Lawrence Babits and Joshua Howard have delivered the most thorough and readable account of the monumentally important Battle of Guilford Courthouse. While I do not agree with every conclusion, Long, Obstinate, and Bloody has set the baseline for all future Revolutionary War battle histories - 5 ENTHUSIASTIC STARS!
Another quite knowledgeable reviewer has noted that "for some reason" Babits and Howard think that Washington "deserted" his position along the northern flank, and says that he has never seen any evidence to support that. First, I cannot fine a single statement to support this claim. Instead they postulate that due to the lack of a road along the northern flank heading towards the courthouse, and the heavy brush, it is possible that Washington's dragoons themselves were unable to operate in the terrain and were therefore positioned at the courthouse. On the southern flank there was a road running roughly east-west, which the authors demonstrate Lee probably used to extricate his dragoons. The authors simply point out that it is unknown if such a road existed to the north, but the presumed lack thereof may suggest that Washington's dragoons were actually not deployed on the flank. As the authors suggest (this is not a definite statement, but a suggestion) "A more likely interpretation. . ." (62, 122-123). And here is a strength of their work. Rather than blindly following the traditional analysis or boldly and carelessly bucking the trend in every instance, the authors offer tangible alternatives when concrete proof is lacking. I think that they are simply offering this as a possible explanation of how Washington ended up along the third line. Perhaps the other reviewer overlooked page 217. A closer reading shows a pension account offered by a North Carolina militiaman that specifically states he saw them at the courthouse at the beginning of the engagement. To me this represents a valuable piece of evidence to support the authors claim.
On another note, the previous commenter made note of the fact that Greene had indeed at one point in the campaign stated that three detachments were with his army. He did not directly state, to my knowledge at least, that the detachments were actually at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse. The authors explicitly state that Buford's men were amalgamated into Green's regiment of Virginia regulars (73). Furthermore, his name wasn't Colonel John Buford as the other reviewer states, it was Abraham.
The other reviewer states that the maps seem to indicate the third line fighting took place at the Francisco monument. I disagree. The monument itself is marked on the map about an inch southwest along the tour road (also on the map) from where the map shows the 1st MD/2nd Guards melee. The current tour road is marked on their map, showing the pull-offs, etc. I would also strongly disagree with the previous reviewer concerning the quality of the maps. Quite the opposite of "amateurish," I found them to be highly informative and useful.
Finally, the authors also never state that Stevens' brigade "routed." Their discussion of that brigades fighting withdrawal is quite complimentary to Stevens, and they explain that the Virginians were responsible for the delay in the 71st Foot arriving on the third line (128). In their discussion of Stevens' wounding, they do quote Lee as having said Stevens "received a ball in his thigh, which accelerated not a little the retreat of his brigade," and they do state that his men began "streaming to the rear," but that's not stating that they routed. In fact, Babits and Howard are quite clear in their discussion that Stevens' men fought ferociously (124-128). They don't suggest that Stevens continued fighting against the 71st in the fields south of the courthouse, presumably because their evidence simply doesn't support such a claim.
Disagreements such as these, however, are the life-blood of the southern campaigns of the revolution. In many cases, because the evidence is scant and oftentimes contradictory, numerous plausible answers exist. Babits and Howard have done yeoman's work in offering solid, evidence-based suggestions for this crucial battle. Their work simply must be consulted when studying this critical period in American history.