Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside The Open Society and Its Enemies as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.
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'One of the most important documents of the twentieth century.' – Peter Medawar, New Scientist
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A scientist, whether theorist or experimenter, puts forward statements, or systems of statements, and tests them step by step. Read the first page Browse Sample Pages
Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index
A scientist, whether theorist or experimenter, puts forward statements, or systems of statements, and tests them step by step. Read the first page Browse Sample Pages
Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index
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11 of 12 people found the following review helpful
By S. Meadows
Format:Paperback|Amazon Verified Purchase
This is probably Popper's most famous work, in which he lays out his philosophy of science, focusing on the question of epistemology.
The book begins in a surprisingly accessible manner. I was expected some very high level philosophy that would be difficult to understand, but the translation is very easy to follow. Where he gets a little more obscure, he brings it back down-to-earth with examples that help to put his argument in context. I would describe the argument that Popper creates as being cumulative; that is, there are lots of references to earlier sections and, in particular, definitions.
For this reason, I would not recommend reading this book over a long period of time. I think it demands to be read quite intensively in as short a time as possible in order to ensure that one may follow it all.
The main thrust of Popper's argument is to say that theories are never verified, they can only be falsified. He dismantles the positivist point of view which led to empiricism and shows empiricism reduces to mere psychologism. From here, he then needs to discuss the degree of falsifiability. He considers a theory to be less likely the more ways it can possibly falsified. From here, what I think he should have done would then be to talk about corroboration and how a theory stands up to attempts to falsify it. Unfortunately, he leaves this to the end and instead goes off on a rather long and tortuous talk about probability.
This quite long section was the downside for me, as his discussion (and in particular, notation) was quite obscurantist, making it difficult to follow and quite oblique. From here, he moves on to talk about quantum mechanics and in particular the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.
This brings me to my last point. If his theory is to be thought of as a scientific theory at all, then it must play by its own rules. That is to say, there must be a set of singular statements from this theory that can, in principle at least, be subject to testing to see if they can be falsified. Such a set of statements is not presented to the reader, so I could only conclude that while Popper's contribution is to be valued and considered, it doesn't constitute a scientific theory. It remains an application of metaphysics.
The book begins in a surprisingly accessible manner. I was expected some very high level philosophy that would be difficult to understand, but the translation is very easy to follow. Where he gets a little more obscure, he brings it back down-to-earth with examples that help to put his argument in context. I would describe the argument that Popper creates as being cumulative; that is, there are lots of references to earlier sections and, in particular, definitions.
For this reason, I would not recommend reading this book over a long period of time. I think it demands to be read quite intensively in as short a time as possible in order to ensure that one may follow it all.
The main thrust of Popper's argument is to say that theories are never verified, they can only be falsified. He dismantles the positivist point of view which led to empiricism and shows empiricism reduces to mere psychologism. From here, he then needs to discuss the degree of falsifiability. He considers a theory to be less likely the more ways it can possibly falsified. From here, what I think he should have done would then be to talk about corroboration and how a theory stands up to attempts to falsify it. Unfortunately, he leaves this to the end and instead goes off on a rather long and tortuous talk about probability.
This quite long section was the downside for me, as his discussion (and in particular, notation) was quite obscurantist, making it difficult to follow and quite oblique. From here, he moves on to talk about quantum mechanics and in particular the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.
This brings me to my last point. If his theory is to be thought of as a scientific theory at all, then it must play by its own rules. That is to say, there must be a set of singular statements from this theory that can, in principle at least, be subject to testing to see if they can be falsified. Such a set of statements is not presented to the reader, so I could only conclude that while Popper's contribution is to be valued and considered, it doesn't constitute a scientific theory. It remains an application of metaphysics.
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful
Format:Paperback|Amazon Verified Purchase
"The Logic of Scientific Discovery", first published in German in 1935 by Karl Popper, (1902-1994), opened a new way in the philosophy of science.
He began his epistemological work with "The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge" (unpublished immediately), and he gave a summary of it in the first edition of his "Logic". The two main problems of Popper's logic are those of induction and of demarcation. Induction is the first one, or the problem of Hume with the first objection of Kant, the second problem is concerning the separation between science and pseudo-science ( i.e. essentially metaphysics, marxism, and psychoanalysis). He realized later that it was the same problem.
So, since Bacon ("Novum Organum") until the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle (Carnap, Schlick, Wittgenstein), the scientific research was for Popper in a wrong way. In their scientific approach the authors of the Vienna Circle did adopt a criterion of meaning (and with verification) in order to divide the two sorts of propositions: scientifical versus metaphysical, to stay in the truth of science. For Popper, the scientific discovery is an unended process of trial and error, in testing hypothesis or theories, with the survival of the best ones through the means of the falsification or the refutation. It is an objective knowledge, but we can never speak of truth, we can only be confident in the theories (or conjectures) which have resisted to the strongest tests. It is a matter of "corroboration", with deductions, until a new theory is about to supersede the previous one (Newton, Einstein...).
