This book is not so much an introduction to philosophy, as the sub-title claims, as an introduction to Humanism from a continental perspective. In the English-speaking world we are used to approaching Humanism (ie a world-view which dispenses with the supernatural, including gods, goddesses, life after death and holy books) from the viewpoint of British empiricism, with a strong Positivist orientation towards science and a dislike of metaphysical systems. Continental philosophy by contrast has been heavily influenced by Catholic theology, especially the system-building of Aquinas and the scholastics. That kind of philosophy typically starts from a set of axioms (eg God made man in his own image) and builds a system of thought from there, rather than depending upon experience and scientific research, which accumulates knowledge piecemeal. So it was interesting to see how Ferry could find a way through the works of typical continental philosophers, adapting some ideas and discarding others, to arrive at a Humanism which has much in common with its Anglophone counterparts.
Ferry's explorations of the philosophy of Nietzsche provide a case in point. The anti-religion and anti-Christian pronouncements of Nietzsche are well known, as is the link between his anti-democratic, amoral will-to-power and Nazi rhetoric. But Ferry digs deeply into Nietzsche's philosophy in order to show us not only the fatal flaws in his reasoning, but also the nuggets of truth which are embedded there, for example, that tragedy and heroism find their true meaning in a culture which abjures life after death and accepts that life ends in death. If Hamlet does not die at the end of the play, but carries on speechifying somewhere else, then the tragedy of the ending is lost. Tragedy only makes sense in a Humanist culture.
The end of the book, however, struck me as something of a regress to rationalist system-building again. Ferry is concerned to refute a reductive scientism which is totally materialist and determinist. He argues for mind, intentionality, free will and moral responsibility, as would most Humanists. But he does so with the help of Heidegger, which means a deal of intellectual fog gathers. I think that John Searle would have been a better guide in that territory. Searle keeps his feet on the ground and argues for the human dimension (mind, free will, etc) without using the jargon of old-style metaphysics.
Well worth reading, with a challenging conclusion.