Lost Triumph: Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg--and Why it Failed [Audiobook, MP3 Audio, Unabridged] [MP3 CD]

I am afraid I was not nearly as impressed with Tom Carhart's Lost Triumph as other reviewers. He argues that Stuart's charge across East Cavalry Field on 3 July 1863 was the Main Effort in a 3 pronged attack devised by Lee to sever the Union line at Gettysburg. In thwarting that attack, he contends, newly promoted Brigadier General George Armstrong Custer was the saviour of the day and of the Union.
First, there is nothing new in Carhart's view that Stuart was intent on far more than flank protection that day - McPherson argued in Battle Cry of Freedom (1988) that Lee's plan was to combine 3 assaults - one of them an attack in to the rear of the Federal line by Stuart's massed cavalry. What is new is Carhart's unsubstantiated view that Stuart's assault was to comprise Lee's Main Effort.
In constructing this implausible argument, Carhart relies on little more than conjecture supported by his contention that Lee, having studied the great battles of history, sought to replicate them in detail on every occasion he gave battle.
The incident surrounding Stuart's tardy return to Lee's HQ on the evening of 2 July is illustrative of Carhart's willingness to dismiss what little primary source evidence there is as scurrilous rumour before offering his own view of events entirely unsupported by any evidence whatsoever. His statement that, "I believe, despite rumours to the contrary, that Stuart was pleasantly received by Lee" simply does not carry any weight of conviction given that Lee had been drawn in to a meeting engagement and the almost frontal assault of the 2nd day precisely because of the abject failure of his cavalry commander to follow orders and maintain contact with the Army over the previous 10 days.
Carhart then goes on to suggest that Lee entrusted Stuart with the very future of his cause while at the same time withholding essential details of his plan from his most trusted lieutenant, Longstreet. This is not merely speculative - but utter fantasy. If, as Carhart suggests, Lee intended Longstreet to charge the front of Cemetery Ridge while Stuart attacked the rear, it would result in 2 friendly forces attacking directly towards each other. Any soldier (and I am one) will tell you that if disaster is to be avoided through friendly fire, such a plan demands detailed coordination between the assaulting forces. This simply cannot happen if one of the assault groups is launched while entirely unaware of the activities of the other.
Carhart argues that no credence can be attached to suggestions that Lee intended to use a mere 13,000 men to charge and break the centre of the Federal line on 3 July, (I am unaware of any credited authority who would argue that Lee intended to rely alone on 'Picket's Charge' to break the Union line). However having stated that a charge so lacking in combat power could not have been Lee's Main Effort, he goes on to argue that Stuart's charge with a mere 6,000 men supported by a hand full of cannon was. His argument is inconsistent and entirely unsupported by evidence in the after action reports. In a typical avoidance of the lack of evidence in support of his hypothesis, Carhart suggests that Lee might have purged the record to save the reputation of his subordinate. Lee may well have been guilty of such after action revisionism, but his failure to record Stuart's attack as his main effort cannot be offered up as evidence in support of this argument.
Finally, in casting Custer as the hero of the piece, Carhart does great disservice to the countless men who stood firm on Seminary Ridge, the Round Tops, in the Wheatfield and Peach Orchard and who fought the bloody hand to hand fight under the clump of trees. Custer did a magnificent job in thwarting Stuart's assault, but if he had failed would Stuart have been able simply to trot up to the rear of the Federal line on Cemetery Ridge and link up with Pickett? I suspect the Federal VI Corps, albeit widely dispersed, would have had a part to play in stopping him as would much of the II Corps, which, like Wellington's infantry at Waterloo, was behind (East of) the ridge protected from Longstreet's cannon.
The cover of the paperback edition carries an endorsement by John Keegan who views Carhart's thesis as `a remarkable achievement'. In my opinion Carhart's most remarkable achievement was to have such highly respected historians as Keegan and McPherson endorse a work that most deservedly belongs in the What If genre.

On the third day at Gettysburg why did Lee throw Pickett's division at the unbroken Union line? This book sets out the case for Lee having launched a plan to attack in the rear of the line at the same time as Pickett's frontal assault.

The best parts of the book are those dealing with Lee's life before the Civil War and building the background information that he was very familiar with the great battles of history.

The book actually starts to peter out when it should be building to a climax. I am no expert on this battle, but even I could tell that much of this was speculation. There's no trouble with that but class it as fiction, alongside such works as "Killer Angels" by Michael Shaara or "Gettysburg" by Newt Gingrich.

By the time it had got to the description of the battle itself the authors research and recreation had become so detailed that pace had slowed and the text was becoming so repetitive, I really had ceased caring very much. The author sets out to make the case Lee could not have been so incompetent as to order Pickett's charge. But all he does is to describe an alternative vision where Lee would have had to have been just as incompetent but in a different way - namely by totally failing to pass on any details of what should have been a co-ordinated attack to the officers who had to carry it out.

Save your money - the books by Shaara and Gingrich are much better value.

Whether you agree or disagree with the arguments presented in Lee's Lost Triumph, it will certainly convince scholars of the Civil War that there is a missing link to fully understanding Lee's actions at Gettysburg.

The author sets the scene for the third day with a succinct account of the political and strategic situation prior to the campaign and an analysis of Lee's actions on 1 and 2 July 1863. He then explains how Lee and the Union utilised cavalry and explains why Stuart circled behind the Union lines; arriving for the last day.

Realising that he required a decisive battle on Union territory to influence the elections of 1864, Lee conceived a plan to crush the Army of the Potomac; the key to swaying public opinion in the North to sue for peace.

Having had success against overwhelming opposition in 1862/63 Lee saw and exploited the opportunity to concentrate his forces at Gettysburg faster than his opponent. Having failed to turn Meade's flanks the author argues that he attempted to synchronise a cavalry attack in the enemy's rear with Pickett's feted charge. If successful he could have chnaged the ultimate outcome of the war. More imporatntly it offers a reason for the attack that has never been really understood or explained; least of all by Pickett who held a grudge not only for the charge but also for his dismissal after Five Forks.

The book is based on a combination of analysis and assertion. The evidence has been drawn from the National archives and is presented in a compelling and convincing manner. Pundits of the Civil War will argue that Lee never utilised cavalry in the manner described and that the cavalry action on East Cavalry Field was no more than a diversion for the attack on Culp's Hill. However, the book re-ignites the question why did Lee advnace Pickett's Division, it offers an answer, but more imporatnatly it makes one again ask why the best military captain of his time would conceive a plan so flawed.

The book is well written and provided an account of the battle that I had previously given little consideration. It adds to the body of knowledge on the subject by adding a new perspective and that has to be good. A thoroughly enjoyable read.