Making Sense of the Troubles: A History of the Northern Ireland Conflict [Paperback]

All these were important enough factors in ensuring the province would one day erupt. But a dominant theme of the narrative, which starts on the second page and runs through it like a geological fault, is that of indifference.
The British handed power to the Ulster Unionists in 1921 and did nothing for more than 40 years to prevent them abusing it; the Irish of the 26 counties were too busy: "The Free State was aggrieved by the loss of what it regarded as its rightful territory, but concentrated instead on making a success of its own fledgling state."
There are some poignant moments recalled in the book, which speak profoundly of Southern Irish indifference to the plight of their Northern compatriots: the immense disappointment this engenders in the reader has to do with the fact that from the Irish themselves we expected more. That the British were callously indifferent to the plight of a Catholic minority is appalling but not entirely surprising - to learn that the Irish appeared to wash their hands of the North has a real sadness about it, especially when so much appears to have been made over the years of the controversial articles 2 and 3 of the 1937 Irish Constitution, laying claim to the State.
"Politically Northern nationalists were unwelcome ghosts at the feast in Dublin." say the authors.
One of Harold Wilson's aides recalled a lunch the opposition leader had with Taoiseach Jack Lynch in 1969. Wilson mooted the idea of Irish unity: "The fascinating moment came when Harold Wilson put forward the plan for turning the dream of unity into reality. I had thought they would jump for joy, but their reaction was more akin to falling through the floor."
So for all the rhetoric, it appears there was little appetite in the South for an end to partition, and in England no sympathy at all for those trapped in what even David Trimble was to call "a cold house for Catholics."
Even in so dispassionate and objective an account it is not difficult to see that while the authors believe the terrorists of both sides have the blood of innocents on their hands, the politicians of virtually every persuasion, and on both sides of the Irish Sea, must take a huge share of the blame. John Hume and Gerry Fitt of the SDLP, and Mo Mowlam the one-time Labour Secretary of State, are among the few to emerge with any credibility or real integrity.
For the rest - of Left or Right - their actions are marked by errors of judgement, insensitive decisions, and an almost wilful inability to see where their policies would inevitably lead. They cite Terence O'Neill's empty rhetoric of reform, which in the mid to late 60s did much to antagonise the Unionists and nothing whatever to appease the nationalists; Faulkner's policy of internment which brought a massive increase in violence in its wake; Margaret Thatcher's steely refusal to grant political status to the hunger strikers in the Maze; Reginald Maudling's lazy indifference and crass concept of "an acceptable level of violence."
Labour politicians emerge with not much more credit. Merlyn Rees, the Labour Northern Ireland Secretary, is portrayed as inexperienced and weak: his inability to get to grips with the Ulster Workers Council (UWC) strike in May 1974, meant the brief experiment of power-sharing after the Sunningdale Agreement was doomed to failure.
This is a profoundly readable book, clear in its aim and consistent in its execution, but a deeply moving one, too. To read it is to understand a little more about an otherwise baffling, and seemingly intractable, problem.I cannot commend it too highly.

_Making Sense_ stays true to its objective, to tell 'a straightforward and gripping story ... in an accessible way'. It is a straightforward read.

But is it a good read? Yes, if you don't want to be bogged down with pre-Troubles history (too simplistically outlined in the book) or don't need to understand the ideologies of unionism and nationalism per se. In this way, _Making Sense_ feels written for a general English/benign foreign audience.

However, if you know some Irish history and/or can appreciate the ethno-nationalist competition in Northern Ireland, then you may very well be let down.

The factual reportage in _Making Sense_ is flawless, but the story told is not neutral. Of course, no account of the Troubles can be. Yet after reading _Making Sense_, one leaves with a sense that: a) Northern Protestants really don't like Catholics; b) republican violence stems from a ideological struggle while loyalist violence is just sectarian hatred; c) the British government could have done more from 1921 forward, but were frustrated by intransigent unionists. All entirely acceptable to believe if one wishes, but by no means a neutral or fair position.

Thus, I was disappointed that _Making Sense_ didn't try harder to place the Troubles in an all-Ireland context. This would require more history, but would help explain some unionist perspective as well as the sometimes variable relationship between the Irish Republican government and Northern nationalists.

For the general reader, I would recommend _A Pocket History of Ulster_, by Brian Bardon (ISBN 086278428x). For more detail, try _A History of Northern Ireland 1920-1996_, by Thomas Hennessey (ISBN 0717124002), who has also written a book on the Northern Ireland peace process (ISBN 0717129462).

For the most part, however, its insights will be confined to those who know little and want to understand, insofar as it is possible to do so, why the slaughter began and why it lasted for 25 years. For those who have already reached this plane of enlightenment, I would recommend Tony Geraghty's "The Irish War" and Peter Taylor's twin texts, "Provos" and "Loyalists".