Popper developed a new epistemology upon his logic of conjectures and refutations in scientific progress, he called it "critical rationalism", with free discussion between the scientists,(against empiricism and non-critical rationalism), and finally it led him up to an evolutionary theory of knowledge in philosophy of science.
He began his epistemological work with "The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge" (unpublished immediately), and he gave a summary of it in the first edition of his "Logic". The two main problems of Popper's logic are those of induction and of demarcation. Induction is the first one, or the problem of Hume with the first objection of Kant, the second problem is concerning the separation between science and pseudo-science ( i.e. essentially metaphysics, marxism, and psychoanalysis). He realized later that it was the same problem.
So, since Bacon ("Novum Organum") until the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle (Carnap, Schlick, Wittgenstein), the scientific research was for Popper in a wrong way. In their scientific approach the authors of the Vienna Circle did adopt a criterion of meaning (and with verification) in order to divide the two sorts of propositions: scientifical versus metaphysical, to stay in the truth of science. For Popper, the scientific discovery is an unended process of trial and error, in testing hypothesis or theories, with the survival of the best ones through the means of the falsification or the refutation. It is an objective knowledge, but we can never speak of truth, we can only be confident in the theories (or conjectures) which have resisted to the strongest tests. It is a matter of "corroboration", with deductions, until a new theory is about to supersede the previous one (Newton, Einstein...).
Popper developed a new epistemology upon his logic of conjectures and refutations in scientific progress, he called it "critical rationalism", with free discussion between the scientists,(against empiricism and non-critical rationalism), and finally it led him up to an evolutionary theory of knowledge in philosophy of science.
8 of 10 people found the following review helpful
By Brian Flange
Format:Paperback
Read this book in conjunction with Popper's collection of essays 'Conjectures and Refutations' and you'll have acquired the best grounding in the philosophy of science that it's possible to achieve. Popper's account of scientific methodology begins from inverting the traditional inductivist method associated with (e.g.) Francis Bacon and emphasising instead the importance of science offering testable, quantitative conjectures that can be proven wrong through experiment and observation. Sounds simple enough in a nutshell but it's one of the few truly big ideas that philosophy of science has ever given us and it led Popper on to propose revolutionary (at least for philosophers) ideas about how science functions. I suspect Popper got closer than any other philosopher to capturing how science might actually work. One of the best things about Popperean philosophy of science is its thoroughgoing anti-authoritarianism - it's not who proposes a theory that determines whether or not it's scientific but rather how the theory may be tested. Ironically, the anti-methodological philosophies of science proposed by noted Popper critics like Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend lend themselves much more readily to authoritarian interpretations than Popper's falsificationism ever did. (Mark ye well, any postmodernist readers.) Perhaps contrary to popular belief (or caricature more like), Popper was pro-freedom, pro-intuition and pro-creativity in science - a refreshing set of beliefs. Granted, a lot has happened since Popper and I don't think Popper is beyond criticism - for example, he didn't really solve Hume's problem of induction and Darwinian natural selection is far more of a falsifiable theory than Popper seemed to realise - but then even Einstein isn't beyond criticism and Popper did do a heroic job of explaining and justifying scientific method. Now, what's the word for someone who achieves that kind of success again? Oh yes: "genius"; Karl Popper was (like it or not) a genius.
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5.0 out of 5 stars
A philosophical book for the working scientist
Most of the working scientists I've talked to know about falsification. Fewer have heard of Popper and most of those who have know him solely as Mr Falsification. Read more
Published 2 months ago by boggisbitesvampires
5.0 out of 5 stars
Philosophy Mathematical
Popper presents a rigorous examination of the subject scientific and how it should be appraised. Although I can't see how this will appeal to anyone who hates numbers and... Read more
Published on 29 Mar 2010 by demola
5.0 out of 5 stars
An antidote to modern techno babble
Popper's 'falsifiability' may not be the philosophical pinnacle of scientific understanding but is a wonderful guide when attempting to differentiate the `wheat from the chaff' in... Read more
Published on 25 Feb 2009 by Mark Le Sueur
5.0 out of 5 stars
The only philosopher book you'll ever need
With millions of trees being massacred to debate "philosophy of maths and/or science", this is the only worthwhile sacrifice. Read more
Published on 31 July 2008 by Danny of Arabia
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