re-written to include the relatively recent adventures and speculation in finance of the last 20 years. Beyond the exposé on the plethora of financial shenanigans over the last 300 years, a good amount of the text details the money flows during the old gold standard to assist in explaining causal reactions to the formation of bubbles and subsequent busts.
Surely many reading this review have experienced some effects described in the book, but nothing is really new as it has all been done before - just updated names for the same game (i.e. think Ponzi scheme). A worthy read for those interested in the history of financial shenanigans. However, the author's do assume you are aware of some of the classic Manics such as the Tulip Bubble and the Mississippi Company scheme. All in, is one is interested in financial history then this is an edition you would want to read.
The reader may be interested in Charles MacKay's classic "Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds" as a primer prior to reading this updated edition. As a side note, I was fortunate to read Extraordinary Popular Delusions nearly 20+ years ago and it saved me many headaches with the ability to spot several suspect adventures.
Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds by Charles MacKay
Of note: The typeset of Manias, Panics is a little tough and could have been a different font and 1/2 point larger. A little rough on older eyes.
Maybe not the definitive book on bubbles, speculation, and monetary expansion, but one can surely benefit from the knowledge obtained to avoid such casual financial distress to one's pocketbook. This 6th addition of Manics, Panics & Crashes is almost entirely re-written to include the relatively recent adventures and speculation in finance of the last 20 years. Beyond the exposé on the plethora of financial shenanigans over the last 300 years, a good amount of the text details the money flows during the old gold standard to assist in explaining causal reactions to the formation of bubbles and subsequent busts.
Surely many reading this review have experienced some effects described in the book, but nothing is really new as it has all been done before - just updated names for the same game (i.e. think Ponzi scheme). A worthy read for those interested in the history of financial shenanigans. However, the author's do assume you are aware of some of the classic Manics such as the Tulip Bubble and the Mississippi Company scheme. All in, is one is interested in financial history then this is an edition you would want to read.
The reader may be interested in Charles MacKay's classic "Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds" as a primer prior to reading this updated edition. As a side note, I was fortunate to read Extraordinary Popular Delusions nearly 20+ years ago and it saved me many headaches with the ability to spot several suspect adventures.
Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds by Charles MacKay
Of note: The typeset of Manias, Panics is a little tough and could have been a different font and 1/2 point larger. A little rough on older eyes.
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